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Preamble 
While collecting office building data on foot on August 16th 2011, the author’s activities 
were relayed to the City of London police by suspicious security at 99 Queen Victoria 
Street, at which point he was intercepted for search and questioning. In spite of the benign 
nature of his activities1 he was informed by the police that he only very narrowly escaped 
arrest by fortune of possessing in person an old letter addressed to him from LSE which 
corroborated his status as a research student. It is the author’s sincere wish that in future 
research students need not expose themselves to imprisonment and deportation in order to 
fulfil their degree requirements.  
                                                 
1
 Econometrics is mostly harmless (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and occasionally even helpful. 
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Figure 1: Stop and Search Record 
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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis develops three chapters which extend our understanding of asset performance 
within the London office market by analysing the determinants and measurement of capital 
returns. The first chapter examines whether enlisting the services of a star-architect allows 
developers to persuade city planners to build bigger within the tightly regulated London 
property market, and therefore to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. We find that outside 
protected conservation areas famous architects can not only build taller, but that their 
designs have no effect on building sale prices holding the amount of space constant. For a 
given land plot however, the ability to build taller increases total floorspace and developer 
profits even when accounting for the increased costs of hiring a famous architect and 
building to their higher standards. The second chapter investigates potential sources of bias 
in commercial repeat-sales price indices by constructing such an index for the central 
London office market and examining the sources of index change relative to the underlying 
market. We find evidence that employment density changes and the restrictiveness of new 
development in the relevant local authority are key external drivers of bias on estimated 
price levels. This discrepancy arises because repeat-sales occur disproportionately in areas 
where changes in these attributes differ relative to the stock as a whole. The third chapter 
presents a comparison of seven competing real estate price index construction 
methodologies in the London office market. This exercise sheds light on the history of 
London office market returns from 1998-2010, and the relative pros and cons of the major 
index construction methods utilized by research and industry. This comparison also reveals 
substantial differences between indices in the timing of market turning points and various 
descriptive statistics, and demonstrates that the hedonic model outperforms the repeat-sales 
index due to the greater inclusivity of sale observations.  
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Thesis Introduction 
In contrast to many other areas of the economy, research into commercial property is 
frequently hindered by the scarcity of large high quality datasets. As a result of this 
deficit, many questions germane to effective policy and economic efficiency remain 
poorly understood or altogether unanswered. In an effort to in part address these 
deficiencies, this thesis utilizes a unique dataset which combines primary data 
collection from office sites in London with secondary sale-transaction and building 
stock information from some of the most prominent property-data providers in 
London. 
 
 Data on the London office market is of particular interest because London is one of 
the world’s premier financial and business centres, and while liquid and attracting 
high-profile investors from around the world, its real estate market is surprisingly 
opaque. This lack of transparency has often been cited as a critical barrier to the 
wider acceptance of real estate assets within the institutional investment community. 
Moreover, London is one of the world’s most highly regulated land markets; with 
undevelopable encircling green belts, zoning and height restrictions, expensive and 
uncertain planning controls, and ubiquitous historic preservation. Therefore questions 
of political economy can not only be analysed with some diversity, but the answers to 
these questions are liable to have a direct and material impact on the welfare of some 
8 million citizens.  
 
This thesis aims to further our understanding of commercial real estate by analysing 
the drivers of capital returns in the London office market and the measurement issues 
which surround them. Asset performance is a crucial indicator for industry and 
precise and timely measurement is necessary for; benchmarking competition, 
transparency, revealing risk-adjusted profit opportunities, and efficient risk-sharing in 
derivatives markets. In the public sector, accurate price indices are an important 
bellwether for both central bank monetary policy and the assessment of market 
regulation. Furthermore, developing our understanding of real estate return drivers 
15 
 
may make it possible to formulate policy which can improve the operation of the 
market and better respond to unanticipated economic shocks. 
 
With these goals in mind, the first chapter of this thesis examines whether star 
architects are exceptionally allowed to build bigger office buildings in London, and 
therefore earn supernumerary returns on their land plots. Given that the extant 
literature has identified substantial economic rents generated by the strict land market 
regulations in force across London, this chapter extends the previous theoretical work 
of Krueger (1974) to test empirically whether famous architects are able to 
successfully engage in an aesthetic form of rent-seeking. Even though London 
currently sports some of the world’s most eccentric office building designs, the extent 
to which these designs and the famous architects who create them are able to 
influence the planning process has hitherto been unexplored. This research finds that 
outside protected conservation areas famous architects can not only build taller (by 20 
floors), but that their designs have no net effect upon the ultimate sale price per m2 of 
buildings. For a given land plot however, the ability to build tall increases developer 
profits (by approximately 100%) even when accounting for the increased design fees 
charged by famous architects and building to their generally higher standards.  
 
As such, famous architects are able to quite literally engage in rent-seeking by design. 
However, unlike the analysis of Krueger, for architecture on prominent public 
display, the competition for regulatory exemptions through design may generate 
social benefits in addition to the standard deadweight losses associated with 
competitive rent-seeking. The data used in this study also corroborates the previous 
findings of Cheshire and Hilber (2008) that the regulatory environment in London 
imposes substantial costs on the economic efficiency of the office market. However, 
the estimated magnitudes of these costs are notably smaller than those reported by 
Cheshire and Hilber, but it is likely that this discrepancy is due to categorical 
differences in the definition of building grades between the two papers, rather than 
mismeasured values. 
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The second chapter investigates potential sources of bias in repeat-sales price indices 
of commercial property by constructing such an index for the central London office 
market and examining the sources of index change relative to the market as a whole. 
Repeat-sales indices are essentially a fixed-effects modelling specification and 
therefore implicitly control for all constant building and locational characteristics 
when estimating price-levels. Since commercial property is relatively heterogeneous 
and often difficult to model explicitly, in recent years the repeat-sales method has 
grown in popularity and practice. However, because the repeat-sales method does not 
model locational characteristics explicitly, its validity is sensitive to external changes 
in the environment of sampled buildings that are not representative of the market as a 
whole. Although the problem of sample selection bias in repeat-sales has been well 
explored in the context of residential property, the literature has yet to examine the 
existence of bias in repeat-sales of commercial property or to empirically investigate 
the potential sources of bias in these indices. This section finds evidence for bias in a 
commercial repeat-sales index of London caused by employment density changes and 
the restrictiveness of new development in the governing local authority. This 
discrepancy arises because repeat-sales occur disproportionately in areas where 
changes in these price determinants differ systemically from the office stock as a 
whole.  
 
The third chapter analyses seven competing price index construction methodologies 
used by research and industry between 1998-2010 for office property in London. In 
so doing, the relative advantages and limitations of these different indices with 
respect to commercial real estate can be better understood, and greater light can be 
shed upon the actual price movements experienced by London office property over 
this turbulent period. The indices produced are; valuations, unsmoothed valuations, a 
sophisticated hedonic model, repeat-sales, transaction-linked indices, real estate 
securities, and stock market equities. A comparison of these indices finds substantial 
differences between the valuation and transaction-based indices primarily related to 
inertia and dampened price movements, especially during the pronounced market 
oscillations experienced in the latter half of the 2000s. In addition, we find that the 
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production of a hedonic time-series of commercial offices in London is not only 
feasible but likely to be superior to the more common method adopted by industry of 
repeat-sales. This result holds due to the reduction in effective sample size and the 
concomitant decrease in representativeness that occurs as a result of the need to 
exclude all property sales which do not occur in multiples over the study period. We 
can be confident in this result due to the introduction of a novel methodology for 
verifying the validity of our hedonic model: comparing the hedonic price index with a 
repeat-sales index consisting of the same sample of sales. With specific regard to 
repeat-sales, this paper finds that the 3SLS procedure conventionally used to correct 
for heteroskedasticity in housing is indistinguishable in commercial offices from an 
uncorrected OLS series.  
 
Other notable findings include the fact that, contrary to previous research, real estate 
securities in the UK follow the movements of London office property more closely 
than the stock market as a whole, the method of desmoothing valuations introduced 
by Geltner (1993b) produces a mixed analogue to actual transaction-based series 
which could perhaps be improved with better calibration of the desmoothing 
parameter, and that the relatively new transaction-linked index methodology is 
extremely similar to its underlying uncorrected valuation index.  Finally, this paper 
introduces an original fractional-time weighting procedure for repeat-sales that allows 
for simpler calculation of transformation-bias while maintaining a minimum of 
temporal aggregation bias. 
 
This thesis continues in paper-based format with the first chapter analysing rent-
seeking in the London office market through architectural design, followed by 
chapters on the sources of repeat-sales index bias in commercial office property, and 
then a comparison of commercial real estate index construction methodologies. The 
thesis then concludes with an overview of the results of these three research projects 
and suggests direction for future inquiry.  
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Chapter 1: License to build: rent-seeking by design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the conjecture first put forward by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) that 
city planners in London are willing to make special exemptions for developers to build 
larger and more expensive office buildings outside of conservation areas if they possess 
world-class design. Building development regulations in London are perhaps the most 
restrictive in the developed world, and enlisting a star-architect to persuade city planners to 
build bigger may be a profitable form of rent-seeking. This study confirms that famous 
architects are able to build bigger outside conservation areas because they can build taller. 
However the concession to build taller comes at the expense to the developer of increased 
construction and design costs, and results in a sale price per m2 no greater than a standard 
building of similar quality. On net however, the increase in lettable floorspace from 
building tall ‘overshadows’ the subsequent increase in costs, and star-architects are able to 
erect buildings on a given plot of land which are more profitable compared to buildings 
which lack an eminent designer.  
19 
 
Introduction 
“If you want to build a tall building, as long as you’ve got a world-class design and it is in 
one of two locations we will go along with it”2 
 
Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-08. 
 
London office towers make headlines worldwide with eccentric designs ranging from 
gherkins and cheese-graters to walkie-talkies and cans-of-ham. Although London has strict 
planning controls in place to monitor new and existing building developments, these 
restrictions are to a certain extent flexible and based on the discretion of local planners and 
politicians. The British use of the ‘development control’ mechanism to implement its 
planning system on a case by case basis, rather than a Master Plan or Zoning system, makes 
it possible in principle to obtain specific exceptions to these otherwise tight and binding 
regulations. Furthermore, there is now substantial evidence to suggest that supply 
restrictions across office (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008), retail (Cheshire et al, 2011) and 
residential (Hall et al, 1973; Evans, 1991; and Hilber and Vermeulen, 2010) property 
sectors in the United Kingdom are responsible for the creation of extensive market 
distortions, and these market distortions create the potential for savvy and organised 
market-actors to earn economic rents (Pennington, 2000). In a similar vein to Krueger’s 
(1974) seminal paper on the welfare implications of rent-seeking in the context of import 
licensing, the combination of semi-binding land-use controls and economic rents in London 
has meant that developers who can convince planning authorities to permit tall building 
designs can earn excess profits on their land investments. While the competition for such 
permits is by all accounts a deadweight social loss, unlike the case of Krueger, in the 
present context leveraging architectural design to exact special privileges may in fact lead 
to some ancillary social benefits in the form of better public architecture. This paper 
examines whether commercial office buildings in London designed and built by famous 
architects are able to exceptionally exploit the flexibility of the planning system in order to 
                                                 
2
 The Observer, October 1st 2006, “High Hopes: ‘London will soon have 18-20 skyscrapers’”. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/oct/01/politics.greaterlondonauthority1, accessed July 18th 2012. 
The two locations Ken Livingsone is likely referring to is the City of London and Canary Wharf. 
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build larger buildings on a given plot of land, and to sell buildings for more compared to 
offices which lack an accomplished designer.  
 
The London office market 
London is perhaps the world’s premier financial centre attracting both international office 
occupiers and investors3. Its office market is frequently ranked as the world’s most 
expensive and has one of the highest turnover rates in the world4: containing nearly 20 
million m2 of office space over 55 square kilometres. Although the geographic boundaries 
may differ slightly according to opinion, London is characterised by four main office 
submarkets. From West to East these are; the West-End, Mid-town, the City of London 
(City): centred around the Bank of England, and the modern business district of Canary 
Wharf (see Figure 2). The Canary Wharf and City office markets are predominantly 
tenanted by financial service firms, whereas the West End is distinguished by creative 
industries, hedge funds and private equity firms, and Mid-town is known for its legal, 
media and publishing tenants. Rents per m2 are highest in the West End. Mid-town office 
rents are some 20-30% lower than the West End, while rents in the City are some 15-20% 
lower, and rents in Canary Wharf are lower still. The West End is primarily administered 
by the City of Westminster, Mid-Town is divided between the City of Westminster, 
Camden Islington, and the City of London, the City of London submarket is predominately 
run by its namesake, and Canary Wharf is governed by Tower Hamlets (see Figure 3 and 
Figure 4). 
  
                                                 
3
 By value, only 34% of investments between 2007-2011 in the City of London office market were 
undertaken by UK-based investors, and over 50% of the office stock in the City of London is held by 
international investors (Lizieri, Reinhart, and Baum, 2011). 
4
 Total office turnover Q1 2007-Q2 2012; London US$163bn, Tokyo US$168bn, and New York US$180bn, 
source: Real Capital Analytics. 
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Figure 2: London Submarkets according to Estates Gazette 
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Figure 3: Central London submarket and Local Planning Authority boundaries 
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The history of building height regulation in London 
There exists two layers of building size regulations in London, the first is building control 
which is statutory and fixed5, the second is planning control which is a matter of policy and 
therefore more flexible. The modern history of building size regulation in London begins 
with the London Council Act of 1890, which set a statutory limit of 27m plus two-storeys 
in the roof (Inwood, 2005). This was shortly followed by the London Building Act of 1894, 
which restricted maximum building height to 24m to the roof cornice, with an additional 
6m allowed for a recessed roof (Simon, 1996). These height limits were billed as a matter 
of safety, as the London fire brigade did not have ladders long enough to reach 
exceptionally tall buildings6. These restrictions came right at the time that building very tall 
became not only possible technologically due the introduction of steel skeletons in the 
1880s, but also profitable because of the arrival of passenger lifts (Turvey, 1998). As a 
result of the statutory height restrictions London produced no buildings which could be 
termed ‘skyscrapers’ throughout the first half of the 20th century7, though at that time many 
such structures were rising elsewhere across the industrialized world.  
 
In addition to this statutory limit, further height restrictions were imposed in 1938 which 
specially protected views of St Paul’s Cathedral and the Monument from obstruction by 
new development in their vicinity. Although initially these protected sightlines were merely 
a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ among City developers, they were remarkably effective until 
such time as they were incorporated more formally into the City of London’s development 
plan. The current extent of the protected sightlines are broadly consist with their original 
1938 manifestation, though they were extended in 1989 to include some Northern views of 
St Paul’s dome (City of London, 2007). 
 
                                                 
5
 However special dispensations were exceptionally given to build in excess of statutory height limits, such as 
the 19-floor University of London Senate House built in 1937 and designed by Charles Holden: winner of the 
1936 Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) Gold Medal. 
6
 Although legend has it that Queen Victoria balked at the construction of tall buildings after the construction 
of the 12-storey Queen Anne’s Mansions in 1873 blocked her view of parliament from Buckingham Palace. 
At the time of construction this was the tallest residential building in Britain. 
7
 Turvey (1998) notes however that even with the widespread use of lifts it took several decades for a 
significant proportion of new buildings in the City of London to begin approaching the statutory maximum 
height.  
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However outside of these protected sight-lines, the statutory limit was finally rescinded by 
the London County Council (LCC) in 1956 due to the advent of fire-lifts, at which point the 
London County Council Plan of 1951 was the next highest layer of binding building size 
regulation. Although the regulations contained therein did not control height per se, it did 
control building height indirectly through allowable plot-ratios8 and minimum angles from 
the opposite pavement to the building’s cornice (usually 56°)9. The plot-ratio restrictions 
varied according to location. For most areas in London the maximum allowable plot-ratio 
was 5:1, for central areas of the City close to the Bank of England the permitted ratio was 
5½:1, for other areas deemed sensitive to increased density the restriction was set at 2:1 
(City of London, 2010). Although originally intended to be maxima in theory, these plot-
ratios came to be regarded as minima in practice. For instance, loopholes in planning law 
such as the notorious Schedule 3 of the Town & Country Planning Act of 1947 allowed 
existing buildings to be redeveloped with 10% greater cubic capacity than the building 
which preceded it. Since old buildings have higher ceilings, thicker and more numerous 
walls, larger passages and the like, the rentable floorspace of such redeveloped structures 
could be increased considerably10. The removal of the statutory height limit in 1956 
ushered forth a boom in the construction of tall buildings in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
which finally saw Christopher Wren’s new St Paul’s Cathedral dethroned as the tallest 
structure in London after a reign of over 250 years11.  
 
The LCC remained in charge of planning control until it was superseded by the Greater 
London Council (GLC) in 1965, at which point planning control was partly devolved to the 
local boroughs12. With the dissolution of the LCC, local boroughs initially maintained the 
old-LCC plot-ratio restrictions in force until such time as they produced new regulations of 
their own. In addition, in 1976 the GLC produced the Greater London Development Plan 
                                                 
8
 The ratio of total building floorspace to total land-plot area: effectively a control on height. 
9
 This restriction was enforced to ensure that a certain amount of daylight filtered onto workers’ desks 
(Marriott, 1989, pp. 30). 
10
 This regulation can explain for instance the disproportionate size of the 21-storey New Scotland Yard at 10 
Broadway in the West End, built at an effective plot-ratio of 7:1 in spite of the fact that the maximum plot-
ratio supposedly allowed by the LCC at that site was 3½:1 (Marriott 1989, pp. 171). 
11
 The offending building was the BT Tower, see Table 4. 
12
 However the GLC was still obliged to grant approval to all buildings in excess of 49m, until 1980. 
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which continued plot-ratio controls at the central-level. These planning controls existed 
concurrently with the plot-ratio restrictions set by the local boroughs until the GLC was 
finally abolished in 1986 and the Secretary of State for the Environment’s Strategic 
Planning Guidance for London 1989 and the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 were 
published. These policy changes extended the power of local authorities to adopt their own 
development plans without direct permission from the Secretary of State (Pennington, 
2000). In the case of the City of London, new development plans were implemented for 
local areas piecemeal, beginning with Smithfield in 1981 and continuing until 1989. Each 
local area plan contained distinct plot-ratios, and in the City of London these were used to 
guide new development until the publication of their Unitary Development Plan in 1994, at 
which point plot-ratios were removed in favour of the predominately discretionary system 
of planning controls seen across the City of London today (City of London, 2010).  
 
At present London lacks a statutory height ceiling and local planning officials, “enjoy a 
considerable degree of discretion over the formulation of plans and the granting of 
individual planning permissions” (Pennington 2000, p.29). Though additionally, all 
buildings over 30m high must also receive central permission from the Mayor’s Office13 
and buildings over 90m in height within the zone east of millennium bridge must be 
consulted with the London City Airport (City of London, 2010). Since the Greater London 
Authority Act 2007 the Mayor of London has also had executive power to overrule local 
councils and determine planning decisions unilaterally on any project which the mayor 
deems to be of strategic importance to London (Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government, 2008). A final layer of control rests with the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, who retains the right to overturn the decisions of local planning authorities 
through the national appeals system (Pennington, 2000). 
  
                                                 
13These restrictions do not apply to the City of London and areas adjacent to the Thames. In the City of 
London the mayor must approve buildings exceeding 150m, while buildings adjacent to the Thames must be 
approved by the mayor if they exceed 25m in height (City of London, 2010). 
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Historic designation 
London has two regulatory designations for the protected status of buildings which apply to 
our sample; buildings located within a conservation area and listed buildings. Both 
buildings located within a conservation area and listed buildings cannot be altered 
externally without special planning consent that is rarely granted. Furthermore listed status 
buildings also cannot be altered internally without such consent. For failing to repair and 
maintain a listed building properly, owners may face criminal prosecution and the local 
council can compulsorily expropriate the building and recover repair costs from the owner. 
If a new building were to be built in a conservation area, it would automatically be given 
conservation status on account of the fact that it is located in such an area. On the other 
hand, listed status is given after a building is built, and therefore this designation cannot 
influence allowable building specifications at the development stage. 
 
Conservation areas were first introduced to the United Kingdom with the Civic Amenities 
Act of 1967. This act made it the local planning authorities’ duty to identify and preserve or 
enhance areas of special architectural and historic interest. Before this legislation, historic 
protection was based solely on individual buildings rather than areas as a whole. The 
provisions of the 1967 Act were incorporated into the Town and Country Planning Act 
1971, which has now been superseded by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the 
Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. The consequence of these 
regulations is that buildings located in conservation areas are subject to additional 
restrictions and more extensive planning controls. The City of London, for instance, an area 
where building tall is possible, expressly forbids the development of tall buildings in 
conservation areas14 (City of London, 2002). In central London roughly half of the total 
land area has been designated as a conservation area15. 
 
                                                 
14
 The most notable modern exception to this rule was the 16-storey New Court Building at 4-7 St Swithin’s 
Lane completed in 2010, and designed by Pritzger-Prize and RIBA Royal Gold Medal-winning architect Rem 
Koolhas. Although located in the Bank conservation area and deemed detrimental to the area’s architectural 
character, the City of London felt that the New Court building was an “exceptional piece of architecture” and 
that allowing Rothschild’s Bank to consolidate its staff into this location was key to maintaining the City’s 
position as a leading financial centre (City of London 2010, p. 35).  
15
 See Table 6 below. 
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Although a limited number of historic structures were given protected status starting with 
the Ancient Monuments Protection Act of 1882, it wasn’t until after the Second World War 
that buildings were protected under listing due to architectural merit alone. The reason for 
this change was to distinguish between which buildings would and would not be allowed to 
be rebuilt as a result of damage caused by German air-raid bombings. The current listing 
practice began with the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. Generally, buildings under 
30 years old are not listed unless deemed to be of outstanding quality and under threat, and 
buildings under 10 years old are not listed (Creigh-Tyte, 1998). At present there are 19,198 
listed buildings and structures in Greater London. 
 
The planning process 
In the City of London the process of development control for new buildings generally 
begins with pre-application meetings and proceeds by undertaking assessments of the 
various envisioned impacts of the new structure deemed important. These assessments may 
include but are not limited to; viewing corridors, historical designation, effects on 
surrounding local character, congestion, light-blocking, wind-corridor effects, the effect on 
commercial and political interests in promotion of the financial ‘cluster’ located in the City, 
and of course architectural design16. This process involves reciprocal negotiation between 
the interests of the developers and the preferences of the City planners, with concessions 
generally meted out from both sides. As a rule however, buildings within conservation 
areas and strategic viewing corridors are not allowed to build taller than surrounding 
structures. Outside of these areas there may be considerable room for compromise. The 
assessment and negotiation process usually lasts a couple of years before a formal 
application is submitted, at which point it may still be rejected. 
 
                                                 
16As a comparison, for the recent large-scale office known as Columbus Tower (see Table 5), the Tower 
Hamlets council called upon the developers to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIA) covering 
the following issues; Demolition and construction, Alternatives and design evolution, Sustainability, Socio-
economics, Traffic and transport, Air quality, Noise and vibration, Ground conditions, Water resources and 
flood risk, Wind, Daylight, sunlight, overshadowing, light-spillage and solar glare, Archaeology, Ecology, TV 
and radio interference, Aviation, and Conservation, townscape and visual impacts (Commercial Estates 
Group, 2008). 
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Central to determining the social value of a proposed building is its design quality and 
height17. While design quality presents an unambiguous benefit to the surrounding area, the 
net benefits of building height are ambiguous, on the one hand bringing economic 
efficiency, higher employment densities, and possible prestige, but on the other potentially 
adversely altering the skyline, casting large shadows, increasing local congestion, and 
creating wind-tunnel effects18. As a result of these potentially negative consequences tall 
buildings face greater scrutiny at all planning stages, and are usually required to make 
substantial section 106 contributions to the local community and infrastructure19. However, 
local city planners in London do have an official mandate to promote and preserve the built 
environment, and architectural quality and iconic design are often cited as the main 
contributors to the success of planning applications20.  
 
With these trade-offs in mind, it is plausible that a tall building which might otherwise be 
rejected by the planning commission could be approved if it additionally offered the 
surrounding areas views of world-class design. However assessment of the architectural 
merit of new development is by its very nature both subjective and speculative. For 
instance, in judging good design the City of Westminster calls its city planners to; 
 
[H]ave regard to such matters as height, bulk, massing, relationship to 
existing building lines, and historic plot widths. The scale, proportions, 
vertical and horizontal emphases, solid-to-void ratios of the facades, the 
richness of detailing and modelling… and the light and shade this gives to 
the façade. (City of Westminster, 2004, p.17). 
 
                                                 
17See ‘Appendix A: Policy on the location and design of tall and large buildings’ for the Mayor’s official 
policy regarding tall and large buildings. 
18
 The wind-tunnel effect is more formally known as a ‘rolling eddy’ and is caused by tall ‘slab’ buildings. 
Notorious examples include the Merrion Centre in Leeds opened in 1963 and the Croydon Centre in Croydon, 
Greater London. The problem was dealt with in both cases by securing a roof above the affected area to 
protect pedestrians. In London this phenomenon can also be observed at Shell Tower on the Southbank, at the 
Elephant & Castle, and by the Stag Brewery development in Victoria (Marriott 1989, pp. 244-5). 
19
 Usually amounting to around 2% of total building construction costs. 
20
 The importance of good design in planning permission is explicitly recognised in Planning Policy 
Statement 1 from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2005). This policy stance is additionally 
reinforced by the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) and English Heritage. 
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Clearly substantial architectural training and experience would be required in order to 
evaluate proposed developments along these aesthetic criteria with any competence. On the 
main, planners do not possess such training and/or cannot quantify all the relevant trade-
offs inherent in a given development decision. Therefore, to a considerable degree planners 
must rely instead upon their own value judgments (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004).  Due to 
the inherent uncertainty, difficulty, and subjectivity involved with assessing the aesthetic 
impacts of a building, particularly in the case of new developments, architectural fame may 
provide one of the few ‘concrete’ signals of design quality available to planners. As such it 
is plausible that planners pay particular attention to the reputation of architects, and afford 
preferential treatment in the planning process to buildings designed by prominent architects 
regardless of actual design. 
 
Political incentives 
While it is clear that, as profit maximisers, developers will wish to keep building taller so 
long as each additional floor contributes more to final sale prices than it subtracts in costs, 
it is not necessarily obvious what incentives the planners and politicians on the other hand 
face for permitting exceptionally tall buildings. As mentioned in the previous section, there 
are direct benefits and positive externalities arising from the economic efficiencies and 
higher employment densities that tall buildings make possible. Although it might be 
seductive to imagine that politicians would strive to tap all potential founts of additional 
public welfare, as public choice theory instructs us, this need not be the case (Olson, 1965). 
For example, the report of a Committee of Inquiry into the Greater London Development 
Plan in 1973 commented that it did not accept the statement that, “the improvement of 
London depends on the Londoner’s well-being” (Foster and Whitehead, 1973)21. Therefore, 
it cannot be naively assumed that the mere existence of potential social benefits is sufficient 
for political action. Rather the direction of policy is necessarily dictated by political 
incentives, which may or may not be aligned with economic ones. 
 
                                                 
21
 This point was taken from Evans (2004, p.9). 
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One potential source of these political incentives is increased government revenues. At the 
municipal level, local authorities and the mayor’s office have limited scope for increasing 
revenue collection and lack fiscal independence due to heavy reliance on the national 
government for funding (Sweeting, 2003; Travers, 2004, Gordon, 2006). However, Section 
106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows local governments to extract 
substantial concessions from developers in exchange for granting planning permission22. 
Although used for all manner of social initiatives, these appeasements have been most 
notably used for the financing of large-scale infrastructure improvements. For instance, the 
mayor recently invoked his veto privilege to permit the construction of Columbus Tower in 
view of the contribution this project was slated to make to the London Crossrail project23. 
Uniquely, the City of London also has special permission from the central government to 
retain a small percentage of the revenues it generates from commercial property taxes. 
Therefore, the City of London in particular has a special interest in allowing developments 
which will increase the commercial rents charged under its purview. 
 
A further political impetus for building tall in London may rest in the maintenance of a 
vibrant business community. It is certainly the case that many top financial firms prefer 
among other things; the consolidation of office functions in a single building, large 
floorplates, and fiber optic cabling. Buildings which cannot be so retrofitted are for all 
practical purposes indefinitely obsolete. Therefore the acceptance of new buildings and in 
particular tall buildings is a way for politicians to promote the continued vibrancy of their 
business community, and perhaps secure campaign contributions for re-election. Modern 
physical characteristics aside, tall buildings built by famous architects may also add an aura 
of prestige to cities which may attract businesses to London and business to London 
businesses. The London Docklands Development Corporation24 and the City of London in 
particular see a large part of their remit as developing and maintaining the financial clusters 
within their borders, and recognise that investments in state-of-the-art office buildings are 
                                                 
22
 Naturally, the very existence of ‘planning gain’ to begin with is a red flag that there are economic rents to 
be had from flexing these regulations.  
23
 See Table 5. 
24
 Now disbanded but originally responsible for the creation of the Canary Wharf business cluster. 
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crucial for London’s international business reputation. For instance both Rothschild’s Bank 
and the insurer Swiss RE considered vacating the City of London if their controversial New 
Court25 and 30 St Mary Axe26 buildings, respectively, were not granted planning 
permission in a timely fashion (Sudjic, 2001; City of London, 2010).  
 
The goal of promoting financial clusters could also explain why tall modern buildings in 
London are almost exclusively designed as office space. Although there is nothing which 
overtly prohibits developers from enlisting famous architects to flex height regulations for a 
tall apartment building, acceptable locations to build high outside of conservation areas and 
protected sightlines in central London are relatively scarce. And since the economic spill-
over benefits and added commercial caché of an office as opposed to a residential building 
are likely greater, business-conscious local authorities such as the City of London and the 
Docklands may discriminate in favour of tall building applications for offices. 
 
Pecuniary interests aside, there is also a cogent argument to be made that iconic 
architecture becomes a tourist attraction in own right, providing direct benefits to the local 
hospitality industry. By way of example, there is no doubt that Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim 
museum in Bilbao or the Sydney Opera House by Jorn Utzon have increased the appeal of 
these cities to tourists, to say nothing of the aesthetic value these structures may confer on 
their citizens (Plaza, 2000; Evans, 2003)27. Making grand architectural statements per se 
may also be a direct goal of politicians regardless of any attendant commercial effects. 
History is filled with examples of political leaders who are either directly or indirectly 
responsible for the erection of monumental architecture (often for personal glory), and 
London may be no exception. In addition to the structure itself, politicians may also 
appreciate the positive association they gain by dint of having collaborated with famous 
architects. Of course, championing new architectural landmarks in this way also carries 
significant political and reputational risk. Particularly for tall buildings, which, if critically 
                                                 
25
 At 20 St Swithin’s Lane. 
26
 See Table 2. 
27
 The benefits of tourist attractions however suffer from the fallacy of composition, not all cities can increase 
tourism, or if they can they collectively also reduce their effective workforce. 
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received, are on view for the entire voting population for likely the remainder of their 
political career28. 
 
Perhaps the most cynical view is that politicians and planners are motivated to expedite the 
applications of famous architect buildings (tall and squat alike) merely in order to expand 
their regulatory empire. Buildings protected from refurbishment and demolition require 
additional staff to monitor status and approve changes. Thus, by increasing the number of 
buildings which are under their purview, politicians can both preserve favoured jobs and 
expand the number of subordinates in their employ. However, in London this causal chain 
would not be quite so direct, as any building built by a famous architect would, like other 
protected structures, take 30 or more years to attain listed status. If however additional staff 
are required to assess hopeful tall building applications or to monitor various aspects of 
these buildings prior to listing, then the empire expansion argument could still hold.  
 
On this point of regulatory expansion, Glaeser (2011) suggests that due to the costs 
involved with protecting buildings and the concomitant productivity losses which arise due 
to the prohibition of all future redevelopment, the number of buildings granted protected 
status in any given city should be capped. Therefore, according to Glaeser’s proposal, in 
order to put an additional building on the protected roster, a less significant structure would 
have to be likewise removed. Without such limits the implicit goal of historic conservation 
groups is evidently to create a city where all physical structures therein remain utterly 
sacrosanct and new development is impossible. Such a situation would of course be 
catastrophic for any such economy, and with more than half of all buildings in central 
London granted either listed or conservation status, we are currently not so far removed 
from this hypothetical world. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 It is perhaps ironic however how nearly every structure in the world which is critically condemned upon 
completion eventually becomes a treasured and protected centrepiece of the cityscape. In London, Christopher 
Wren’s new St Paul’s Cathedral and the now listed Centrepoint building by Richard Seifert at 103 Oxford 
Street (see  Table 3) are prime examples. Perhaps familiarity is all that’s really needed to turn the staunchest 
critics into doctrinaire acolytes. 
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Interest groups 
Although developers can be expected to oppose size restrictions being enforced upon their 
own designs, it could also be argued that, on the whole, they may prefer the present semi-
binding height restrictions to a world of laissez-faire. Entrenched developers with 
specialized (and costly) local and procedural knowledge will outcompete new entrants that 
lack resources to surmount these obstacles. These entry barriers serve to reduce competition 
and likely raise the return to development activity in London in general.  Developers may 
therefore support political candidates who are favourably inclined to the current regulatory 
barriers.  
 
Property investors as well have no less of a vested interest in the current regulatory regime. 
Naturally, any investor who currently holds property in London would be subject to a large 
capital loss should development regulations be relaxed in any meaningful way (Cheshire, 
2005). It is also possible that new investors may prefer markets with potential for both real 
rental and capital growth, and since such growth is more likely to occur in heavily supply 
restricted markets, investors may support development regulations as well. A counterpoint 
however is that, at least in housing markets, supply restrictions may add to the volatility of 
returns, which deters investment (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008). Since stable supply in 
face of demand shocks means unstable (but possibly growing) prices, it is not immediately 
clear whether new investors to the London market prefer regulatory barriers or not. 
Incumbent investors on the other hand would almost universally prefer the maintenance and 
indeed the expansion of development restrictions. 
Literature Review 
Although this paper may be among the first formal investigations into the question of 
whether city-planners allow famous architects to build bigger, a body of related literature 
exists which examines the influence of good architecture and building taller on sale prices. 
While good architecture may provide benefits to both internal and external parties, only 
internal benefits should be reflected in sale-prices. Among the first studies into the effect of 
good architecture on office properties is the work of Hough and Kratz (1983). In their 
hedonic estimation of rental rates in Chicago they find that tenants pay premiums of 22% 
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for ‘good’ architecture, but only if the building is also ‘new’. Hough and Kratz attribute this 
discrepancy to the fact that the dummy variable they used to indicate ‘good’ architecture 
prior to 1930 was simply an indicator for those buildings which had also been marked for 
conservation, and were therefore subject to abridged property rights on top of the 
architectural benefits they were attempting to isolate.  
 
Later work by Asabere and Huffman (1991) confirms the apparent tension evident in 
Hough and Kratz between the positive influence of good architecture on the one hand, and 
the ostensibly negative influence of historic designation on property rights on the other, by 
failing to find a net premium on landmarked commercial and industrial properties. Vandell 
and Lane (1989) on the other hand produce a measure of architectural quality independent 
of historic status and find similar rental premiums for good architecture as Hough and Kratz 
do for good and new architecture. A more recent study by Fuerst et al (2011) examined the 
effect of ‘signature’ architects; defined as winners of the Pritzger Prize or American 
Institute of Architects Gold Medal, on US offices and concluded that these buildings 
yielded a rental premium of 5-7% and a sale price gain of 17%. However their sale price 
gain disappeared when they reran the model with a sample of counterfactuals statistically 
chosen to be similar to their famous architect buildings, and their sample choice of 
signature architects was heavily weighted towards a single architectural firm whose 
inclusion was questionable. The rent results were also sensitive to this new comparison and 
to the definition of their treatment group (i.e. signature architect). 
 
In addition to internal price effects, good architecture may also confer important 
externalities. Although the literature abounds with studies on the positive spill-over effects 
of good architecture on residential property29, the author was unable to locate any such 
studies examining office buildings explicitly. It may therefore be the case that any such 
positive effects are small or simply too difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, for 
                                                 
29
 See for instance Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010) and Noonan and Krupka (2011). 
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commercial property in particular, the putative benefits of good architecture are unlikely to 
be universally viewed as such30.  
 
Although the literature lacks studies on the positive externalities of good office 
architecture, Thibodeau (1990) documents the negative externality associated with high-rise 
office construction near residential properties. He estimates that these non-conforming 
structures exact as much as a 15% discount on neighbouring homes, whereas houses more 
than 1,000m away enjoyed a 5% price premium. Since the number of houses in a 
residential neighbourhood roughly increases as the square of distance31, the net effect of the 
externalities observed by Thibodeau increased total housing values in the vicinity by 1%. In 
a similar vein, tall modern office buildings in London may represent a non-conforming use 
to the surrounding low-rise period structures in the same way that Thibodeau found for 
high-office buildings on residential property. 
 
As opposed to the variable effect of good architecture on sale prices outlined above, 
building height exhibits an unambiguously positive influence on building price other things 
equal. Of course, building higher allows developers to build more total floorspace on a 
given land area. But even controlling for the amount of floorspace, higher floors also tend 
to be more valuable than those below32. The reasons given for the price advantages of 
building higher are often cited as greater prestige, productivity increases associated with 
greater intra-building face-to-face contact, and better views. To gain perspective on the 
magnitudes involved, one of the most recent studies by Koster, Ommeren, and Rietveld 
(2011) used the presence and height of pre-WWII buildings as an instrument to show that 
office rents increase by 4% for every 10m height increase in the building, and that prestige 
effects account for 17.5% of the total rents paid for buildings six-times the average height 
in Holland. 
 
                                                 
30
 For instance the London Shard built by famed architect Renzo Piano has been criticized by English 
Heritage and UNESCO. 
31
 πr2, assuming uniform average residential plot areas. 
32
 For instance see Colwell et al. (1998) for the effect of height on transaction prices, and for the effect on 
rents see Bollinger et al (1998) and Frew and Jud (1988). 
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Looking at the profit-maximising height of new office developments, Helsley and Strange 
(2008) argue that agglomeration economies and economies of scale are insufficient to 
explain the extreme stature of many of the world’s tallest skyscrapers. They posit that there 
is a valuable reputation effect for being the tallest building, and that developers compete to 
attain this recognition. The consequence of their game theoretic model is a stock of office 
buildings that are taller than profit-maximisation would imply. Although Helsley and 
Strange only cite historical anecdotes to underpin their theoretical model, Barr (2012) 
empirically tests the incidence of office overbuilding historically in New York, and indeed 
finds that developers have engaged in profit-dissipating height competition. In contrast to 
offices however, other research by Chau et al (2007) did not find a significant disparity 
between the theoretical profit maximising height of residential high-rises in Hong Kong and 
their actual heights. It may therefore be the case that benefits outside the normal calculus of 
project-development profits accrue more readily to firms than individuals from being 
associated with an exceptionally tall building. 
 
With regard to political incentives and disincentives to build taller in London, Cheshire and 
Hilber (2008) discuss some pertinent differences in the political forces at work in the 
administrative boroughs which divide London. In their paper on office supply restrictions 
in Britain they provide evidence that the peculiar tax structure of the City of London33 and 
the fact that the it is run by the local business community and its interests, has incentivized 
the City to relax office space supply restrictions and encourage new development relative to 
other boroughs. Cheshire and Hilber also suggested that ‘trophy’ architects might help 
developers to bend these lax rules even further. Similarly, they argue that since political 
control of the Docklands is also held by the London Docklands Development Corporation 
and not the voting population, the Docklands has quelled ‘NIMBY34’ interests in favour of 
high-rise commercial space and economic growth. Conversely other areas of London, in 
particular the West End, have much stronger planning protection and height restrictions that 
                                                 
33
 Wherein the City of London is uniquely allowed to levy an additional business rates tax (tax on commercial 
property rents) and retain the revenues so generated, rather than have all revenues pooled at the central 
government level and reallocated to local authorities by formula grant. 
34
 “Not In My BackYard”, an acronym for political actors opposed to new development. 
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are practically impossible to breach, and as a result a less malleable office stock and higher 
building price to construction-cost ratios. Moreover, at a glance it is apparent that the West 
End of London has nearly no tall buildings35, while both the City of London and Canary 
Wharf (Docklands) exhibit the only clusters of tall buildings in London. 
 
This paper continues with an overview of the data collection methodology and how 
variables were constructed from this data. It then applies this data to test the  hypotheses 
that; (i) famous architects are allowed to build bigger outside conservation areas, (ii) if this 
is indeed because they can build taller, and (iii) whether building bigger allows famous 
architects to erect buildings which sell for more on a given quantity of land. Finally the 
paper concludes with a discussion of these results. 
Data 
Building Sample 
Data on office building characteristics and sale prices were acquired from Estates Gazette 
(EG) and Real Capital Analytics (RCA). Combined, the EG and RCA data sum to 2,932 
unique sale instances in central and outer London between 1998 and 2011. This dataset was 
then culled with the following methodology.  
 
1. Removed non-central36 London buildings, as defined by EG and RCA. There were 
less than 100 such observations and this was done in order to make data collection 
more manageable and preserve the study focus.  
2. Removed all portfolio sales, as there is no way to correctly allocate portions of the 
composite sale price to each sold building. 
3. Removed all buildings whose primary use was not office space. 
4. Removed all sales of buildings which had been rebuilt, refurbished, or otherwise 
altered since last transacted. This was done to ensure that each building when 
visited was essentially identical to the building which had been sold. 
                                                 
35
 Notable exceptions include the 37-storey BT Tower at 60 Cleveland Street commissioned by the 
Government General Post Office to support microwave aerial antennae for telecommunications and the 33-
storey Centre Point at 103 New Oxford Street which was exceptionally granted planning permission in 
exchange for land concessions of the surrounding area to the LCC for road improvements (Marriott, 1989, 
pp.114). 
36
 The EG and RCA ‘Central London’ boundaries actually correspond more closely to the standard definition 
for inner London which comprises the 11 central boroughs, than the standard definition for central London 
which only includes the West End, Midtown and City submarkets.  
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5. Removed sales which lacked any required data needed for the hedonic estimation. 
6. Removed sales which occurred less than 12 months after the previous sale37. 
 
This data was then supplemented with information collected from on-site-visits to the 
remaining 575 properties in the sample between July and September 2011, and internet 
research between October 2011 and Jan 2012. Required hedonic data was successfully 
collected on all characteristics for 387 properties which covered a total of 513 sales (126 
repeat-sales).  
 
Famous Architect 
Central to the question of this paper is the definition of what constitutes a famous architect. 
Although architectural excellence is necessarily a subjective judgment, there is 
considerable consensus within the architectural community that awards from the Royal 
Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the American Institute of Architects (AIA), and the 
Pritzker Prize are the most prestigious. Among the awards conferred by these bodies, the 
RIBA Royal Gold Medal, AIA Gold Medal, and the Pritzger Prize are the most esteemed as 
they are given annually for a lifetime body of work. Buildings which have been built by 
architects which have won an award from any of these three bodies are considered to be 
famous architects for the purposes of this study38. Given the exclusivity of these awards the 
number of potential candidates and buildings are limited. The architects who fall into this 
list and whose buildings were successfully surveyed consist of Cesar Pelli, Norman Foster, 
Terry Farrell, Aston Webb, Edward Lutyens, and Joseph Emberton consisting of ten 
buildings39,40. Four of these buildings are located outside of a conservation area, and each 
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 These so called ‘flips’ may have a distorting effect on price indices (Clapp and Giacotto, 1999), and the 
hedonic model F-statistics tested here improved markedly with their exclusion. 
38
 Cesar Pelli, Norman Foster, Terry Farrell, and Edward Lutyens built each of their buildings in the sample 
after winning one of these architectural awards. Sir Aston Webb’s 23 Austin Friars was constructed before the 
imposition of height controls, and Edward Lutyens Banking Hall and Lutyens House and Joseph Emberton’s 
Summit House  were constructed during the period of statutory height controls. 
39The architect Richard Seifert’s notoriously tall Centre Point building at 103 New Oxford Street is included 
in the sample of 387 buildings. But because Richard Seifert did not win any of the architectural awards 
recognized here, he is not considered a famous architect by this study. In fact it could be argued that he is 
famous in London precisely because of his ability to exploit loopholes in planning law to build tall, rather 
than through any particular design skill. Marriott (1989) even remarks that, “The trouble with Seifert…was 
that he knew some of the regulations far better than the LCC itself”, pp.32. 
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of these was either designed by Cesar Pelli, Norman Foster or Terry Farrell (see Table 2 
below). We define ‘modern’ buildings as those buildings built after the retraction of 
statutory height restrictions in 1956, and ‘pre-modern’ as buildings built before. As we can 
see from Table 2 below there is in fact a 54 year gap between the completion dates of the 
closest modern and pre-modern famous architect buildings in our sample. Sales of the 6 
modern famous architect buildings were observed a total of 10 times, and sales of the 4 pre-
modern famous architect buildings were observed 6 times41. 
 
Table 1: Famous architect and awards 
Architect Awards Won Year Awarded 
Cesar Pelli AIA Gold Medal 1995 
Norman Foster Pritzker Prize, RIBA Royal Gold Medal, AIA Gold Medal 1983-1999 
Terry Farrell RIBA Award, AIA Award 1978-2010 
Edward Lutyens RIBA Royal Gold Medal 1921 
Aston Webb RIBA Royal Gold Medal 1905 
Joseph Emberton RIBA Award 1930 
 
The validity of using awards from these three bodies as indicators of architectural fame is 
potentially reinforced by noting that all of the four buildings in our sample built by pre-
modern famous architects have been listed by the Historic Buildings and Monuments 
Commission for England for possessing special architectural or historical interest; 
assuming of course that these buildings are not listed ipso facto of being built by a 
prominent architect. All modern buildings in the sample, on the other hand, are not yet 
eligible for listing as buildings as they are under 30 years of age (see Historic designation 
above). All pre-modern buildings built by famous architects are also located in 
conservation areas. Although it can be noted from Table 2 that the two tallest buildings in 
the sample were built by architects that this paper regards as famous, the criterion used by 
this paper for being deemed a famous architect was chosen blind of the data. 
 
A caveat to bear in mind with our famous architect metric is that it does not directly test for 
good architecture, but rather asks the simpler and more objective question of whether a 
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 The tallest building in Europe, the London Bridge ‘Shard’ designed by Pritzker-Prize, RIBA Royal Gold 
Medal, and AIA Gold Medal-winning architect Renzo Piano is not part of the sample, see Table 4. 
41
 See ‘Appendix C: Descriptive statistics’ for a detailed breakdown. 
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building’s architect has been recognized for excellence by the most prestigious 
architectural-bodies. This simplification comes at a cost however. Although plausible, it 
may not be a valid inference to say that the particular buildings built by famous architects 
in this sample are also examples of good architecture. To be sure that this is the case would 
require independent evaluation of each building’s actual architectural merits, ideally by a 
panel of experts. However, for the purpose of assessing the impact of mere architectural 
fame on the willingness of planners and politicians to allow extra building height at the 
application stage, this metric is sufficient. 
 
The following four Tables describe (i) the Famous architect office buildings in the sample. 
(ii) Tallest non-famous-architect office buildings in the sample, (iii) Tallest London office 
buildings not in the sample, and (iv) Tallest London office buildings not yet completed but 
with planning permission. Unsurprisingly, a notable feature of existing modern and 
permitted tall office buildings in London is the preponderance of buildings designed by 
famous architects. Furthermore, only one of these ‘tall’ office buildings in our sample (14-
storey 12 Throgmorton Avenue) was built while in an active conservation area42. 
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 The predecessor to the current Drapers Gardens building was actually 28-storeys tall and only allowed 
because the architect (Richard Seifert) invoked the much abused Third Schedule of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947 and amassed all the allowable floorspace of the considerable land-plot into a single narrow 
tower (Marriot 1989, pp.117). 
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Table 2: Famous architect buildings in sample 
Building Name Address Architect Floors† Year 
Built 
Borough Conservation 
Area 
Listed Sales 
- 25 Canada Square Cesar Pelli 
 
43 2002 Tower Hamlets NO NO 2 
‘The Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe 
 
Norman Foster 40 2003 City of London NO NO 1 
Bishops Square 10 Bishop Square 
 
Norman Foster 13 2005 Tower Hamlets NO NO 2 
- 10 Gresham Street 
 
Norman Foster 8 2004 City of London YES NO 1 
Alban Gate 125 London Wall‡ 
 
Terry Farrell 19 1992 City of London NO NO 3 
Sugar Quay ͨ Lower Thames 
Street 
Terry Farrell 6 1979 City of London YES NO 1 
Lutyens House 1-6 Finsbury 
Circus 
Edward Lutyens 
 
9 1923 City of London YES YES 1 
Banking Hall 27-35 Poultry Edward Lutyens 
 
6 1925 City of London YES YES 3 
- 23 Austin Friars Aston Webb 
 
6 1888 City of London YES YES 1 
Summit House 12 Red Lion 
Square 
Joseph Emberton 
 
5 1925 Camden YES YES 1 
†Floors refers to all above-ground levels including the ground floor but not including basements. 
‡Alban Gate replaced the 18 floor Lee House designed in 1962 by Burnet, Tait and Partners.  
ͨNorman Foster is currently slated to design a replacement development to Sugar Quay. 
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Table 3: Tallest non-famous-architect office buildings in sample 
Building Name Address Architect Floors Year 
Built 
Borough Conservation 
Area 
Listed Sales 
Centre Point 103 New Oxford 
Street 
Richard Seifert 
 
33† 1965 Camden YES* YES 1 
Empress State 
Building 
Empress Approach Stone, Toms & 
Partners 
30‡ 
 
1961 Hammersmith NO NO 1 
Commercial 
Union Tower 
1 Undershaft Gollins, Melvin, 
Ward 
26 1969 City of London NO NO 1 
New Scotland 
Yard 
10 Broadway Chapman, Taylor 
and Partners 
21 1962 Westminster NO NO 1 
City Tower 40 Basinghall 
Street 
Burnet, Tait and 
Partners 
21 1957 City of London NO NO 0ª 
Angel Court 1 Angel Court Fitzroy Robinson 
and Partners 
19 1980 City of London YES* NO 1 
Plantation Place 30 Fenchurch 
Street 
Arup Group 15 2004 City of London 
 
NO NO 1 
Landmark 
House 
Hammersmith 
Bridge Road 
Thomas Saunders 
Partnership 
15 1973 Hammersmith NO NO 2 
Drapers 
Gardens 
12 Throgmorton 
Avenue ͨ 
Foggo Associates 14 2009 City of London YES* NO 1 
- 280 Bishopsgate Foggo Associates 13 2001 Tower Hamlets 
 
NO NO 2 
*Centre Point, Angel Court, and the original Drapers Gardens building at 12 Throgmorton Avenue were granted planning permission before their 
surrounding areas were given conservation area designation. 
†Centre point was permitted to be taller than would normally be allowed by the London County Council because the developer Harry Hyams 
consented to fund the creation of a needed road junction under and around the building. 
‡This figure includes three floors added to the top of the building during a renovation in 2003 at a cost of £80m. 
ͨ12 Throgmorton Avenue replaced the 29 floor building known as Drapers Gardens originally designed by Richard Seifert in 1962.  
ª One sale observation was obtained on this property but it was a ‘flipped’ sale and therefore this observation was removed from analyses concerning 
sales. This observation was retained however for analyses concerning building size.  
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Table 4: Tallest inner London office buildings not in sample 
Building Name Address Architect Floors Year 
Built 
Borough Conservation 
Area 
Listed 
‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge 
Street 
Renzo Piano* 
 
95 2012 Southwark NO NO 
One Canada Square 1 Canada Square Cesar Pelli* 
 
50† 1991 Tower Hamlets NO NO 
Tower 42 25 Old Broad Street Richard Seifert 
 
47 1980 City of London NO NO 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate Kohn Pedersen Fox‡* 
 
46 2011 City of London NO NO 
HSBC Tower 8 Canada Square Norman Foster* 
 
45 2002 Tower Hamlets NO NO 
Broadgate Tower 201 Bishopsgate Skidmore, Owings, and 
Merrill 
33 2009 City of London NO NO 
- 25 Bank Street Cesar Pelli* 33 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
NO NO 
- 40 Bank Street Cesar Pelli* 33 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
NO NO 
One Churchill Place 1 Churchill Place HOK International 32 2004 Tower Hamlets 
 
NO NO 
- 10 Upper Bank 
Street 
Kohn Pedersen Fox* 
 
32 2003 Tower Hamlets NO NO 
*Denotes famous architect according to this paper’s definition. 
†To comply with air-traffic safety regulations for London City Airport the architect removed 5 floors from the original design of One Canada Square. 
‡Kohn Pedersen Fox was Winner of the AIA Architectural firm award in 1990, and William Pedersen has received 5 AIA Awards between 1984-2003. 
ͨBT Tower located at 60 Cleveland Street is 37 floors tall and contains some office space to let, but because it was designed primarily as a signal tower 
by the Government General Post Office to support microwave aerial antennae for telecommunication we do not consider it to be a comparable office 
building. 
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Table 5: Tallest proposed inner London office buildings with planning permission 
Building Name Address Architect Floors Comp 
Year  
Borough Conservation 
Area 
Listed 
The Pinnacle 
 
24 Bishopsgate Kohn, Pedersen Fox* 63 2014 City of London NO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
Columbus Tower 
 
West India Quay Mark Weintraub 61 N/D Tower Hamlets YES† 
One Nine Elms 
 
1 Nine Elms Lane Kohn, Pedersen Fox* 58 N/D Wandsworth NO 
‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall 
Street 
Richard Rogers* 48 2014 City of London NO 
Riverside South 
 
Westferry Circus Richard Rogers* 45 2016 Tower Hamlets NO 
One Park Place 
 
1 Park Place 
 
Horden Cherry Lee 45 2012 Tower Hamlets NO 
- 100 Bishopsgate 
 
Allies and Morrison* 40 N/D City of London NO 
North Quay 
 
Aspen Way Cesar Pelli* 40 N/D Tower Hamlets NO 
Heron Quays West 
 
Heron Quays Richard Rogers* 40 N/D Tower Hamlets NO 
‘The Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street 
 
Rafael Vinoli* 36 2014 City of London NO 
*Denotes famous architect according to this paper’s definition. 
†Tower Hamlets council initially rejected this proposal due to an anticipated detrimental effect on the local conservation area, but the Mayor of 
London exercised his veto power claiming this project was of strategic importance to London. 
N/D means no definite completion date at present. 
Listed column is N/A because buildings can only be given listed status post construction.
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Administrative Regions 
Boundaries for London boroughs were taken from the UK ordnance survey boundary-line 
maps and spatially referenced to each office property. The sample of 387 buildings falls in 
all ten boroughs which comprise inner London. These are; the City of London, the City of 
Westminster, Tower Hamlets (containing the Docklands), Southwark, Lambeth, 
Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, Islington, Hackney, and Camden. 
Although the sample of 387 buildings used in this study is spread across all 10 boroughs, 
86% of these buildings are located in the City of Westminster, Camden, Islington, and the 
City of London. 
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Figure 4: Map of inner London boroughs and office locations (in red) 
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Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings 
Data on conservation areas was acquired from the London Mayor’s Office with maps 
produced by Landmark Information Group. Data on the listed status of buildings comes 
from English Heritage and Estates Gazette. Of the 387 buildings in the sample 209 or 54% 
are currently located within a conservation area, 90 or 23% were built while located within 
a conservation area, 46 or 12% are listed, and 35 or 9% are both currently located within a 
conservation area and listed. As the Table 6 below shows, a large percentage of the total 
land area in the four main boroughs which comprise our sample is contained within 
conservation areas.  
 
Table 6: Conservation areas in primary central London boroughs  
Local Planning Authority Number of areas Percent of total borough 
covered 
First 
introduced 
City of Westminster 55 75% 1967 
Camden 39 50% 1968 
Islington 40 50% 1968 
City of London 26 33% 1971 
 
The variable conservation density 300m was approximated by randomly adding one point 
for each 100sqm of conservation area within each conservation area’s perimeter (excluding 
parks, gardens, and water features), with a minimum distance between points of 4m, and 
then calculating the number of points which fell into a 300m radius of each building. 100m 
and 500m radial distances were also tested and were not as statistically significant in the 
model. The variable listed building density 300m was calculated by spatially matching the 
point map of listed buildings from English Heritage with the Ordnance Survey containing a 
map of each building’s curtilage43. Then a point was randomly placed within each listed 
building’s curtilage for every 10sqm of curtilage area, with a minimum inter-point distance 
of 1m, and the number of points which fell within 300m of each office building was tallied. 
Again 100m and 500m radial distances were tested but were not as statistically significant 
as the 300m distance. A possible explanation for this distance being the most statistically 
significant for both conservation area and listed building density is that it may conform to 
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 Curtilage is defined as the land area attached to a structure and forming the enclosure around it. 
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the distance around the building which visually most contribute to the quality of the 
surrounding local environment. It may also proxy for micro-location supply restrictions 
which increase prices, though much of this effect would likely be captured by planning 
permission refusal rate at the local authority level (see below). 
 
For the analyses into the effect of conservation area on building size (dependent variables; 
Sqm/Curtilage, Floors, Footprint/Curtilage), buildings are only identified to be located in a 
conservation area if the building was built after the corresponding conservation area had 
been put in force. For the Price/Sqm regression, conservation area is defined as such if the 
building was located within a conservation area at the time of sale. For the Price/Curtilage 
regression a separate dummy variable is used for conservation designation at the time of 
construction and within conservation area at the time of sale. These dummy variable 
adjustments are done so that when a building is included in a conservation area it measures 
the restriction to building size and/or the effect on building prices as appropriate for the 
analysis at hand. The most notable tall buildings in the sample which were first built and 
then subsequently designated a conservation area were 103 New Oxford Street (33-floors) 
and 1 Angel Court (19-floors). 
 
Parks and Gardens 
A digital map of London’s parks and gardens was acquired from English Heritage. Parks 
and gardens density was calculated by placing a random point within the perimeter of each 
park or garden for each 10sqm contained within, with a minimum distance between points 
of 1m. Then the total number of points within a 300m radius of each office property was 
counted. 
 
Planning Permission Refusal Rate 
In London, planning decisions are administered at the borough level of local government. 
Each borough has a different degree of regulatory strictness regarding new development. 
This study employs data on office planning refusal rates from 1990 to 2008 for the ten 
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boroughs44 which contain the 387 properties in the sample, provided from the research of 
Hilber and Vermeulen (2010). Of course, the planning permission refusal rate is somewhat 
endogenous in that applicants will likely adjust their planning requests according to the 
restrictiveness of the borough in question. However, it is infeasible for this study to collect 
and analyze data on each office planning request to ascertain the absolute restrictiveness of 
each borough. In lieu of this limitation, the office planning refusal rates produced by Hilber 
and Vermeulen (2010) from the Department for Communities and Local Government is 
used despite the potential endogeneity problems mentioned above. Since data post-2008 
was unavailable, for years 2009-2011, 2008 data is used. For the regressions on building 
size the average 1990-2008 office planning refusal rate is used. This is done because, again, 
we do not have data on refusal rates prior to 1990, and it is thought that taking account of 
the entire dataset would make the most sense given that the majority of buildings in the 
sample were built prior to 199045. The regressions considering sales prices use the 9-year 
moving average of office permission refusal rates based retroactively on the date of sale. 
This was done so as to accommodate as much prior information about the restrictiveness of 
the local planning authority in question as possible (given that the earliest sale date of 
buildings used in this analysis is 2000) without including irrelevant information on the 
restrictiveness of the local authority after the sale has occurred.  
 
With regard to these planning statistics, the City of London is a bit of an anomaly in that, 
although the office planning permission refusal rate is effectively zero for this borough, 
planning in the City of London is in fact highly restrictive. Instead of flat-out refusal, the 
City of London tends to negotiate by rejecting certain aspects of a proposal and then return 
the application for modification and resubmission before final approval will be granted. 
Although other boroughs manage applications in this way to a greater or lesser degree 
(Ball, 2011) the City of London is exceptional in this regard. Therefore the City of London 
has a higher effective refusal rate than is evident from the DCLG statistics. To account for 
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 City of London, City of Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, Camden, 
Islington, Hackney, Lambeth, Southwark, Tower Hamlets. 
45
 See ‘Appendix C: Descriptive statistics’. 
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this disparity a dummy variable for the City of London is added in some regressions on 
building size. 
 
It has also been argued by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) that because of business control of 
the planning process the City of London and the Docklands have especially permissive 
regulations with regard to building size compared to other areas of London. In order to 
account for this possible disparity a dummy variable for the Docklands is also included 
with the City of London dummy variable in regressions of building size. 
 
Employment Density 
Employment density is empirically one of the strongest drivers of office rents and sale 
prices. Accordingly, we would expect profit-maximizing developers to wish to build more 
space on a given parcel of land if they can sell, lease or rent office space on that land for 
more46. Therefore ceteris paribus, employment density is also likely to be an important 
driver of average office building height. 
 
The most detailed publicly available statistics on the location of the workforce in London 
consist of postcode sector data from the NOMIS Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) Employee 
Analysis. This dataset begins in 2000 and the most recent data at the time of writing is for 
2008. Furthermore, only employees from industries with a 2003 SIC section code 
designation of J or K, corresponding to the banking, finance, business services and 
insurance industries were included in this count. Unfortunately this dataset possesses a 
structural break in how the data was collected between 2005 and 2006. Therefore our 2006-
08 postcode sector employment counts are rescaled pro rata using the scaling factor 
provided by the ONS for London SIC codes J and K using the pre-2005 methodology.  
 
A map of employment density was constructed from the 11,773 postcode sectors in greater 
London by including all postcode sectors that have any part of their boundary within 2km 
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 Since the marginal cost of constructing another floor increases with each additional floor (Gat, 1995), we 
would only expect the tallest buildings to be located in the most favourable locations with the highest office 
rents. 
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of any office property in the sample. This left a total of 546 postcode sectors. A feature of 
this dataset is that density/number of postcode sectors is substantially higher within central 
London, where the majority of properties are located (see Figure 5 and Figure 6)47. All 
water features from the Ordnance Survey Mastermap and Parks and Gardens from English 
Heritage were then removed so as to produce a map which better reflected the locations 
within the postcode sectors where employees could actually work. Then a number of points 
corresponding to the employment counts within the remaining boundaries of each of the 
546 postcode sectors for each year between 2000 and 2008 were randomly placed within 
each boundary, and then the number of employees within a radial buffer of 500m from each 
property at the year of sale was calculated. 500m was chosen as this has been empirically 
observed in studies of other cities to correspond approximately to the distance after which 
the hedonic influence of employment density begins to attenuate, see Arzaghi and 
Henderson (2008) and Jennen and Brounen (2009). 
 
Figure 5: The 546 postcode sectors 
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 This map was constructed by aggregating common postcode units up to the postcode sector-level from the 
Ordnance Survey. 
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Figure 6: The 546 postcode sectors and 387 office locations 
 
 
However, it is important to note that the employment density measure used here is 
automatically somewhat endogenous with respect to large buildings when regressing on 
building size. The reason being that the employment counts taken from the ABI include 
employees working inside the very building for which the surrounding employment density 
is being calculated. Therefore when a big building is built at a given location, there is 
automatically a higher employment density at that location. So in effect, every building 
adds to its own density, and therefore big (occupied) buildings cause high density, even if 
the converse is not true. However, the average employment count per 500m radial distance 
from each property between 2000-08 is 35,000, whereas, the average building size is 
9,400sqm. If we take an average of 185 sqft (17.1sqm) per worker48, that leaves us with an 
average of 550 workers per building, which represents only 1.6% of the working population 
of the average postcode sector in our sample. The potential endogeneity of employment 
density on prices and building height might also arise from unobserved physical and 
environmental characteristics. However, it is not as crucial to address the potential 
endogeneity of employment density in this study looking at famous architecture as it would 
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 Taken from http://www.officefinder.com/officespacecalc.html on July 17th 2012 as the least amount of 
office space needed per typical worker. 
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be if the effect of employment density was the variable of interest. This is because the 
extent to which employment density is correlated with unobservables only improves its 
function as a control, and residual endogeneity (such as a big building increasing its own 
employment density) can only affect the famous architect coefficient to the extent that the 
two variables are correlated. However, as a result of this potential problem we do attempt to 
instrument for employment density levels at the time of sale with the density of financial 
service workers, the density of total workers, and the proportion of male workers from the 
1981 census at the local authority level provided by NOMIS. The rationale behind using 
old measures of employment density is that, following the research of Ciccone and Hall 
(1996), places with high employment density in the past may also be areas in which 
employment density is high today. But if enough time has elapsed, these historic 
employment density levels may also no longer be correlated with the unobservables that 
can bias contemporaneous estimates of employment density. The 1981 estimates were used 
because these were the earliest employment numbers available which were associated with 
a definite geographic boundary. 
 
A further problem with our employment density measure is that we do not have this data 
prior to 2000, while many of the buildings in our sample were built even before the 20th 
century. As accurate data on local employment densities in London for this period could 
not be obtained, the average employment density between 2000-08 is used for regressions 
which estimate building size, and instruments are used to predict this variable in the 
Instrumental Variable 2-Stage Least Squares (IV2SLS) specifications. 
 
Access to Labour Force 
Access to the labour force is estimated by taking the distance in metres to the nearest 
underground, overground, or rail station. Although simple, this statistic outperforms several 
more sophisticated estimates of access to the labour force; see ‘Appendix B: Separately 
tested but omitted controls’. 
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Submarket Area 
The sample contained the following 15 postcode districts; EC1, EC2, EC3, EC4, E1, WC1, 
WC2, W1, SW1, SW6, W6, N1, NW1, SE1, and E14. Submarkets were defined according 
to Estates Gazette’s market definition shown below. 
 
City Core:  EC1A, EC2M, EC2N, EC2R, EC2Y, EC2V, EC2A (only Finsbury 
Pavement, Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell Street), EC3, EC4 (excluding 
EC4A & EC4Y) 
 
City Fringe:  EC1M, EC1N (excluding postcode sector 2), EC1R, EC1V, EC1Y, 
EC2A (excluding Finsbury Pavement, Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell 
Street), E1 
 
Southbank:  SE1 postcode sectors, 0, 1, 2 & 9 
 
Docklands:  E14 
 
Midtown:  EC4A & EC4Y, EC1N (postcode sector 2), WC1, WC2 (excluding 
Leicester Square) 
 
West End:  W1, SW1, NW1 sectors 2 (Euston Road only), 3, 5 & 6, Leicester Square 
(WC2) and W2 sectors 1, 2 & 6 
 
South Central:  Remainder of SE1 and all of SE11 
 
North Central:  Remainder of NW1 and N1 and all of E8 
 
West Central:  Remainder of W2 and all of W6, W8, W14, SW3, SW5, SW6, SW7 & 
SW10 
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Building Characteristics 
Data on building characteristics such as; the number of floors49, the number of basements, 
number of parking spaces, single or multi-tenant, and air conditioning (A/C) was gathered 
from EG, RCA, internet research, and site visits to each building. The quality of the 
floorspace comes from Estates Gazette, which grades each floor of the building either A or 
B. Buildings with only grade A space are graded as an A, with A and B graded A/B, and 
only B space is the omitted dummy variable. Data on the area of building footprints and 
curtilages comes from the Ordnance Survey MasterMap. 
 
Decade of Construction 
Data on the decade in which the building was built comes from EG, RCA, and internet 
research. This is an important variable because it simultaneously accounts for technology 
improving cost reductions to building tall and general changes in planning regulation and 
sentiment through the years. Buildings built prior to the 1950s are contained under the 
omitted dummy variable. This is done because more precise data on the construction dates 
of pre-WWII buildings were not always forthcoming. 
 
Whereas most hedonic studies include when the building was built and possibly a dummy 
variable indicating whether the building has ever been refurbished, this study uses a more 
sophisticated measure for obsolescence by utilizing the number of years at the time of sale 
since the building had been built or last refurbished; known here as “Depreciation Age”. 
Analysis 
We first examine whether famous architects designing buildings outside conservation areas 
have been able to build more office space on a given plot of land. It is logical to assume 
that this has only been possible since 1956; the year that statutory height restrictions in 
London were lifted in exchange for the more flexible system of planning control in force 
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 Like employment density the number of floors may also be endogenous with respect to prices 
(Koster, H., Ommeren, J., and P. Rietveld, 2011). Although suitable instruments for the number of floors were 
not found, as with employment density this should not be problematic as the focus of this study is not the 
estimation of the causal relation between floor height and sale price. 
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today50. To test this hypothesis we employ our data set of 387 buildings. As per Table 2, 
four of these buildings were built by famous architects post-1956 outside a conservation 
area, two by famous architects post-1956 within a conservation area, and four by famous 
architects pre-195651. The dependent variable is total building floorspace (sqm) divided by 
the area of the plot of land encompassing the building (curtilage)52. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 7. Since we only expect famous architects to be able to build 
bigger outside a conservation area, we use an interaction term53 to capture this expected 
effect. As independent controls we utilize; built by famous architect (not interacted), within 
conservation area, average office permission refusal rate for the corresponding local 
planning authority between 1990-2008, and the decade the building was built. For some 
specifications we also include a dummy variable for the City of London and Docklands, to 
take account of their relative regulatory leniency (Cheshire and Hilber 2008), and average 
employment numbers within 500m. Employment density is likely to be endogenous to the 
amount of floorspace at a given location, so for one specification of the model in Table 8 
we attempt to instrument for employment density with the density of workers employed in 
financial services, total employment density, and the proportion of workers who are men by 
local authority from the 1981 census. With floorspace/curtilage as the dependent variable, 
White tests reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, and so robust standard errors are 
reported. 
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 See the section ‘The history of building height regulation in London’ above. 
51
 See Table 2. 
52
 Also known as the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) or Plot-ratio. 
53
 Namely; (Building designed by famous architect) x (Outside conservation area). 
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Table 7: Dependent variable is Floorspace/Curtilage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
     
Famous Architect Outside 
Conservation Area 
 4.889*** 3.875*** 3.338*** 
  (0.876) (0.850) (0.570) 
Famous Architect 1.823** -0.135 0.118 0.215 
 (0.865) (0.356) (0.366) (0.388) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.109 -0.0807 -0.503** -0.454** 
 (0.197) (0.193) (0.221) (0.230) 
Average Office Permission 
Refusal Rate 
-11.18*** -11.31*** -10.29*** -15.76*** 
 (1.554) (1.523) (1.578) (3.712) 
Built 1950s   0.124 0.163 
   (0.387) (0.394) 
Built 1960s   0.892 0.932 
   (0.583) (0.586) 
Built 1970s   0.592* 0.655* 
   (0.333) (0.338) 
Built 1980s   0.390 0.348 
   (0.293) (0.309) 
Built 1990s   0.765*** 0.750*** 
   (0.256) (0.254) 
Built 2000s   1.432*** 1.384*** 
   (0.265) (0.272) 
Built 2010s   0.423 0.356 
   (0.806) (0.881) 
City of London    -0.699 
    (0.499) 
Docklands    1.747*** 
    (0.674) 
Constant 5.737*** 5.742*** 5.188*** 5.846*** 
 (0.174) (0.172) (0.204) (0.479) 
     
Observations 387 387 387 387 
R-squared 0.146 0.186 0.247 0.268 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can see the coefficient on famous architect is significant in the first regression 
specification, and the average office refusal rate of the local planning authority has a 
strongly negative effect on the floorspace allowed on a given curtilage. When we interact 
famous architect with built in conservation area in specification 2 the effect on the 
interaction term is even stronger and the original significance on the famous architect term 
is lost. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that it is only the combination of a 
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famous architect outside a conservation area that makes it possible to build taller. In the 
third specification we add controls for the age of the building, which has a significant effect 
for buildings built in the 1970s, 1990s and 2000s. There are only two buildings in the 
sample built in the 2010s54, so the lack of significance on this variable should be considered 
a preliminary result only. With the addition of building age controls we also see that the 
‘built in conservation area’ term now becomes negatively significant. In the fourth 
specification dummy variables for the City of London and the Docklands are added, and 
both have their expected signs though only the Docklands is significant. Table 8 below 
presents the full specification which includes average employment density between 2000-
08 within 500m as an additional control.  
                                                 
54See Table 17. 
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Table 8: Dependent variable is Floorspace/Curtilage 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
IV2SLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
   
Famous Architect outside Conservation Area 3.255*** 2.926*** 
 (0.528) (0.738) 
Famous Architect 0.137 -0.169 
 (0.320) (0.391) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.488** -0.622** 
 (0.227) (0.269) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -14.89*** -11.45** 
 (3.649) (4.868) 
Built 1950s 0.184 0.269 
 (0.388) (0.408) 
Built 1960s 1.012* 1.327* 
 (0.595) (0.687) 
Built 1970s 0.703** 0.889** 
 (0.332) (0.401) 
Built 1980s 0.361 0.411 
 (0.307) (0.323) 
Built 1990s 0.727*** 0.635** 
 (0.254) (0.301) 
Built 2000s 1.402*** 1.471*** 
 (0.268) (0.288) 
Built 2010s 0.183 -0.499 
 (1.074) (1.882) 
City of London -1.190** -3.133* 
 (0.514) (1.651) 
Docklands 1.857*** 2.293*** 
 (0.644) (0.662) 
Average Employment 500m 1.47e-05** 7.28e-05 
 (6.42e-06) (4.83e-05) 
Constant 5.410*** 3.688** 
 (0.521) (1.545) 
   
Observations 387 387 
R-squared 0.278 0.118 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald chi2(14) =  215.20 
 
As we can see from Table 8 the additional control for average employment density tightens 
up the model, disentangling its effect with the City of London dummy which is now 
statistically significant. In Table 8 specification 2 we attempt to instrument for the 
potentially endogeneous control: average employment density. The 2SLS instrument has an 
acceptable Wald statistic of 215.20 confirming its relevance, and the first stage regression 
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has an R-squared of 0.118. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of the 
instrumented  variable is not rejected (p =.1932), and Sargan-Hansen tests do not reject the 
exogeneity of the instruments. Unfortunately however the instrumented employment 
density is not a significant predictor of floorspace/curtilage (t-stat =1.51). Regardless, the 
famous architect outside a conservation area interaction term remains significant in the 
2SLS specification. Indeed, this result is robust with respect to adding each successive 
group of controls. 
 
In addition to building taller, the increases in floorspace for a given lot-size observed in 
Table 7 and Table 8 above can also come about as a result of building ‘wider’ – in two 
dimensions. That is, increasing the proportion of the building’s curtilage occupied by the 
building’s footprint. In the next set of regressions we run the same group of independent 
control variables, only this time on the total above ground floors (including the ground 
floor) to confirm the results in  Table 7 and Table 8. The results of this specification will 
test whether famous architects have indeed been able to build bigger because they can build 
taller. White tests reject homoskedasticity in all cases and robust standard errors are 
reported. The results of these regressions can be seen in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Dependent variable is Total above ground floors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Floors 
OLS 
Floors 
OLS 
Floors 
IV2SLS 
Floors 
     
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
20.65*** 20.17*** 19.99*** 20.19*** 
 (6.513) (6.004) (5.882) (5.896) 
Famous Architect -0.351 -0.526 -0.697 -0.512 
 (0.589) (0.602) (0.573) (0.651) 
Built in Conservation Area -1.311*** -1.064*** -1.139*** -1.058*** 
 (0.246) (0.274) (0.271) (0.307) 
Average Office Permission 
Refusal Rate 
-5.891* 1.724 3.654 1.572 
 (3.126) (10.48) (10.44) (9.917) 
Built 1950s 1.385*** 1.303*** 1.350*** 1.299*** 
 (0.389) (0.381) (0.363) (0.386) 
Built 1960s 5.219*** 5.156*** 5.333*** 5.142*** 
 (1.519) (1.475) (1.472) (1.497) 
Built 1970s 2.502*** 2.314*** 2.419*** 2.306*** 
 (0.656) (0.662) (0.674) (0.673) 
Built 1980s 0.561** 0.268 0.295 0.265 
 (0.262) (0.307) (0.310) (0.310) 
Built 1990s 1.552*** 1.237*** 1.185*** 1.241*** 
 (0.325) (0.358) (0.352) (0.356) 
Built 2000s 2.289*** 1.996*** 2.034*** 1.993*** 
 (0.341) (0.362) (0.358) (0.368) 
Built 2010s 1.806 1.713 1.331 1.743 
 (1.401) (1.157) (1.586) (1.285) 
City of London  1.075 -0.0139 1.160 
  (1.206) (1.290) (2.401) 
Docklands  3.914* 4.158** 3.894** 
  (2.015) (1.964) (1.974) 
Average Employment 500m   3.26e-05*** -2.57e-06 
   (1.21e-05) (5.40e-05) 
Constant 6.634*** 5.699*** 4.734*** 5.775*** 
 (0.339) (1.234) (1.257) (1.729) 
     
Observations 387 387 387 387 
R-squared 0.441 0.457 0.468 0.455 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald chi2(14) =  117.14  
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In Table 9 we start with the famous architect and conservation area interaction and 
successively add controls as in the previous tables. As we can see, famous architect outside 
a conservation area is a significant predictor for the number of floors in the building, as 
well as ‘built-in-conservation area’ and all buildings built from the 1950s onwards. Similar 
to Table 7 and Table 8, the un-interacted famous architect dummy also has no effect upon 
the number of floors. In specification 4 we also attempt to instrument employment density. 
A Wald test yields 117.14, with a first stage R-squared of 0.455, and exogeneity of the 
instrumented  variable is not rejected (Durbin-Wu-Hausman, p =.4639), and neither is the 
exogeneity of the instruments (Sargan-Hansen, p =.1044). However as in the floorspace per 
curtilage case, instrumented employment density loses its significance as an explanatory 
factor. Notice that the coefficients for famous architect outside conservation areas across 
the four regressions in Table 9 averages about 20 floors. If we assume 3m per floor, that 
would mean that office buildings built by a famous architect outside a conservation area are 
on average 60m taller than all other buildings. Recall that 24m was the maximum allowable 
height of buildings to the roof cornice built between 1894 and 1956. 
 
Though perhaps not as obvious a characteristic as building taller, buildings on a given plot 
of land can also be bigger because their footprints take up more of the available land-plot. 
However there is a limit to this type of growth in that the ratio of the footprint/curtilage 
cannot exceed 155. To test whether famous architects since 1956 outside conservation areas 
have also been allowed to build ‘wider’, for the dependent variable in the next set of 
regressions we use the ratio of the area of the building footprint over the total area of the 
building curtilage. White tests reject homoskedasticity and therefore robust standard errors 
are reported. The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 10.  
                                                 
55
 A possibly interesting exception to this rule is the ‘walkie-talkie’ building under-construction at 20 
Fenchurch Street in the City of London. With a tapered base and bulging towards its roof, this office building 
may be an example of overcoming the floorspace limitations imposed by both height restrictions and plot size 
(see Table 5). Such design was also typical of Tudor era buildings of the 15th and 16th century which sported 
overhanging upper floors to increase the amount of total floorspace while simultaneously reducing their 
taxable building footprint. 
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Table 10: Dependent variable is building Footprint area / Curtilage area 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Footprint/ 
Curtilage 
OLS 
Footprint/ 
Curtilage 
OLS 
Footprint/ 
Curtilage 
IV2SLS 
Footprint/ 
Curtilage 
     
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
6.58e-05 -0.0354 -0.0441 -0.0667 
 (0.127) (0.125) (0.128) (0.143) 
Famous Architect -0.0933 -0.0798 -0.0878 -0.109** 
 (0.0656) (0.0678) (0.0614) (0.0500) 
Built in Conservation Area 0.0690*** 0.0666*** 0.0631*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0209) 
Average Office Permission 
Refusal Rate 
-0.603*** -1.306*** -1.216*** -0.979** 
 (0.132) (0.480) (0.459) (0.465) 
Built 1950s -0.0141 -0.00827 -0.00606 -0.000293 
 (0.0252) (0.0238) (0.0261) (0.0337) 
Built 1960s -0.147*** -0.141*** -0.133*** -0.111* 
 (0.0491) (0.0488) (0.0509) (0.0582) 
Built 1970s -0.161*** -0.150*** -0.145*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0434) (0.0422) 
Built 1980s -0.0648*** -0.0605*** -0.0592*** -0.0557** 
 (0.0205) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0234) 
Built 1990s -0.0756*** -0.0682*** -0.0706*** -0.0769*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0240) (0.0252) 
Built 2000s -0.0484** -0.0447** -0.0429* -0.0381 
 (0.0189) (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0240) 
Built 2010s -0.0895*** -0.0931*** -0.111*** -0.158* 
 (0.0140) (0.0173) (0.0344) (0.0938) 
City of London  -0.0926* -0.144** -0.277* 
  (0.0555) (0.0601) (0.142) 
Docklands  0.0504 0.0619 0.0919* 
  (0.0377) (0.0392) (0.0517) 
Average Employment 500m   1.53e-06** 5.51e-06 
   (6.09e-07) (3.74e-06) 
Constant 1.029*** 1.115*** 1.069*** 0.951*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0527) (0.0516) (0.114) 
     
Observations 387 387 387 387 
R-squared 0.182 0.198 0.217 0.088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald chi2(14) = 64.71  
 
As is evident from Table 10, buildings built by famous architects outside conservation areas 
do not have bigger footprints for a given curtilage in any of the four specifications. 
Interestingly, the footprint of buildings built inside a conservation area take up significantly 
more of the available land-plot. Perhaps in consequence of not being able to build as many 
64 
 
floors (Table 9), in conservation areas developers maximize the dimensions upon which 
they do have greater discretion. In addition, since the 1950s buildings have reduced the 
ratio of footprint to curtilage. This may have come about due to developers building tall but 
also being constrained by plot-area ratios to simultaneously build narrow. In specification 4 
the employment density instruments have a Wald statistic of 64.71, the first-stage 
regression has an R-squared of .0876, and exogeneity of the instrumented variable (p 
=.2406) and the instruments (p =.2257) are not rejected. However as in the previous tests 
when employment density is instrumented in specification 4, the instrumented employment 
density no longer has a significant impact on the dependent variable. In addition, in the 
2SLS specification famous architect registers a significantly negative coefficient, which 
may appear perverse. However, a common requirement in order to build tall is that the ratio 
of the building’s footprint to its curtilage56 must be smaller, so as to allow extra light to 
shine at street level and to prevent buildings from intensifying high winds through funnel 
effects. This effect should be most pronounced for tall buildings, presumably those built by 
famous architects. So the significance of this term could possibly be accounted for by the 
fact that famous architects must build somewhat narrower in order to build much taller. 
 
Now that we have confirmed that famous architects build bigger because they can build 
taller-but not wider, we now examine whether famous architects can also increase the sale 
price of buildings they design for a given curtilage. Although we know that famous 
architects can put more space on top of a given curtilage from Table 7 and Table 9, we do 
not know what the effect of the architect’s design will have on the building’s value per 
square metre. On the one hand, tenants may appreciate and pay more for good architecture. 
But on the other, famous architects may impart greater costs on building owners due to the 
maintenance costs involved with eccentric design or reduced flexibility with planning 
authorities to later alter or refurbish the building. Therefore, there may be a number of 
simultaneously confounding effects that bundle into the variable ‘famous architect’, making 
it difficult to predict ex-ante what the net effect of all of these influences will be. Although 
                                                 
56
 As opposed to maximum plot-ratios discussed earlier with regard to development planning. 
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we may presume there to be a positive effect given that developers do continue to solicit the 
services of famous architects in spite of their higher fees. 
 
To test the net effect of famous architect on building price controlling for the amount of 
space already in the building, we regress office price per square meter on the hedonic 
controls. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 11. Note that whereas the 
previous regressions were analysing the physical characteristics of 387 buildings, the 
sample size now consists of the 513 sale-transactions of these 387 buildings completed 
between 2000-2011. White tests do not reject homoscedasticity and so normal standard 
errors are reported. 
 
Table 11: Dependent variable is the natural log of (Price / Total floorspace sqm) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
     
Famous Architect -0.281*** -0.332*** -0.177** -0.223** 
 (0.101) (0.0978) (0.0899) (0.0865) 
Within Conservation Area 0.0757* 0.0682* 0.0209 0.0280 
 (0.0402) (0.0394) (0.0368) (0.0360) 
Listed Bldg -0.00199 -0.0300 -0.0261 -0.0388 
 (0.0536) (0.0574) (0.0475) (0.0506) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 
9yr Moving Average) 
0.0418*** 0.0435*** 0.0278* 0.0301** 
 (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0156) (0.0150) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.109*** 0.0894*** 0.179*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0273) (0.0344) (0.0331) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 
300m) 
0.0209** 0.0245*** 0.00634 0.00779 
 (0.00813) (0.00787) (0.00902) (0.00871) 
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.0182 0.0218* 0.0203 0.0233 
 (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0152) (0.0147) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.00897*** 0.00845*** 0.00938*** 0.00937*** 
 (0.00290) (0.00281) (0.00270) (0.00261) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.267*** 0.211*** 0.185*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0518) (0.0469) (0.0458) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) 0.0274 0.00493 0.0121 -0.00527 
 (0.0306) (0.0297) (0.0278) (0.0269) 
Ln(Number of Above-Ground 
Floors) 
0.275*** 0.343*** 0.153*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0593) (0.0528) (0.0539) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0135* -0.00796 -0.0161** -0.00759 
 (0.00747) (0.00763) (0.00661) (0.00673) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.00965 -0.0211** -0.00905 -0.0205** 
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 (0.00949) (0.00936) (0.00841) (0.00830) 
A/C 0.339*** 0.243*** 0.263*** 0.202** 
 (0.0897) (0.0882) (0.0804) (0.0787) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.0728 0.0466 0.0640 0.0352 
 (0.0494) (0.0493) (0.0438) (0.0434) 
EG Office Grade A 0.154*** 0.0786* 0.159*** 0.0830** 
 (0.0436) (0.0447) (0.0388) (0.0395) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0364*** 0.0295*** 0.0364*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.00933) (0.00909) (0.00821) (0.00796) 
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.0536 -0.0895** -0.0659* -0.106*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0384) (0.0344) (0.0337) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) -0.00119 0.00137 0.00239 0.00412 
 (0.00408) (0.00401) (0.00359) (0.00352) 
Built 1950s  -0.144  -0.200** 
  (0.0889)  (0.0780) 
Built 1960s  -0.372***  -0.252*** 
  (0.0783)  (0.0694) 
Built 1970s  -0.253***  -0.214*** 
  (0.0780)  (0.0688) 
Built 1980s  -0.0883  -0.0656 
  (0.0571)  (0.0502) 
Built 1990s  -0.000658  0.0278 
  (0.0552)  (0.0489) 
Built 2000s  0.115**  0.142*** 
  (0.0567)  (0.0500) 
Built 2010s  0.0317  0.319 
  (0.258)  (0.229) 
City Fringe   -0.307*** -0.318*** 
   (0.0781) (0.0764) 
Docklands   0.256 0.184 
   (0.228) (0.218) 
Midtown   -0.0187 -0.0309 
   (0.0585) (0.0575) 
North Central   0.104 0.0148 
   (0.147) (0.142) 
South Central   -0.0741 -0.0730 
   (0.122) (0.118) 
Southern Fringe   -0.00216 0.0278 
   (0.110) (0.106) 
West Central   0.213 0.232* 
   (0.133) (0.128) 
West End   0.333*** 0.314*** 
   (0.0686) (0.0667) 
     
Quarter Sold YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 5.917*** 6.254*** 5.548*** 5.867*** 
 (0.352) (0.344) (0.410) (0.396) 
     
Observations 513 513 513 513 
R-squared 0.439 0.493 0.578 0.621 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The four regressions alternately add controls for decade built and submarket location. 
Notice that now the conservation area control is now testing whether a building is currently 
located within a conservation area, and not whether the building was built while a 
surrounding conservation area was in force as in the previous regressions. We see that there 
is some evidence for the value imparted by being within a conservation area in the first two 
specifications with the ‘Within Conservation Area’ and ‘Conservation Area Density 300m’ 
variables. But when submarket location dummies are added to the regression we see that 
this relationship gets subsumed into them. Since we simultaneously test the effect of being 
located within a conservation area, it may be the case that the ‘Conservation Area Density 
300m’ variable is separately picking up the positive effect on price of reduced local supply 
rather than an additional measure of the positive externality resulting from the aesthetics of 
the surrounding area. We also see from Table 11 that office planning permission refusal 
rate, parks and gardens, the number of above ground floors, A/C. building grade, 
employment density, and the occupancy rate of the building have significantly positive 
effects, while the ratio of basement to above ground floors and multiple tenanted (as 
opposed to single occupier) buildings sell for a significant discount. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the depreciation age variable loses its negative effect when decade built dummies are 
included in the regression.  
 
However, the main result from these regressions is to note that famous architects have a 
demonstrably negative effect on the sale price of office buildings. This result is not contrary 
to our previous findings that famous architects increase building size because the above 
regressions control for the amount of total space in the building in the construction of the 
dependent variable (Price/Sqm). Given this negatively-signed relationship it would appear 
that famous architect-built buildings may have supernumerary costs of upkeep per sqm 
and/or additional (implicit) regulatory restrictions due to their celebrated-status that 
outweigh the benefits captured internally by good design. To examine this effect further, 
Table 12 specification 1 below splits the famous architect coefficient into pre-and post-
modern architects, to see whether older or newer design has a different effect on sale prices. 
Specifications 2 and 3 also instrument for employment density. 
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Table 12: Dependent variable is the natural log of (Price / Total floorspace sqm) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
    
Famous Architect  -0.202**  
  (0.0856)  
Modern Famous Architect 0.00924  0.0385 
 (0.111)  (0.111) 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect -0.560***  -0.542*** 
 (0.133)  (0.132) 
Within Conservation Area 0.0317 0.0577 0.0668 
 (0.0356) (0.0434) (0.0437) 
Listed Bldg -0.0138 -0.0336 -0.00720 
 (0.0506) (0.0492) (0.0501) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 
9yr Moving Average) 
0.0307** 0.00107 -0.00358 
 (0.0149) (0.0292) (0.0295) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.157*** -0.0621 -0.102 
 (0.0327) (0.194) (0.196) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) 0.00673 0.0138 0.0138 
 (0.00862) (0.00993) (0.00999) 
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.0278* 0.0389** 0.0462** 
 (0.0146) (0.0196) (0.0199) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.00952*** 0.00761** 0.00745** 
 (0.00258) (0.00296) (0.00298) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0455) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.0111 0.00991 0.00670 
 (0.0267) (0.0292) (0.0294) 
Ln(Number of Above-Ground Floors) 0.168*** 0.255*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0675) (0.0685) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.00885 -0.00734 -0.00857 
 (0.00666) (0.00651) (0.00657) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0207** -0.0195** -0.0195** 
 (0.00820) (0.00807) (0.00813) 
A/C 0.225*** 0.206*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0762) (0.0771) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.0319 0.0304 0.0261 
 (0.0429) (0.0422) (0.0425) 
EG Office Grade A 0.0884** 0.0605 0.0619 
 (0.0391) (0.0430) (0.0433) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0267*** 0.0328*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.00793) (0.00810) (0.00819) 
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.0998*** -0.0989*** -0.0915*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0332) (0.0335) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00433 0.000337 -0.000119 
 (0.00348) (0.00474) (0.00477) 
Built 1950s -0.197** -0.218*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0771) (0.0777) 
Built 1960s -0.239*** -0.269*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0688) (0.0687) (0.0693) 
69 
 
Built 1970s -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0680) (0.0665) (0.0670) 
Built 1980s -0.0668 -0.0512 -0.0498 
 (0.0496) (0.0501) (0.0505) 
Built 1990s 0.0245 0.0479 0.0482 
 (0.0484) (0.0505) (0.0508) 
Built 2000s 0.130*** 0.164*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0495) (0.0521) (0.0525) 
Built 2010s 0.323 0.402* 0.420* 
 (0.227) (0.233) (0.235) 
City Fringe -0.339*** -0.416*** -0.455*** 
 (0.0758) (0.113) (0.114) 
Docklands 0.180 0.196 0.195 
 (0.216) (0.212) (0.213) 
Midtown -0.0366 -0.110 -0.130 
 (0.0569) (0.0887) (0.0894) 
North Central 0.00830 -0.439 -0.527 
 (0.140) (0.419) (0.422) 
South Central -0.0761 -0.313 -0.359 
 (0.116) (0.238) (0.240) 
Southern Fringe 0.0239 -0.145 -0.180 
 (0.105) (0.182) (0.184) 
West Central 0.230* -0.314 -0.414 
 (0.127) (0.492) (0.496) 
West End 0.306*** 0.136 0.0958 
 (0.0660) (0.168) (0.170) 
    
Quarter Sold YES YES YES 
    
Constant 5.897*** 7.678*** 8.034*** 
 (0.391) (1.626) (1.640) 
    
Observations 513 513 513 
R-squared 0.630 0.583 0.577 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
With regard to the instrumental variable estimations in specifications 2 and 3, in both cases 
the Wald Statistic exceeds 700 and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not reject exogeneity. 
But unfortunately Sargan-Hansen tests reject exogeneity of the instrument, and again the 
coefficient on instrumented employment density is insignificant in the second-stage. As we 
can see from Table 12 most of the results from Table 11 are robust to the IV specifications, 
including the effects of famous architects. Moreover, there is now an interesting split 
observed between modern and pre-modern architects. Whereas modern architects 
apparently have no net effect on the price per sqm of their buildings, pre-modern architects 
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have a strongly negative influence57. This difference could be explained if we consider that 
buildings built by pre-modern famous architects may have exceptionally restrictive 
regulatory monitoring in practice, perhaps in order to ensure the preservation of their work 
in perpetuity. These additional restrictions and the concomitant attenuation in property 
rights could explain the differential effect between modern and pre-modern architects. 
Since the modern architect dummy variable is not significantly positive, we can infer that 
either the positive effects of famous architecture on sale prices are small or that the 
additional restrictions on property rights are material enough to cancel out these positive 
benefits. Another possibility for the negative effect of famous architect design is that the 
prestige surrounding buildings built by famous architects may help to secure higher 
occupancy rates and that simultaneous inclusion of this variable with famous architect in 
the model strips famous architect of this positive effect. Although this explanation is 
plausible, a restricted regression run with the occupancy rate excluded refutes this 
interpretation as the coefficients on pre and post-modern famous architect are nearly 
unchanged in this specification58. 
 
Although the price/sqm is negatively affected or unaffected by being designed by a famous 
architect (Table 11), modern architects have also been able to build more space outside a 
conservation area on a given plot of land (Table 7). To see what the net effect of more (but 
perhaps cheaper) space has on the value of office properties, Table 13 regresses sales 
price/curtilage on relevant hedonic controls. Note that unlike the regressions in Table 11 
and Table 12, the variable for the number of above-ground floors is omitted in the first four 
regressions of Table 13 because this would steal the very effect on price/curtilage we wish 
to capture in a building designed by a famous architect outside a conservation area. In 
addition, variables for whether the building is currently in a conservation area, and whether 
the building was built while inside a conservation area are added. The reason both are 
needed is that while the first may affect the sale price per sqm of the building, the second 
may affect the size of the building, and both are relevant when determining the price per 
                                                 
57
 A test for the equality of the coefficients on modern and pre-modern architects is rejected at the 1% level 
(p=0.0027). 
58
 See ‘Appendix E: Occupancy rate excluded comparison’. 
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curtilage. White tests on the regression errors reject homoskedasticity, and so robust 
standard errors are reported for all specifications. The results of these regressions are 
displayed below in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Dependent variable is the natural log of (Price / Curtilage sqm) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
VARIABLES Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage 
      
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
1.185*** 1.092*** 1.187*** 1.117*** 1.156*** 
 (0.249) (0.234) (0.189) (0.175) (0.319) 
Famous Architect -0.484*** -0.484*** -0.391*** -0.398***  
 (0.127) (0.109) (0.139) (0.129)  
Modern Famous Architect     -0.438 
     (0.296) 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect     -0.384*** 
     (0.142) 
Within Conservation Area 0.0304 0.0537 -0.0671 -0.0525 -0.0528 
 (0.0673) (0.0848) (0.0630) (0.0818) (0.0819) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.0978 -0.157 -0.000906 -0.0344 -0.0333 
 (0.0718) (0.103) (0.0620) (0.0953) (0.0958) 
Listed Bldg -0.0916 -0.119 -0.0951 -0.139* -0.140* 
 (0.0726) (0.0769) (0.0707) (0.0775) (0.0779) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal 
Rate 9yr Moving Average) 
0.0213 0.0209 0.0116 0.0131 0.0131 
 (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.282*** 0.272*** 0.218*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0428) (0.0533) (0.0510) (0.0513) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 
300m) 
-0.00433 -0.00330 -0.0163 -0.0166 -0.0166 
 (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.0209 0.0249 0.0292 0.0327* 0.0327* 
 (0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 
300m) 
0.0197*** 0.0192*** 0.0166*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.00402) (0.00408) (0.00382) (0.00381) (0.00381) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.297*** 0.240*** 0.189*** 0.157** 0.156** 
 (0.0755) (0.0771) (0.0689) (0.0693) (0.0696) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.00618 -0.0280 0.00149 -0.0105 -0.0102 
 (0.0514) (0.0547) (0.0475) (0.0500) (0.0502) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0198* -0.0136 -0.0226** -0.0133 -0.0133 
 (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.00889) (0.00927) (0.00931) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.00714 -0.0183 -0.00557 -0.0180 -0.0181 
 (0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
A/C 0.602*** 0.545*** 0.475*** 0.449*** 0.449*** 
 (0.118) (0.125) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.324*** 0.319*** 0.275*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0658) 
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EG Office Grade A 0.458*** 0.404*** 0.412*** 0.362*** 0.361*** 
 (0.0650) (0.0658) (0.0579) (0.0587) (0.0589) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0306* 0.0249 0.0321** 0.0260* 0.0261* 
 (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0140) 
Multiple Tenant Bldg 0.0543 0.00977 0.0358 -0.00828 -0.00848 
 (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0502) (0.0505) (0.0506) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00554 0.00753 0.00576 0.00794 0.00795 
 (0.00545) (0.00570) (0.00486) (0.00510) (0.00511) 
Built 1950s  -0.131  -0.269** -0.269** 
  (0.140)  (0.123) (0.124) 
Built 1960s  -0.232*  -0.191 -0.191 
  (0.129)  (0.124) (0.124) 
Built 1970s  -0.0991  -0.118 -0.118 
  (0.119)  (0.113) (0.114) 
Built 1980s  -0.0905  -0.120 -0.121 
  (0.104)  (0.0997) (0.100) 
Built 1990s  -0.00719  -0.0477 -0.0483 
  (0.101)  (0.0981) (0.0984) 
Built 2000s  0.214**  0.153 0.154 
  (0.0984)  (0.0941) (0.0942) 
Built 2010s  -0.235  0.104 0.104 
  (0.611)  (0.439) (0.440) 
City Fringe   -0.517*** -0.541*** -0.542*** 
   (0.102) (0.0999) (0.100) 
Docklands   0.253 0.194 0.193 
   (0.330) (0.322) (0.323) 
Midtown   -0.0812 -0.106 -0.107 
   (0.0726) (0.0710) (0.0713) 
North Central   -0.532*** -0.627*** -0.628*** 
   (0.204) (0.203) (0.204) 
South Central   -0.427** -0.445** -0.446** 
   (0.202) (0.199) (0.200) 
Southern Fringe   -0.263 -0.261 -0.261 
   (0.177) (0.185) (0.186) 
West Central   -0.368* -0.369* -0.371* 
   (0.197) (0.196) (0.198) 
West End   0.216** 0.185** 0.185** 
   (0.0921) (0.0919) (0.0924) 
      
Quarter Sold YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant 6.020*** 6.336*** 6.692*** 6.994*** 6.999*** 
 (0.514) (0.528) (0.552) (0.560) (0.561) 
      
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 
R-squared 0.483 0.508 0.591 0.611 0.611 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notice that in specifications 1-4 the famous architect outside conservation area and famous 
architect coefficients are both significant, but in different directions. With famous architects 
outside of conservation areas able to produce higher priced buildings on a given curtilage, 
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but famous architects overall producing lower priced buildings. The net effect of being a 
building built by a famous architect outside a conservation area is the additive combination 
of the famous architect and famous architect outside conservation area coefficients. We see 
that in specifications 1-4 the interactive benefit of a famous architect building built in a 
conservation area outweighs the negative costs associated with its design. In specification 5 
the famous architect coefficient is split between modern and pre-modern architects. In this 
case a test for the equality of these coefficients cannot reject the null hypothesis that they 
are in fact equal (p =.8505). In the most preferred specifications 4 and 5, the net effect of 
these two factors is approximately 0.7, or roughly a 100% increase in building price for a 
given curtilage59. Of course, this result is only the gross sale price increase and does not 
account for additional costs which accrue to building taller and hiring a trophy architect. 
Buildings inside a conservation area however which cannot build appreciably taller may 
struggle to derive sufficient compensation from the drawbacks of famous architect design, 
as their coefficients are either negative or statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
 
Table 14 utilizes a 2SLS instrument for employment density in specification 1, and 
specification 2 is the same as the preferred specification 4 in Table 13 with a control added 
for the number of floors. The intention of adding the number of floors to the estimation is 
to see whether it will steal the positive significant effect on famous architect outside 
conservation area, since this is how we suppose famous architects are able to increase the 
price of buildings on a given curtilage. 
  
                                                 
59
 See Kennedy (1981) for the exact calculation of the effect of dummy variables in a log-log regression, 
which differs from a continuous variable. 
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Table 14: Dependent variable is the natural log of (Price / Curtilage sqm). 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IV2SLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
   
Famous Architect outside Conservation Area 1.187*** 0.347* 
 (0.275) (0.178) 
Famous Architect -0.410** -0.351*** 
 (0.159) (0.116) 
Within Conservation Area -0.0302 -0.00726 
 (0.0924) (0.0775) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.0455 0.0203 
 (0.0907) (0.0886) 
Listed Bldg -0.136* -0.0949 
 (0.0700) (0.0690) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 9yr 
Moving Average) 
-0.00250 0.00234 
 (0.0408) (0.0170) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.0869 0.163*** 
 (0.272) (0.0448) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) -0.0139 -0.00196 
 (0.0133) (0.0149) 
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.0414 0.0396** 
 (0.0281) (0.0178) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.0160*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.00415) (0.00346) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.162** 0.156*** 
 (0.0635) (0.0574) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.00371 0.0191 
 (0.0398) (0.0442) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0134 -0.0102 
 (0.00917) (0.00888) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0178 -0.00842 
 (0.0113) (0.0126) 
A/C 0.458*** 0.312** 
 (0.108) (0.130) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.267*** 0.123** 
 (0.0580) (0.0606) 
EG Office Grade A 0.354*** 0.239*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0543) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0272** 0.0286** 
 (0.0113) (0.0135) 
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.00408 -0.0164 
 (0.0470) (0.0462) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00621 0.000397 
 (0.00616) (0.00476) 
Ln(Number of Above-Ground Floors)  0.742*** 
  (0.0804) 
Built 1950s -0.274** -0.334** 
 (0.108) (0.130) 
Built 1960s -0.188** -0.450*** 
 (0.0947) (0.118) 
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Built 1970s -0.108 -0.229** 
 (0.110) (0.107) 
Built 1980s -0.108 -0.0665 
 (0.0920) (0.0912) 
Built 1990s -0.0301 -0.0677 
 (0.0970) (0.0917) 
Built 2000s 0.173* 0.104 
 (0.101) (0.0895) 
Built 2010s 0.158 0.0206 
 (0.340) (0.370) 
City Fringe -0.603*** -0.323*** 
 (0.174) (0.0872) 
Docklands 0.194 0.324 
 (0.298) (0.308) 
Midtown -0.151 -0.0830 
 (0.128) (0.0580) 
North Central -0.883 -0.389** 
 (0.609) (0.182) 
South Central -0.580* -0.258 
 (0.345) (0.160) 
Southern Fringe -0.359 -0.0981 
 (0.265) (0.163) 
West Central -0.673 -0.228 
 (0.708) (0.174) 
West End 0.0858 0.220*** 
 (0.242) (0.0792) 
   
Quarter Sold YES YES 
   
Constant 8.017*** 5.921*** 
 (2.368) (0.521) 
   
Observations 513 513 
R-squared 0.606 0.680 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald chi2(14) = 773.95 
 
As in the price per sqm regressions, although employment density is well explained by the 
instruments in the first-stage (Wald=773.95), and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not reject 
exogeneity of the instrumented  variable, Sargan-Hansen tests reject exogeneity of the 
instruments and as we can see from Table 14 specification 1, the coefficient is insignificant 
in the second stage. In any event, the coefficients on famous architect outside of a 
conservation area and famous architect are of similar magnitudes in the IV2SLS 
specification to the OLS specifications in Table 13. With the number of floors added in 
Table 14 OLS specification 2, we see that famous architects outside a conservation area 
lose most of their statistical significance in increasing the price of the building, and the 
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negative effect of famous architect is largely unchanged. In spite of the fact that the 
‘Famous Architect outside Conservation Area’ variable is significantly positive at the 10% 
level, the net effect of this with ‘Famous Architect’ is now almost exactly equal to zero. It 
therefore appears that, consistent with the results of Table 13 and Table 9, the ability of 
famous architects outside a conservation area to increase the price of a building on a given 
curtilage is indeed due to the fact that they can build taller. 
 
The robustness checks in ‘Appendix F: Robustness checks’ which sequentially exclude the 
tallest famous architect buildings outside conservation areas from the preferred 
specification of floorspace/curtilage in Table 8, the number of above ground floors in Table 
9, and the price/curtilage in Table 13 are all consistent with the full sample results 
presented above. Taken together, it appears that although famous architects negatively 
influence or have no influence on the price per unit of floorspace (Table 11 and Table 12), 
because of the fact that they can stack more units of floorspace up on a given amount of 
land (Table 7 and Table 9), on net famous architects appear to be able to increase the price 
of buildings built on a given land area (Table 13), so long as they have the freedom to build 
tall outside of a conservation area. 
Discussion 
Economic Rents 
From Table 9 we know that famous architects outside a conservation area can increase the 
number of floors in their buildings by approximately 20, with a standard deviation of about 
6. This would mean that utilizing a famous architect would allow a developer to go from an 
original allowable building height of 8 (our sample mean60) to 28 floors. Just how valuable 
is this increase in floorspace to a developer? In order to answer this question we utilize; (i) 
permissible development area land cost, (ii) gross internal area construction costs for 
standard and trophy architect designed office buildings by height, (iii) design costs for 
standard and trophy architects, and (iv) net-to-gross floorplate ratios by building height61. 
The hypothetical building in question is supposed to have a 1,600m2 footprint (i.e. 40m a 
                                                 
60
 See ‘Appendix C: Descriptive statistics’. 
61
 The ratio of lettable space to gross internal area, see ‘Appendix D: Net-to-gross internal area ratio’. 
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side squared, our sample mean) and to be located in the City of London. All office 
construction cost data was provided by the construction consultants Gardiner & Theobald. 
 
The data from Gardiner & Theobald shows that construction cost per sqm rises most 
steeply between floors 20 to 30, but is comparatively flat for buildings both below and 
above this height. This relationship is graphed in Figure 7 below with the net-to-gross ratio 
as a function of the number of floors. 
 
Figure 7: Construction costs only (per sqm) and net to gross ratios as a function of building height 
 
 
Adding land and design costs to construction costs we arrive at an estimate for the total 
building cost. However, trophy architects charge a fee premium compared to standard 
architects, and the buildings they design will generally incur additional construction costs 
over-and-above that of a standard building. Estimates for these cost differences were also 
provided by Gardiner & Theobald. Figure 8 below maps out the standard total construction 
cost for a standard office building, and an expensive and ‘cheap’ trophy architect office 
building. The expensive and cheap trophy architect buildings assume upper and lower 
bound estimates for land and trophy construction costs, respectively. 
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Figure 8: Total land, construction and design costs per sqm as a function of building height 
 
Costs are for each lettable sqm, ie net of the net-to-gross ratio. 
 
Figure 9 below shows how total (rather than per sqm) building costs increase with the 
number of floors. 
 
Figure 9: Total land, construction and design costs as a function of building height 
 
 
The next step is to derive estimates for the sale-price that can be achieved once the building 
is built and let. In order to construct these estimates we utilize the coefficients in Table 12 
specification 1, and apply these to the sample means of the 167 buildings sold in City of 
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London throughout the study period, or to the particular values assumed62. These values are 
displayed below in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: City of London means and assumed values 
Variable Actual Value Assumed 
Modern Famous Architect e† 
Within Conservation Area 1‡ 
Listed 1 
Office Permission Refusal Rate 0.28% 
Employment Density 500m 67,217 
Conservation Area (m2)  within 300m 123,207 
Listed Buildings (m2) within 300m 34,279 
Parks & Gardens (m2) within 300m 530 
Adjacent to a Park 0.07 
Distance to Nearest Station (m) 212 
Floors 8.25 
Depreciation Age 1 
Basements per Floor 0.12 
A/C e 
Office Space Grade A e 
Percent Occupied 0.89 
Multiple Tenants 0.28 
Parking Spaces 15 
†ln(e)=1, i.e. the dummy variable is indicated in log form. 
‡ln(1)=0, i.e. the dummy variable is not indicated in log form. 
 
Using these assumed values combined with the fractionally time-weighted63 time-dummy 
coefficients estimated from Table 12, we calculate an estimated sale-price/m2 time-series 
for this hypothetical building across the study period. The results are displayed in Figure 10 
                                                 
62
 We assume that the building to be constructed is designed by a famous architect, outside a conservation 
area, is not listed, is brand new (no depreciation age), has A/C, and is Grade A (highest grade measured) 
office space. Other independent variables are assumed to be the sample mean of those properties exclusively 
located in the City of London. 
63
 See chapter 3. 
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along with estimates for the cost/m2 of expensive trophy architect and standard architect 
buildings by number of floors from 2000-2012 provided by Gardiner & Theobald. 
 
Figure 10: Price per m2 for ‘average’ office in City of London compared with building costs. 
 
 
As we can see from the gap between prices and costs in Figure 10, there appears to be 
considerable profits to be earned from securing planning permission to build ‘tall’. This has 
been true regardless of market conditions over the last decade and even assuming the 
additional costs involved with employing a trophy architect. Conservatively assuming a 
£7,000/m2 price achieved at the time of sale64, the 8-floor standard architect building will 
earn profits of £46m with a capital return65 of 186%, and the 28-floor expensive trophy 
architect building will earn profits of £89m with a capital return of 71%. Notice that the 
trophy architect building earns 93% higher profits, which compares well with the 100% 
increase in revenues estimated earlier from Table 13 specifications 4 and 5. Since the two 
projects are mutually exclusive, if sufficient capital can be raised, ceteris paribus the 28-
floor trophy architect building will yield greater profits and is the superior investment66.  
                                                 
64
 At current ‘prime’ and ‘grade A’ rent levels this would suggest very plausible yields of 7.7% and 6.9%, 
repectively. Source: Gardiner & Theobald. 
65
 Although an IRR would be ideal, we define capital return here as simply Profit/Cost. 
66
 The cost of capital is subsumed in construction costs. 
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These results are formalized in Figure 11 below. On the vertical axis we have marginal 
revenues accruing from the sale of a building with an additional floor67. On the horizontal 
axis we have the number of floors in the building, which is a close approximation to 
supply.  represents the normal height restriction imposed on buildings by local councils, 
which in the City of London is approximately 8 floors.  is the average floor height 
achievable with a trophy architect outside a conservation area, which according to our 
estimates is 28 floors. And ∗ represents the number of floors required to equate the 
marginal cost of an additional floor with the marginal revenue of an additional floor, that is, 
the number of floors at which profits are maximised. Using our cost data we find that 
standard buildings will achieve maximum profits at about 73 floors and trophy architects at 
about 65 floors68. Profit from building   floors is  + ∗ (presumably with a standard 
architect), and profit from building   floors with a trophy architect is  + . The dead-
weight loss on the famous architect project arising as a result of the increased cost of the 
trophy architect needed to build  floors relative to the standard architect is A. The fact 
that trophy architects are not allowed to build as tall as they wish leads to the dead-weight 
loss 	. And the total dead-weight loss to using a famous architect compared to a world 
with no height restrictions where developers of tall buildings can use the most efficient 
construction methods is 
 +  + 	.  
  
                                                 
67
 Note that marginal revenue per floor is downward sloping because the net to gross ratio decreases with 
building height, not because of assuming  a downward sloping demand curve with respect to additional floors. 
Recent research by Koster, Ommeren, and Rietveld (2012) show in fact that each additional 10m in height 
adds 4% to the value of the building, in which case this demand curve would be upward sloping given the 
comparatively slow rate at which net-to-gross ratios decrease with the number of floors. As such the 
downward sloping revenue curve with respect to additional floors can be viewed as a conservative 
assumption. 
68
 Standard architect and famous architect buildings would ‘breakeven’ under these assumptions with 140 and 
135 floors respectively. Currently only one office building in the world, the 163 floor Burj Khalifa in Dubai 
has more floors than this, and the office building with the second greatest number of floors is the 118 floor 
International Commerce Centre in Hong Kong 
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Figure 11: Profitability of trophy architects 
 
 
Taking our office price and cost information we can estimate these additional profits and 
dead-weight losses in Figure 11. Taking our above example we find that; ∗ = £3,	 =£43,	 = £46, 
 = £32, and 	 +  = £45. This suggests that for a new office 
building in the City of London, height restrictions are preventing the developer and 
therefore society from realising gross gains of 
 +  +  + 	 = £123 for buildings 
by standard architects. To get an idea of the magnitude of these losses, this £123m 
represents a gross social welfare loss equivalent to 100% of the total cost of the 28-floor 
famous architect building, and 500% of the total cost of the 7-floor standard architect 
building. 
 
Given the substantial extra profits to be earned from hiring a trophy architect to build tall 
the natural question to ask is why developers in London do not all hire famous architects to 
flex the planning controls. One potential rejoinder to this critique is that the actual costs to 
attempting to build tall are actually greater than those reported here or that the additional 
returns may be less certain. For instance in order to build exceptionally tall more extensive 
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and detailed environmental impact statements may be required, legal assistance may be 
protracted, the architect may be asked to successively alter the building at various stages of 
the planning negotiation, the planning commission may take additional time to deliberate69, 
and permission may still be ultimately refused at the local or municipal level (Kufner, 
2011). Mayo and Sheppard (2001) refer to this type of costly, time-consuming, and 
uncertain process and outcome as ‘stochastic development control’. These authors found 
that the regulatory variance (riskiness) of the development process was more important in 
reducing current supply than the actual length of planning delay. In order to assess the 
actual profit incentives facing developers to hire famous architects one must also account 
for the additional costs of proposing a large scale development to a local authority and 
rescale expected returns by a discount rate which appropriately takes account of the 
additional planning risks. Therefore the estimate above that profits can be nearly doubled 
from £46m to £89m merely by hiring a famous architect will be somewhat inflated as it 
does not take account of further planning and legal costs and assumes that successfully 
flexing planning controls with a famous architect is automatic. A further complication may 
be the fact that the additional returns estimated here from contracting a famous architect 
assume that upon sale the building will have the same occupancy rate as the sample average 
(89%). Of course in reality new developments may be speculative, and it is far from certain 
that the building will have filled with tenants upon completion. Indeed, major projects with 
planning permission are routinely paused or abandoned in London due to a failure to secure 
a sufficient number of pre-lets on the proposed new space. Unfortunately for this study, a 
more formal assessment of these additional costs and uncertainties will remain the domain 
of future research.  
 
Regulatory tax 
It may also be instructive to compare the ‘regulatory tax70’ produced by this dataset with 
the results originally reported in Cheshire and Hilber (2008). Following Cheshire and 
Hilber we define the regulatory tax  at time  in location  to be;  
                                                 
69
 Kufner (2011) suggests that these additional regulatory demands increase the duration of the planning 
approval process for tall buildings by 1-2 years. 
70
 The concept of ‘regulatory tax’ on new development was originally introduced by Glaeser et al (2005).  
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 =  − =  − 1    (1) 
 
Where; 
  = The market price of an additional square metre of office space at time  in location  
  = The corresponding marginal construction cost of adding a square metre of an 
additional floor 
 
The regulatory tax is then the ratio of the profit to be earned on an additional floor in an 
average building to the cost of adding an additional floor to this average building. As is 
clear from equation (1), the regulatory tax represents the magnitude of economic rents 
which arise artificially from the state’s intervention in the land market, since without this 
intervention the long-run trajectory of equation (1) would equal zero. In effect, the state 
could ‘tax’ rents in an unregulated market at the same rate of the regulatory tax, and total 
rents plus tax would rise to the current regulated level of rents alone, at least in partial 
equilibrium. 
 
Using our dataset, capital values are constructed by submarket location by calibrating the 
estimated coefficients of Table 12 specification 1 with the average values of only the 
buildings located in their respective submarkets. The results are displayed in Figure 12 
below. 
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Figure 12: Estimated regulatory tax (RT) by submarket 
 
 
Note that unlike the estimates of the regulatory tax in Cheshire and Hilber, in this paper the 
regulatory tax differences between submarkets estimated is constant between years. This 
constant difference is an artefact of our hedonic estimation procedure which pools sales 
among submarkets and years without an interaction term. Therefore, the truest comparison 
we can make with the Cheshire and Hilber paper is the 2000-05 average shown in Table 16 
below71.  
 
Table 16: 2000-05 Average regulatory tax comparisons 
 2000-05 Average 
Cheshire & Hilber (2008) Current Study 
City 4.63 2.38 
West End 7.91 3.86 
Docklands 3.24 2.79 
Hammersmith 2.10 1.99 
 
As we can see, our estimates of the regulatory tax are roughly half the magnitude of those 
calculated by Cheshire and Hilber for the City and the West End, and close to parity for the 
Docklands and Hammersmith submarkets. In all cases however, the averages in Table 16 
                                                 
71
 Cheshire and Hilber’s (2008) regulatory tax data only go up to 2005, and our data only goes back to 2000. 
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are below those estimated by Cheshire and Hilber. There are a number of potential causes 
of this difference. To begin with, unlike this study, Cheshire and Hilber do not have access 
to capital values directly, but rather imputed them with data on effective rents and capital 
yields. Furthermore the source of our respective cost data is different, with Cheshire and 
Hilber applying data from Davis Langdon whilst this study employs the construction 
consultants Gardiner & Theobald. But perhaps the most likely source of this discrepancy 
lies in the difference between how the quality of space in each study is graded. While 
Cheshire and Hilber calculate their measure of the regulatory tax from only ‘prime’ space, 
this study was limited in the fact that it could only use an independent grading of the office 
floors in the building (whether A, B, or some of both) in order to assess its overall quality. 
Therefore the highest building-grade category in our study is almost certainly less accurate 
than Cheshire and Hilber, and potentially biased downward. Of course, it could also be the 
case that actual levels of the regulatory tax are indeed less than those measured by Cheshire 
and Hilber. At this juncture only future research will tell. Regardless of the regulatory tax 
differences seen in Table 16, in both cases our estimated regulatory taxes for all London 
submarkets are above unity for all time periods and averages between 2 and 3. These 
findings corroborate the severity of the gross social costs to building regulation in London 
and underscore potential problems with the restrictiveness of the current planning regime.  
 
Of course the above analyses only examine the gross costs of a single hypothetical building 
and omit the aesthetic and other benefits which may also arise from building height 
controls. Therefore if welfare maximisation is the desired economic goal, one cannot 
directly draw normative conclusions about the appropriateness of current policy from these 
results. To estimate the net social welfare loss/benefit associated with building height 
controls would require estimation of the value of these ancillary benefits and estimation of 
a general equilibrium model of the entire office market. Although these further extensions 
are beyond the possibilities of the data, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that 
suggests that the quality of the architecture produced in London in the 20th century was low 
following the repeal of statutory height restrictions in 1956, but increased after problematic 
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codes in planning law were removed72 and local planning authorities were given greater 
independence and discretion. For instance, we can see from the hedonic estimation in Table 
12 specification 1 that the decade built dummy variables reduce sales prices the most for 
buildings built in the 1960s and 1970s, but gradually increase towards positive values 
starting from about the 1990s. Indeed, it was a common view among real estate 
practitioners that post-WWII buildings looked as though they had been designed by 
‘chartered accountants’, and that the rebuilding of damaged buildings during the war was 
unfavourably reminiscent of the notoriously haphazard reconstitution of London following 
the Great Fire of 1666 (Marriott 1989, pp. 28,66). Perhaps an even more objective metric 
for the low quality of office space characterising this period was the marked divide at the 
time between the costs of speculative office developments with those commissioned for the 
client’s own occupation; with the former costing £4 10s to £7 per square foot and the latter 
£8-£10 in the years 1957-1967 (Marriott 1989, pp.29). As such it appears that the current 
planning regime is at the very least an aesthetic improvement upon its immediate post-war 
predecessor.  
 
It is interesting to speculate as to whether the developers’ predilection for low quality office 
space in great quantity following the removal of height restrictions in the 1950s was in fact 
exacerbated by the earlier imposition of these very restrictions. It may be the case for 
instance that this artificial supply constraint had driven prices to such high levels that 
budget constraints on the part of most tenants had an income effect which led to greater 
demand for an inferior good: low quality office space. This is plausible since, after labour, 
one the most significant costs to business service industries is office rent. If this were true, 
the original restrictions on building size enacted in the 1890s would have provoked 
aesthetic impacts in the marketplace that ran contrary to the statute’s putative intention 
(Mises, 1929). Furthermore, once this state of affairs existed, further regulation at the 
                                                 
72
 For instance, under labour’s Town and Country Planning Act 1947 a local authority which refused or 
revoked planning permission could be obliged to compensate the developer for their total abortive 
expenditure up to the time of revocation. Furthermore, in 1954 the Conservatives appended the law so that 
compensation must also include the development value lost, profit and all. While these laws stood, these 
requirements made it prohibitively expensive for the LCC, or any other planning authority, to refuse an 
application of any size (Marriott 1989, pp.172). Naturally this had the effect of handcuffing councils to 
prevent developments that it felt were in the interests of the developer but not the community. 
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planning level would have been required to ensure that uninspired developments did not 
pollute the existing building stock for the foreseeable future73. This is of course just one 
possible scenario. Equally plausible explanations for the change in the desired quality of 
office buildings in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s include pure changes to social preferences 
or construction technology74. At the present the data does not permit us to discriminate 
among these competing claims. 
Conclusion 
Tall buildings are controversial additions to modern cities. Although they may block out 
light, obscure views, funnel winds, and change the aesthetics of the skyline, tall buildings 
can also bring benefits such as higher densities, economic efficiency, and attractive design. 
In recent decades a political process has been at work in London selecting for tall buildings 
which are deemed by city planners to provide the greatest of these benefits. In making this 
assessment planners may use architectural fame as a credible signal for architectural 
quality, which by its very nature is subjective and speculative. In accord with official 
statements, this research has demonstrated that politicians allow famous architects to build 
taller and to sell their projects for more. Outside of conservation areas the effect of a 
famous architect was found to yield 20 additional floors to an average building and 100% 
greater sales revenues for the developer. Using construction cost data from Gardiner & 
Theobald this paper was also able to demonstrate that these additional revenues were able 
to increase the development profits of a high quality office building in the City of London 
from £46m to £89m. In sum, there are significant economic rents to be earned from 
successfully commissioning a famous architect to build tall. 
 
Although efficient levels of good architecture are no doubt desirable, when viewed through 
the lens of public choice, using famous architects to build taller may lead to additional 
social losses in the form of competitive rent-seeking. Krueger (1974) showed how import 
licensing in a hypothetical economy led to both inefficiencies in the composition of output 
                                                 
73
 Since office stock is durable and considerable development would be required to bring prices 
 back in line with market fundamentals.  
74
 Although these explanations appear to sound more like ‘just-so stories’. 
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and welfare losses as a result of competition for these licenses. In her model, competitive 
rent-seeking with selective supply restrictions produced greater social losses than the case 
where legal prohibitions were absolute. The situation of developers in London may be 
roughly analogous. Hiring famous architects, building to their higher standard, and 
navigating the additional planning scrutiny imposed on building tall is expensive. However 
unlike the stylized case of Krueger, in the present context not all of this activity may 
necessarily be considered wasteful. Again, to the extent that this competitive process leads 
to buildings which better mitigate negative impacts and accentuate potential benefits of 
building tall, the resulting building stock may prove socially superior to the non-
competitive case (for example allocation of tall building permission by lottery). 
 
The result that famous architects do not increase the sale-price per sqm of office buildings 
is an important contribution to the literature. Although previous studies identified here 
found a positive effect on both officially recognized and subjectively ‘good’ office 
architecture75, all these studies save one employed rents and not transaction prices as their 
dependent variable. As a result these studies may not capture the additional costs associated 
with the ownership of an architecturally significant building. If landlords can pass on some 
but not all of these additional costs to tenants, the result will be lower profits and sale prices 
for owners in spite of abnormally high rents for tenants. If indeed this situation is true, it 
would reconcile the apparent paradox between this paper and previous research. Moreover, 
the single study which utilised transaction prices to identify the premium imparted by 
famous architects (Fuerst et al, 2011) found that their results collapsed when they regressed 
their famous architect buildings with only a sample of similar comparables, suggesting the 
presence of deleterious omitted variable bias in their full sample. Although we do not test 
the for sample selection bias with propensity score matching as do Fuerst et al (2011), the 
hedonic model employed here has almost twice their number of controls, includes the 
crucial variable employment density, and our sales instances are correctly time-weighted. A 
further potential problem with their original analysis is that 63% of their sample of famous 
architect buildings originates from a single architectural firm (Skidmore, Owings, and 
                                                 
75
 Hough and Kratz (1983), and Vandell and Lane (1989). 
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Merrill), and it is not clear whether many of this firm’s buildings were in fact designed by 
architects who the authors would have considered famous by their own criteria76. Again 
when they restrict their sample through propensity matching, the significant effect of top-
500 architectural firms, including Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, disappears from the data. 
Assuming that, consistent with our findings, famous architects do not in fact increase the 
per area-unit sale price of office buildings in the current regulatory environment (Table 11), 
the probable existence of external benefits to good architecture implies that the divide 
between the sale price (internal benefits) of buildings with good architecture and the total 
benefits such buildings provide to the public may be large. It could be inferred from this 
situation that good architecture would be considerably underprovided by the private market. 
In which case, developers would require external incentives to enlist the services of good 
architects and thereby maximize the public good. The concession to developers who hire 
famous architects to build tall may be one such subsidy offered by the planning system 
which can overcome this price gap and deliver more efficient quantities of good 
architecture. However, the ability for planning system to deliver these superior outcomes in 
practice is a question of public choice77. 
 
Given the degree to which land markets in London are regulated it is not surprising that 
there are rents to be earned from obtaining special exemptions to them. What is of greater 
concern however is the magnitude of these rents, as this is indicative of the degree to which 
these regulations generate market distortions. Although not the primary aim of this paper, 
the data corroborates the controversial conclusion of Cheshire and Hilber (2008) that the 
regulatory restrictiveness of the London office market may impose non-trivial economic 
costs, though the estimated magnitudes of these effects were not found to be as large as in 
                                                 
76
 Fuerst et al (2011) does not indicate which buildings in their sample were actually designed by the founding 
‘signature’ architects at Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill; who won relevant architectural awards, and which 
buildings were designed latterly by other architects under the firm’s name. Presumably these are regarded by 
Fuerst et al (2011) as one and the same. This is a problem because the youngest founding architect at 
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill that we identified which could be considered a ‘signature’ architect had been 
dead for 27 years at the time of Fuerst et al’s publication.  
77
 That is to say, do planners in London have both the necessary information and correct incentives to 
efficiently realize a beautiful built environment? 
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their earlier paper. Nevertheless the size of the regulatory distortions estimated here are still 
substantial and cause for concern.  
 
A further implication of this study arises from the literature on agglomeration economies. 
Building taller affords greater density, which increases opportunities to network and 
exchange ideas which drive economic innovation. Greater density also allows for more 
efficient use of capital and resources, and as a natural consequence the potential for 
reductions in carbon emissions. However in spite of these potential benefits regulations 
across the world threaten the ability of developers to exploit these efficiencies and further 
drive economic progress through greater densities. Soliciting the services of famous 
architects may allow developers to partially circumvent regulations which would otherwise 
stymie the concentration of people and ideas which would naturally arise, and therefore for 
the economy as a whole to exploit otherwise suppressed opportunities for growth. Since we 
do not have estimates of the value created by good architecture it cannot be determined 
based on our data whether or not the planning regime in London is an institutional success 
or failure. However, if the current regulatory framework in London is too restrictive from a 
social welfare perspective, then the existence of this planning loop-hole is a state of affairs 
to be commended (Colombatto, 2003). If on the other hand the current building regulations 
are not in fact excessive, then concessions to skilled architects to build tall may still be a 
commensurate trade-off for better design and greater international recognition. Alas, as to 
answering which state of affairs characterises London’s current planning regime is 
regrettably a question for subsequent analysis.  
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Appendix A: Policy on the location and design of tall and large buildings 
Excerpted from the London Plan 2011 p.217. 
 
Policy 7.7 Location and design of tall and large buildings 
 
Strategic 
 
A Tall and large buildings should be part of a plan-led approach to changing or developing 
an area by the identification of appropriate, sensitive and inappropriate locations. Tall and 
large buildings should not have an unacceptably harmful impact on their surroundings. 
 
Planning decisions 
 
B Applications for tall or large buildings should include an urban design analysis that 
demonstrates the proposal is part of a strategy that will meet the criteria below. This is 
particularly important if the site is not identified as a location for tall or large buildings in 
the borough’s LDF. 
 
C Tall and large buildings should:  
 
a generally be limited to sites in the Central Activity Zone, opportunity areas, areas of 
intensification or town centres that have good access to public transport 
 
b only be considered in areas whose character would not be affected adversely by the scale, 
mass or bulk of a tall or large building 
 
c relate well to the form, proportion, composition, scale and character of surrounding 
buildings, urban grain and public realm (including landscape features), particularly at street 
level; 
 
d individually or as a group, improve the legibility of an area, by emphasizing a point of 
civic or visual significance where appropriate, and enhance the skyline and image of 
London 
 
e incorporate the highest standards of architecture and materials, including sustainable 
design and construction practices 
 
f have ground floor activities that provide a positive relationship to the surrounding streets 
 
g contribute to improving the permeability of the site and wider area, where possible 
 
h incorporate publicly accessible areas on the upper floors, where appropriate 
 
i make a significant contribution to local regeneration.  
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Appendix B: Separately tested but omitted controls 
Employment Connectivity: Travel-time Gravity 
In addition to employment density, a measure of employment connectivity was also tested. 
This measure was constructed by randomly plotting the number of points corresponding to 
the employment counts within each of the 546 postcode sectors described above for each 
year between 2000 and 2008. This plot was then partitioned with thiessen polygons 
surrounding each underground, overground, and rail station, and the number of workers 
working in each polygons was counted. Then for each station the public transportation 
travel-time in minutes from that station to a particular office was calculated with Google 
maps. This travel time was then back-scaled to reflect changes in public travel time speeds 
according to information provided by Transport for London. This yearly travel-time served 
as a divisor for the employment population surrounding each station, and was raised to 
powers of 1 ,1.5 and 2. Then for each office these travel times for all stations according to 
the date the office was sold were summed, and a measure of employment gravity for each 
office was calculated. This measure is omitted from the hedonic analysis below as it does 
not have an influence independent of employment density on sale-prices, and when 
employment density is omitted its significance and coefficient values are much less, with t-
stats around 2 as opposed to 6 for employment density.  
 
Labour-Force Connectivity: Travel-time Gravity 
An additional measure for the connectivity of each office to the surrounding labour force 
was calculated by; (i) taking the population aged 20-64 in each of the 983 Census Middle 
Super Output Areas (MSOA) in London78, (ii) dividing it by the public transportation 
travel-time in minutes as calculated from Google Maps79 from the population-weighted 
centroid of each that MSOAs to a particular office80, and (iii) summing up this number 
across all of the 983 MSOAs that office. Effectively this is a measure of labour force public 
                                                 
78
 For 2001, population data from the 2001 census was used. For years 2002-2010 official government 
population estimates were used. For years 1998-2000, the 2001 census counts were scaled back in time 
geometrically according to London population estimates from Key Population and Vital Statistics for each 
year. 
79
 Travel-times were calculated between March and April 2012, and applied to previous years by using 
historic public and car transportation travel-time data provided by Transport for London. 
80
 Separately raised to the power of 1, 1.5, or 2. 
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transportation travel-time gravity to each office. A separate measure was calculated for car 
travel-time and the minimum of car/public travel time in the denominator, also raised to 
powers of 1, 1.5, or 2. Although all nine81 of these measures were tested in the hedonic 
model, the coefficients were often converse to expectations, and never close to significance 
for any iterations of the specification unless employment density was removed. If 
employment density is removed, the co-location of many workers close to transportation 
hubs apparently made the labour force gravity variables significant, with a t-stat of 
approximately 2. Since employment density has a t-stat of 6, and nearest station distance at 
least had the correct sign (negative) on its coefficient, it was chosen to run the preferred 
model with employment density and distance to nearest station as proxy for both 
employment and labour connectivity. 
 
Congestion Charging Zone 
From February 17th 2003 a congestion charging zone was imposed for vehicles entering 
central London. From 19th February 2007 to Dececmber 24th 2010 a Western Extension to 
this boundary was also enforced along London’s West End. As a Pigouvian tax on 
congestion externalities, and with demonstrably positive and large effects on average 
vehicle speeds82, the congestion charge should theoretically have had an effect on land 
prices within the charging zone. Although this paper tested controls for the congestion 
charge including dummy variables, distance of the property to congestion charging 
boundary if within the zone, interactions with the amount of retail space in the building83, 
interactions with the number of office building parking spaces, double interactions with the 
Labour Force Connectivity by car (see above), and differences between the Central 
Charging Zone and the Western Extension, no statistically significant effects on the sale-
price of office space were indicated. 
                                                 
81
 Public, car, and  min(public,car) travel times raised to powers of 1, 1.5, or 2. 
82
 Vehicles speeds increased 30% on average with the charging zone during peak hours (Transport for 
London, 2004). 
83
 Previous studies have indicated reductions in retail sales as a consequence of congestion charging. For 
studies involving the London Congestion Charge see Quddus, Bell, Schmoker, Fonzone (2007), and for an 
international perspective see Daunfeldt, Rudholm, Ramme (2011). 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics of data used on building size regressions 
 N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Modern Famous Architect 6 - - - - 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect 4 - - - - 
Floorspace (sqm) 387 8,757 10,993 181 113,666 
Levels 387 8.37 4.17 4 46 
Footprint (sqm) 387 1,528 1,491 66 10,806 
Curtilage (sqm) 387 1,744 1,841 66 13,571 
Floorspace/Curtilage 387 4.829 1.933 0.348 17.296 
Footprint/Curtilage 387 0.939 0.147 0.093 1.0 
Average Employment 500m 387 35,783 23,584 1,105 95,121 
Built Pre-1950s 122 - - - - 
Built 1950s 13 - - - - 
Built 1960s 27 - - - - 
Built 1970s 25 - - - - 
Built 1980s 58 - - - - 
Built 1990s 67 - - - - 
Built 2000s 73 - - - - 
Built 2010s 2 - - - - 
Within Conservation Area 209 - - - - 
Built in Conservation Area 90 - - - - 
Listed 46 - - - - 
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics of data used on hedonic regressions 
 N/Freq. Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Modern Famous Architect 10 - - - - 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect 6 - - - - 
Price (£m) 513 65.89 101.05 1.45 1,111.9 
Floorspace (sqm) 513 9,231 11,596 181 113,666 
Levels 513 8.45 4.17 4 46 
Footprint (sqm) 513 1,613 1,531 66 10,806 
Curtilage (sqm) 513 1,819 1,831 66 13,571 
Price (£)/ Floorspace (sqm) 513 7,025 3,097 1,492 25,477 
Price (£)/ Curtilage (sqm) 513 34,594 20,705 1,584 141,427 
Floorspace/Curtilage 513 4.853 1.891 0.348 17.296 
Footprint/Curtilage 513 0.938 0.147 0.093 1.0 
2008 Employment 500m 513 38,134 25,044 1,508 104,476 
Built Pre-1950s 162 - - - - 
Built 1950s 20 - - - - 
Built 1960s 32 - - - - 
Built 1970s 30 - - - - 
Built 1980s 80 - - - - 
Built 1990s 93 - - - - 
Built 2000s 94 - - - - 
Built 2010s 2 - - - - 
Within Conservation Area 276 - - - - 
Built in Conservation Area 121 - - - - 
Listed 63 - - - - 
City Core 167 - - - - 
City Fringe 45 - - - - 
Docklands 8 - - - - 
Mid-Town 72 - - - - 
North Central 14 - - - - 
South Central 12 - - - - 
Southern Fringe 17 - - - - 
102 
 
West Central 17 - - - - 
West End 161 - - - - 
Sold 2000 Q4 6 - - - - 
Sold 2001 Q1 6 - - - - 
Sold 2001 Q2 4 - - - - 
Sold 2001 Q3 6 - - - - 
Sold 2001 Q4 8 - - - - 
Sold 2002 Q1 5 - - - - 
Sold 2002 Q2 8 - - - - 
Sold 2002 Q3 5 - - - - 
Sold 2002 Q4 4 - - - - 
Sold 2003 Q1 5 - - - - 
Sold 2003 Q2 9 - - - - 
Sold 2003 Q3 5 - - - - 
Sold 2003 Q4 11 - - - - 
Sold 2004 Q1 13 - - - - 
Sold 2004 Q2 11 - - - - 
Sold 2004 Q3 11 - - - - 
Sold 2004 Q4 12 - - - - 
Sold 2005 Q1 9 - - - - 
Sold 2005 Q2 8 - - - - 
Sold 2005 Q3 14 - - - - 
Sold 2005 Q4 20 - - - - 
Sold 2006 Q1 13 - - - - 
Sold 2006 Q2 20 - - - - 
Sold 2006 Q3 19 - - - - 
Sold 2006 Q4 20 - - - - 
Sold 2007 Q1 15 - - - - 
Sold 2007 Q2 27 - - - - 
Sold 2007 Q3 19 - - - - 
Sold 2007 Q4 15 - - - - 
Sold 2008 Q1 10 - - - - 
Sold 2008 Q2 12 - - - - 
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Sold 2008 Q3 7 - - - - 
Sold 2008 Q4 5 - - - - 
Sold 2009 Q1 13 - - - - 
Sold 2009 Q2 17 - - - - 
Sold 2009 Q3 13 - - - - 
Sold 2009 Q4 14 - - - - 
Sold 2010 Q1 12 - - - - 
Sold 2010 Q2 21 - - - - 
Sold 2010 Q3 19 - - - - 
Sold 2010 Q4 19 - - - - 
Sold 2011 Q1 13 - - - - 
Sold 2011 Q2 10 - - - - 
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Appendix D: Net-to-gross internal area ratio 
As buildings increase in height each floor must devote a greater percentage of space to 
structural support, plant operations, and passenger lifts. This requirement reduces the ratio 
of lettable floorspace to gross internal area as the building increases in height. For instance, 
using our sample of 387 buildings, a regression of the number of lifts on the number of 
floors, holding footprint constant, shows that on average for every 5-floor increase in 
height, buildings are allocated with 2 additional lifts. It is easy to see how, as a building of 
a given footprint is designed taller, its lettable office space would gradually be ‘hollowed 
out’ by these structural requirements. 
 
Table 19: Lifts per floor 
 (1) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Number of Lifts 
  
Footprint 0.00143*** 
 (0.000171) 
Floors 0.395*** 
 (0.0863) 
Constant -1.580** 
 (0.691) 
  
Observations 387 
R-squared 0.757 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Floors2 was tested simultaneously but found insignificant 
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Appendix E: Occupancy rate excluded comparison 
 
Table 20 below compares regressions which include and omit building occupancy rate in 
order to see whether a positive effect of famous architect on sale price is being subsumed 
by the occupancy rate variable. As the modern and pre-modern famous architect 
coefficients do not change by more than 1 standard error with the exclusion of occupancy 
rate, we can see that the inclusion of the occupancy rate variable does not significantly alter 
the result that modern and pre-modern famous architects have no effect and a negative 
effect, respectively on office building prices per unit of floorspace.  
 
Table 20: Testing whether a positive effect of famous architect on sale-price is ‘stolen’ by the occupancy rate 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
OLS 
Ln(Price/ 
Sqm) 
   
Modern Famous Architect -0.0309 -0.0242 
 (0.115) (0.116) 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect -0.562*** -0.628*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) 
Within Conservation Area 0.0360 0.0309 
 (0.0355) (0.0359) 
Listed Building -0.0129 -0.0125 
 (0.0506) (0.0512) 
Ln(Average Office Permission Refusal Rate 
9 yr Moving Average) 
0.0303** 0.0350** 
 (0.0148) (0.0150) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.156*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0330) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) 0.00655 0.00608 
 (0.00860) (0.00870) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0278* 0.0253* 
 (0.0143) (0.0145) 
Ln(Park and Gardens Density 300m) 0.00954*** 0.00957*** 
 (0.00258) (0.00261) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.149*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0455) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station) -0.0102 -0.0135 
 (0.0267) (0.0270) 
Ln(Number of Above Ground Floors) 0.174*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0537) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.00869 -0.00803 
 (0.00665) (0.00673) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0205** -0.0217*** 
 (0.00819) (0.00828) 
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A/C 0.223*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0790) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.0306 0.0458 
 (0.0429) (0.0431) 
EG Office Grade A 0.0881** 0.110*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0389) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0268***  
 (0.00793)  
Multiple Tenant Building -0.0996*** -0.0881*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0336) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00433 0.00609* 
 (0.00347) (0.00348) 
   
Decade Built YES YES 
   
Quarter Sold YES YES 
   
Submarket Dummies YES YES 
   
Constant 5.888*** 5.874*** 
 (0.391) (0.396) 
   
Observations 513 513 
R-squared 0.630 0.621 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix F: Robustness checks 
As shown in Table 2, there are four buildings in the sample built by famous architects 
outside a conservation area. All of these buildings were built post-1956 after the statutory 
height regulations were abolished. As a robustness check for Table 8, Table 9, and Table 
14, in the following tables we sequentially remove these building observations from the 
sample according to their height from tallest to shortest. 
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Table 21: Floorspace/Curtilage robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
Full Sample 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
Omit Tallest 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
Omit 2 Tallest 
OLS 
Floorspace/ 
Curtilage 
Omit 3 Tallest 
     
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
3.255*** 2.909*** 2.842*** 2.150*** 
 (0.528) (0.476) (0.609) (0.465) 
Famous Architect 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.140 
 (0.320) (0.321) (0.322) (0.321) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.488** -0.492** -0.492** -0.494** 
 (0.227) (0.226) (0.226) (0.227) 
Average Office Permission 
Refusal Rate 
-14.89*** -14.90*** -14.92*** -15.03*** 
 (3.649) (3.638) (3.646) (3.655) 
Built 1950s 0.184 0.182 0.183 0.186 
 (0.388) (0.388) (0.388) (0.388) 
Built 1960s 1.012* 1.010* 1.010* 1.012* 
 (0.595) (0.595) (0.595) (0.595) 
Built 1970s 0.703** 0.702** 0.702** 0.706** 
 (0.332) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) 
Built 1980s 0.361 0.359 0.359 0.362 
 (0.307) (0.304) (0.304) (0.304) 
Built 1990s 0.727*** 0.739*** 0.740*** 0.733*** 
 (0.254) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256) 
Built 2000s 1.402*** 1.402*** 1.402*** 1.414*** 
 (0.268) (0.267) (0.267) (0.269) 
Built 2010s 0.183 0.188 0.189 0.187 
 (1.074) (1.070) (1.070) (1.079) 
City of London -1.190** -1.172** -1.173** -1.206** 
 (0.514) (0.510) (0.510) (0.516) 
Docklands 1.857*** 1.680** 1.679** 1.673** 
 (0.644) (0.702) (0.702) (0.703) 
Average Employment 500m 1.47e-05** 1.44e-05** 1.43e-05** 1.46e-05** 
 (6.42e-06) (6.44e-06) (6.47e-06) (6.50e-06) 
Constant 5.410*** 5.418*** 5.421*** 5.429*** 
 (0.521) (0.520) (0.522) (0.523) 
     
Observations 387 386 385 384 
R-squared 0.278 0.250 0.236 0.225 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 22: Total above ground floors robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Floors 
Full Sample 
OLS 
Floors 
Omit Tallest 
OLS 
Floors 
Omit 2 Tallest 
OLS 
Floors 
Omit 3 Tallest 
     
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
19.99*** 16.11** 8.436*** 5.142*** 
 (5.882) (6.478) (2.374) (0.741) 
Famous Architect -0.697 -0.697 -0.579 -0.564 
 (0.573) (0.570) (0.566) (0.566) 
Built in Conservation Area -1.139*** -1.205*** -1.225*** -1.235*** 
 (0.271) (0.255) (0.253) (0.253) 
Average Office Permission 
Refusal Rate 
3.654 2.725 0.643 0.131 
 (10.44) (10.32) (10.16) (10.18) 
Built 1950s 1.350*** 1.341*** 1.369*** 1.384*** 
 (0.363) (0.362) (0.364) (0.365) 
Built 1960s 5.333*** 5.324*** 5.319*** 5.333*** 
 (1.472) (1.475) (1.480) (1.480) 
Built 1970s 2.419*** 2.439*** 2.466*** 2.485*** 
 (0.674) (0.670) (0.669) (0.670) 
Built 1980s 0.295 0.364 0.403 0.418 
 (0.310) (0.290) (0.284) (0.284) 
Built 1990s 1.185*** 1.335*** 1.510*** 1.477*** 
 (0.352) (0.337) (0.314) (0.312) 
Built 2000s 2.034*** 2.061*** 1.994*** 2.056*** 
 (0.358) (0.331) (0.315) (0.313) 
Built 2010s 1.331 1.369 1.449 1.443 
 (1.586) (1.583) (1.591) (1.633) 
City of London -0.0139 -0.00486 -0.160 -0.313 
 (1.290) (1.248) (1.211) (1.216) 
Docklands 4.158** 2.141** 1.982** 1.954** 
 (1.964) (0.965) (0.950) (0.953) 
Average Employment 500m 3.26e-05*** 3.05e-05** 2.59e-05** 2.73e-05** 
 (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.17e-05) (1.17e-05) 
Constant 4.734*** 4.883*** 5.251*** 5.289*** 
 (1.257) (1.250) (1.219) (1.220) 
     
Observations 387 386 385 384 
R-squared 0.468 0.369 0.282 0.260 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Price/Curtilage robustness check 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
VARIABLES Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
Full Sample 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
Omit Tallest 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
Omit 2 Tallest 
Ln(Price/ 
Curtilage) 
Omit 3 Tallest 
     
Famous Architect outside 
Conservation Area 
1.156*** 1.031*** 0.956*** 0.932*** 
 (0.319) (0.320) (0.322) (0.330) 
Modern Famous Architect -0.438 -0.428 -0.424 -0.422 
 (0.296) (0.296) (0.297) (0.296) 
Pre-Modern Famous Architect -0.384*** -0.378*** -0.381*** -0.382*** 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
Within Conservation Area -0.0528 -0.0536 -0.0548 -0.0550 
 (0.0819) (0.0822) (0.0823) (0.0825) 
Built in Conservation Area -0.0333 -0.0405 -0.0391 -0.0404 
 (0.0958) (0.0961) (0.0962) (0.0965) 
Listed Bldg -0.140* -0.139* -0.138* -0.138* 
 (0.0779) (0.0777) (0.0776) (0.0777) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal 
Rate 9yr Moving Average) 
0.0131 0.0135 0.0134 0.0140 
 (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.205*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0525) 
Ln(Conservation Area Density 
300m) 
-0.0166 -0.0173 -0.0172 -0.0172 
 (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.0327* 0.0504** 0.0506** 0.0527** 
 (0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0208) 
Ln(Park and Garden Density 
300m) 
0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00381) (0.00378) (0.00378) (0.00383) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.156** 0.146** 0.149** 0.148** 
 (0.0696) (0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0720) 
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.0102 -0.000209 1.12e-05 -0.000338 
 (0.0502) (0.0507) (0.0507) (0.0510) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0135 
 (0.00931) (0.00931) (0.00931) (0.00929) 
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0176 -0.0172 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0136) 
A/C 0.449*** 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.265*** 0.263*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0656) (0.0658) 
EG Office Grade A 0.361*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 0.371*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0587) (0.0589) (0.0590) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0261* 0.0264* 0.0263* 0.0261* 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.00848 -0.00210 -0.00193 -0.00334 
 (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0511) 
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Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00795 0.00824 0.00811 0.00822 
 (0.00511) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00510) 
     
Decade Built YES YES YES YES 
     
Submarket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Quarter Sold YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 6.999*** 6.991*** 7.006*** 7.049*** 
 (0.561) (0.569) (0.569) (0.578) 
     
Observations 513 511 510 507 
R-squared 0.611 0.607 0.602 0.600 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Chapter 2 Transition 
The previous chapter presented research on the ability of famous architects to relax 
building size restrictions in the tightly regulated London office market. The substantial gap 
between the sale price and cost of additional space (or regulatory tax) shows that these 
restrictions appear to be highly distortionary, and as a result sizeable economic rents can be 
earned from successfully flexing the planning system with famous design. Naturally, this 
knowledge has direct relevance to developers wishing to generate superior capital returns 
on their investments via building as tall as possible. However, the existence of these sizable 
economic rents should also be recognised as important evidence for local and national 
governments regarding the economic costs imposed by the current regulatory regime. 
Unless it can be shown that the added aesthetic benefits derived from these strict policies 
recoup these substantial losses, a more permissive development framework for London 
should be considered. 
 
Consistent with the work of Cheshire and Hilber (2008), this paper also found that the 
estimated regulatory taxes varied considerably across London submarkets due to local 
differences in the price of space. As will be shown in the following chapter, this intra-city 
price variation appears to be at least partially due to differences in the restrictiveness of 
development control across local administrative boundaries, which roughly correspond to 
the recognised extent of these submarkets. It will subsequently be shown that this 
submarket price variability has important implications for the construction of an accurate 
repeat-sales price index for London in practice. In particular, we will demonstrate that 
submarket price effects bias estimated price levels in a city-wide index due to the 
unrepresentativeness of the observed sale-multiples required for repeat-sales indices. Thus 
the very factors which drive economic rents and potentially superior development profits in 
London on the one hand, may lead directly to measurement problems in price index 
construction on the other.  
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Chapter 2: Spatial heterogeneity in commercial repeat-sales indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates sources of bias in commercial repeat-sales price indices (RSPI) by 
constructing an RSPI for the central London office market, and examining sources of index 
change relative to the market as a whole. We find that very local employment density 
changes and the restrictiveness of new development in the relevant local authority impose 
substantial biases on estimated price levels because repeat-sales occur disproportionately in 
areas where changes in these attributes differ compared to the stock as a whole. 
Furthermore, when employment density changes and planning restrictiveness are controlled 
for, submarket dummies and a Heckman’s correction for unobserved sample heterogeneity 
lose their ability to explain index levels. These findings are consistent with the conjecture 
that employment density changes and development restrictiveness are the key external 
drivers of RSPI bias in the central London office market. 
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Introduction 
Accurate estimation of price-levels in real estate is as difficult as it is important. As an asset 
class real estate accounts for over £5 trillion or 20% of gross wealth in the UK (Office for 
National Statistics, 2012). Clearly the price indices that measure this wealth are important 
performance benchmarks for industry, and can help market participants identify when price 
changes are at odds with market fundamentals. However, since real estate – particularly 
commercial real estate – is in general highly heterogeneous and infrequently traded, the 
estimation of accurate and timely price indices is fraught with difficulty. Among the 
competing strands of price index construction methodologies, repeat-sales indices have 
become increasingly popular as a tool for measuring residential and commercial real estate 
prices and movements in them84.  
 
The repeat-sales method of index construction is essentially a fixed effects approach. By 
differencing sales occurring at separate points in time it is possible to implicitly control for 
property characteristics. This contrasts with hedonic price indices where the universe of 
relevant controls for property characteristics must be identified and obtained. Furthermore, 
if one assumes temporal and spatial parameter constancy, knowledge of the correct 
functional form of the model in repeat-sales is irrelevant, whereas in the hedonic case this 
decision is crucial (Cropper, Deck, and McConnell, 1988). Of course, any internal building 
attributes which change during the holding period (due to say, capital improvements or 
depreciation85) will naturally bias the index. Although one could attempt to model capital 
improvements hedonically within a repeat-sales regression, researchers generally deal with 
deliberate building changes by removing these observations from the sample. External 
changes to the building’s environment on the other hand, will not necessarily bias repeat-
sales. It is hoped in fact that the inter-period price movements which arise from changes 
external to the building will be reflected in the index. It is only when external changes are 
unrepresentative of the market as whole that such factors become problematic in a repeat-
                                                 
84See Case and Shiller (1989),  and Geltner and Pollakowski (2007). 
85
 Until recently depreciation was not modelled, as a linear specification of this variable would be multi-
collinear with the holding period. In recent years however research has circumvented this problem by 
modelling the depreciation rate non-linearly (Chau, Wong, and Yiu, 2005).  
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sales regression. For instance, it is correct for local transportation improvements to register 
in the price levels of a repeat-sales index. However, if the second-sales in a repeat-sales 
index consisted of only the houses sold within 2km say, of new stations following the 1999 
jubilee line extension in London, this particular sample of properties would not be 
representative of price movements accruing to the entire housing stock across all of inner 
London (Gibbons and Machin, 2005). In a similar vein, real estate price indices based 
solely on samples of sold properties may not accurately represent the population of 
properties due to the potential for sample-selection bias. Note that by contrast a hedonic 
index which consisted solely of Gibbons and Machin’s sample could still produce unbiased 
price levels so long as transportation connectivity differences were correctly controlled. 
This sample sensitivity is a fundamental difference between hedonic and repeat-sales 
indices. Of course, like repeat-sales indices, hedonic indices can also be subject to sample 
selection bias. However, the scope for these problems in hedonic indices is relatively less. 
 
The repeat-sales method, as introduced in the seminal article by Bailey, Muth, and Nourse 
(1963), can be derived from the hedonic method. If we assign the logged first and second 
sale price of property  as  ! and  ", respectively, in logs we have; 
 
 ! =#	$ !%&! +#'(!
)
&! +	* !   (2)  
 
 " =#	$ "%&! +#'("
)
&! + * "   (3) 
 
Where; 
  + = Log sale price for sale number , = 1,2 
 	 = Coefficient on $ 
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$ +  = Log characteristic j of property i for sale , = 1,2 
 '  = Price-level at time t 
 (+ = Dummy variable indicating sale , = 1,2 at time t 
 * + = i.i.d. error term for property i and sale , = 1,2. 
 
Assuming property characteristics are constant between sales, ∀∀($ ! = $ " ), 
differencing equation (3) with equation (2) yields; 
 
 " −  ! =#'((")&! − (!) + 1 !,"   (4) 
 
Where 1 !," = * " − 	* !. If we assume that sales 1 and 2 occur at time 	 and  + 2, 
respectively, the estimation equation becomes; 
  34 −   = '34 − ' + 1 ,34   (5) 
 
Index estimates ' represent the cumulative price index for time , and can then be anti-
logged and corrected for transformation bias86 to produce the unbiased nominal estimates of 
the price index. 
 
This study investigates the existence of bias in a repeat-sales index of commercial office 
property in London, and identifies potential sources of this bias. It is found that exceptional 
local employment density changes (long thought to be a significant determinant of office 
demand and prices) not only cause properties to sell with greater probability, but that these 
density changes bias commercial repeat-sales price indices upward. In addition, the repeat-
                                                 
86
 See Kennedy (1981) and Giles (1982) for the calculation of the transformation-bias correction. 
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sales in our sample tend to be located in places that are spatially unrepresentative of the 
distribution of actual offices across central London (relatively clustered around the City of 
London)., and since price movements across London submarkets vary to a considerable 
degree, this unrepresentativeness is expressed in repeat-sales index price levels. 
Furthermore, we find that the different price movements across submarkets can be linked to 
the restrictiveness of supply in the corresponding local authority area87. Because these 
effects are not constant over time, the bias they impart is more damaging to the usefulness 
of repeat-sales indices because index corrections cannot be generalised (Steele and Goy, 
1997).  
Literature Review 
A fundamental question with regard to all transaction-based indices, whether derived from 
hedonic or repeat-sales methodologies, is the extent to which sold properties are actually 
representative of the property stock. That is to say, whether the prices of the properties that 
have sold are reflective of the unrealized return that would have been achieved had all the 
unsold properties also in fact sold88. A natural target for price indices is the central 
tendency of the distribution of price levels in a market (Wang and Zorn 1999). In a 
regression context, this estimated central tendency or mean will be biased when one or 
more of the independent variables are correlated with the error term. This can happen in the 
case of omitted variables or measurement errors which end up in the error term. When this 
happens, any regressors that are correlated with the mismeasured or unspecified factors will 
end up proxying for them, and one cannot interpret estimated price coefficients as an 
accurate gauge of their true effect. In a price index regression this leads to inaccurate 
estimates of price-levels and changes. Although repeat-sales regressions do not in general 
suffer from this type of problem, they do possess characteristics that particularly expose 
themselves to sample selection bias. Among these is the fact that because the index is based 
on repeat-sales rather than all sales, only a fraction (usually around a third) of any given 
                                                 
87
 Although central London submarket definitions and local planning authority (LPA) boundaries are not 
perfectly coincident, the submarket and LPA boundaries for the uniquely permissive City of London are 
approximately equal (see Figure 25). 
88
 An analogous problem in appraisal-based indices is the representativeness of the portfolio of properties 
comprising the index. 
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sample of sales will be able to be matched with a sale-pair. Of course, the remaining 
observations must be discarded and this is an incomplete use of transaction information. In 
addition, even when sale-pairs can be matched the resulting sample of repeat-sales has been 
found to be often (but not always) unrepresentative of the population of properties. This 
may come about because, by construction, a repeat-sales index is composed primarily of 
those properties which transact relatively frequently. One of the ways in which repeat-sales 
have been shown to vary is that residential properties which are resold ‘rapidly’ often 
appreciate at different rates (generally higher) than properties which take more time to sell 
between sales (Case, Pollakowski, and Wachter 1997; and Clapp and Giacotto, 1999). In 
their research these authors attribute this effect to the possibility that these rapidly resold 
properties have been improved structurally or cosmetically between sales, but that this 
information is not available to the researcher so that they could exclude these observations 
from their analysis. Other research by Steele and Goy (1997) found that the first-sale of 
repeat-house-sales in their sample sold for a relative discount, which imparted a positive 
bias to their price index. They explained this phenomenon by hypothesizing that repeat-
sales properties were being held by an opportune buyer with exceptional ability to time the 
market. On the same token other research by Meese and Wallace (1997), and Clapp, 
Giacotto, and Tirtiroglu (1991) failed to find a systemic difference between properties sold 
once and repeat-sales, and research by Clapp and Giacotto (1992), while finding selection 
bias in repeat-sales, saw no effect on their price index for time periods greater than 3 years.  
 
Dombrow, Knight and Sirmans (1997) examine sources of bias in repeat-sales regressions 
related to changes in unobserved property characteristics and the temporal instability of 
estimated parameters. When adding controls in a repeat-sales regression for whether a 
house was vacant at the time of sale and whether below market financing was achieved, 
they found that estimated price indices became smoother and exhibited less volatility. In 
addition, they found that the effect of house floorspace on sale-prices was not constant. The 
evidence that parameters are time-variable is of course problematic for both repeat-sales 
and hedonic regressions. The most common way to deal with this problem is to divide the 
sample by smaller time periods and re-estimate parameter values each period as in hedonic 
imputation. However, usually sample size limitations prevent this practice. Regardless, the 
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lack of parameter stability is an insurmountable source of bias in mechanical methods of 
index estimation89, and one can only hope that the bias in any particular case remains mild. 
 
In contrast to explicitly examining sources of bias that can be observed (and if observed 
explicitly controlled) Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) extend the analysis of unrepresentative 
repeat-sales by analysing the extent to which residential repeat-sales indices in Florida may 
be biased by unobserved sample selection. To do this they retain the standard repeat-sales 
regression method of Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963), but augment it with a bivariate 
sequential Heckman (1979) correction. As in the standard Heckman procedure, Gatzlaff 
and Haurin treat the censored repeat-sales equation as a specification error in which a 
variable is incorrectly omitted. As shown by Heckman, the expected value of the error term 
in this equation is not zero and therefore naïve OLS estimates are biased. However by 
estimating a probit model relating the probability of sale to a set of selection ‘instruments’, 
then using estimates produced from this equation to construct the inverse Mills-ratio90, and 
finally  including this variable as a control in the original estimation equation this bias can 
be remedied. The unique characteristic of the Heckman procedure is that one need not 
observe the potential sources of bias in one’s sample in order to control for them. Using 
macroeconomic variables and house characteristics as instruments, Gatzlaff and Haurin 
find significant upward unobserved sample selection bias in their sample as a result of 
changing economic conditions and the variable composition of sold homes.  
 
One limitation of these previous studies is none of them examine the existence of sample 
selection bias in commercial repeat-sales indices. Neither do the papers which focus on 
sample selection bias attempt to corroborate their hypotheses of the proximate causes of 
observed bias with evidence derived from their actual data. In fact, altogether the author 
was only able to source a single previous paper which examined a commercial repeat-sales 
index; the purpose of the paper was to compare it with an appraisal index (Gatzlaff and 
Geltner, 1998), and another paper which investigated sample selection bias in commercial 
property, but in the context of a hedonic regression (Munneke and Slade, 2000). This study 
                                                 
89
 Appraisals may, in principle at least, be better able to capture the effects of changing parameters. 
90
 See chapter 3 for an exposition of the calculation of this quantity. 
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fills this gap in the literature by investigating the existence of sample selection bias in a 
repeat-sales index of commercial office property in London, and examining potential 
sources of this bias. We also extend the analysis of Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) by showing 
that a standard Heckman’s correction may be sufficient to account for unobserved sample 
selection bias in our sample, and that this bias disappears when controls for local 
employment density changes and supply restrictiveness are included. 
Data 
The data on commercial office transactions in central London from 2000-08 was provided 
by Estates Gazette and Real Capital Analytics. We restrict ourselves to the geographic 
boundary of central London as postcode sectors are considerably smaller in these areas than 
the rest of London allowing for finer-grained analysis. Only sales occurring between 2000 
and 2008 are used as these correspond with the years for which we have data on 
employment density by postcode sector (see below). Paired sales were removed from the 
sample if a second sale occurred less than 12 months from the first. This was done in 
attempt to reduce the potentially biasing effect of these so-called ‘flips’ on price index 
estimation (Clapp and Giacotto, 1999). In addition, sales that were part of a portfolio were 
removed91, as were those properties which had price movements exceeding 50% per 
annum, or which were refurbished or otherwise redeveloped between sales. This filtering 
process represents the current best practice with regard to repeat-sales, and is nearly 
identical to that used by Real Capital Analytics to compute indices of US markets for 
research and industry (Geltner and Pollakowski, 2007). The two alterations being that in 
order to allow for differences between London and the US markets, the second sale of the 
repeat-sales pair is deemed to be a ‘flip’ if it occurs in less than 12 months after the first 
rather than 18, and annual price movements cannot exceed 50% per annum for all years 
rather than using a rate of return which scales downward according to the holding period92. 
From an original dataset of 3,351 observations, this filter yielded 409 office properties sold 
                                                 
91
 For properties which sell as a portfolio it is not possible to separate individual property contributions to the 
combined sale price, and therefore these transactions cannot be used to infer information about market price-
levels (unless an identical grouping of properties is sold in multiples). 
92
 We do not adopt the more complex extreme returns filter of Geltner and Pollakowski (2007) because of the 
relatively short period under analysis and the unusual volatility endemic for the period (2000-08). 
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in central London sold between 2000-08 which did not have a repeat sale-transaction for 
any years between 1990-2011, and 173 repeat-sales occurring in central London between 
2000-08. The original pool of observations differs slightly from the dataset adopted in 
chapter 1 of this thesis because additional sales observations for use in the repeat-sales 
index were latterly collected from Estates Gazette. 
 
Data on the entire office stock in central London in 2002 was provided by Property Market 
Analysis LLP (PMA). As of 2002, the population of central London buildings whose 
primary function is office use amounted to 6,848 buildings, comprising 20.3 million m2 of 
office floorspace. Although detailed data on the characteristics of each of these properties 
could not be obtained, the number of buildings in each postcode sector and total floorspace 
at the postcode sector-level was made available. Since we do not have data on the exact 
address of each of these 6,848 buildings, the number of office buildings in each central 
London postcode sector was used to construct a hypothetical office stock consisting of an 
identical number of office buildings dropped at random locations in each of the 244 
postcode sectors that comprise our definition of central London. For instance, if we know 
that a certain postcode sector has 100 buildings in it, then a digital representation of this 
postcode area is created and the 100 office locations are plotted at random within this area 
for analysis. For the 16.4 million m2 of land area in the 244 postcode sectors in this 
analysis, the average level of spatial detail (area) for each postcode sector is 67,200sqm or a 
260m sided-square (see Figure 13). Water features from the Ordnance Survey Mastermap 
and Parks and Gardens from English Heritage were also removed from these postcode 
sectors so as to better reflect the locations within them where office buildings could 
actually be located, and where employees could work. In addition, PMA supplied data on 
the gross floorspace built in central London from 2002-2011 at the postcode sector level. 
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Figure 13: Postcode sectors of central (pink) and inner London (green) 
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The sale price and office location data is also supplemented with data on the number of 
employees within the 244 postcode sectors under study from NOMIS. In order to construct 
local employment density, a spatial point for each worker was placed at random within 
their corresponding postcode sector, and then the surrounding number of points within a 
600m radius for each of the 6,848 simulated office locations was calculated for each year 
2000-08. The number of workers was taken from the Annual Business Inquiry employee 
analysis with 2003 SIC J and K, standing for the banking, finance, and business services 
industries. SIC J and K were chosen as these are the measures of employment used in the 
real estate industry to model and forecast prices. Although other kinds of office 
employment, such as perhaps government (L), may also be important particularly in the 
West End, it was decided to use the more conventional measures of office employment in 
this analysis. Between 2005-2006 the employment dataset possesses a structural break in 
the collection methodology, and therefore our 2006-08 postcode sector employment counts 
are rescaled pro rata using the scaling factor provided by the ONS for London SIC codes J 
and K. The employment radius of 600m was chosen as it exhibited the highest level of 
statistical significance in a well specified hedonic analysis comparing all radial distances 
between 100 and 1000 meters in 100m increments, and 1,500 and 2,000 meters93. The 
number of employees working within 600m of each building each year was then used to 
calculate the employment density for each property for each year between 2000-08. 
 
An important caveat to bear in mind with the following analysis with respect to postcode 
sectors is the concern over the modifiable area unit problem (MAUP), wherein the 
conclusions drawn from spatially aggregated data may depend upon the particular 
demarcation of the spatial aggregation94. However, the potential to encounter this problem 
declines with the level of spatial disaggregation. As noted above, the average area of the 
244 postcode sectors is roughly equivalent to a 260 meter-sided square. Given that this is 
less than half of the radius used to measure employment density (600m), we believe that the 
potential for MAUP problems to jeopardize the validity of our findings to be small. 
                                                 
93
 Interestingly, the statistical significance of employment numbers exhibited a perfect inverted U-shape with 
respect to different radial distances with a maximum at 600m. 
94
 For further reference see Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton (2007, p.28). 
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Analysis 
We begin by depicting the locations of our office sales and the office stock in central 
London in the five figures directly below. Comparing Figure 14 and Figure 15 we see that 
even though office property locations appear to be relatively evenly spread east to west 
across central London, there is considerably more office space located in the City of 
London market to the east95. 
  
                                                 
95
 See Figure 25. 
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Figure 14: Office building locations by postcode sector 2002 (central London only) 
 
Source: PMA  
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Figure 15: Office floorspace m2 by postcode sector 2002 (central London only)  
 
Source: PMA  
127 
 
Figure 16 below shows the location of the 409 office properties in central London sold 
between 2000-08, which did not have a repeat sale-transaction for any years between 1990-
2011. Figure 17 shows the location for the 173 repeat-sales occurring in central London 
between 2000-08.  
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Figure 16: Sales only - never repeat-sold (409 total, 2000-08, central London, 244 postcode sectors) 
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Figure 17: Repeat-sales only – second sale or more (173 total, 2000-08, central London, 244 postcode 
sectors) 
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Figure 18: Sales and Repeat-sales (582 total, 2000-08, central London, 244 postcode sectors) 
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One test that we can perform on the above data is to see whether all sold floorspace and 
repeat-sold-only floorspace occur in proportion to the amount of office space within each 
postcode sector. If this is not the case, then this will immediately suggest that sales and/or 
repeat-sales are not spatially representative of the office stock as a whole. 
 
Observed sample heterogeneity 
Table 24 regresses the floorspace sold per postcode sector on the stock of floorspace in that 
sector. This analysis will test the extent to which sales and repeat-sales are actually 
occurring in areas in proportion to the amount of stock within that area. 
 
Table 24: Proportion of Sale and Repeat-sales floorspace sold in each postcode sector as a function of the 
proportion of total floorspace in the postcode sector. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Proportion of Sold Floorspace in 
Postcode Sector 
Proportion of Repeat-sold 
Floorspace in Postcode Sector 
   
Proportion of Total Floorspace in 
Postcode Sector 
0.980*** 1.028*** 
 (0.0812) (0.138) 
Constant 8.48e-05 -0.000119 
 (0.000443) (0.000755) 
   
Observations 244 244 
R-squared 0.383 0.191 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can see proportion of total floorspace is a highly significant predictor for the amount 
of sale and repeat-sales floorspace. The relevant null hypothesis however is that there is an 
equiproportionate relationship between the two. Hypothesis tests for the coefficient on total 
floorspace being different from 1 yield p-values of 0.8048 and 0.8388 respectively, and 
therefore the null hypothesis that the coefficients equal 1 are not rejected. Notice however 
that the R-squared on repeat-sales floorspace is half that of sale floorspace, suggesting that 
there is greater variation (error) in the location of repeat-sales floorspace with respect to the 
office stock. Of course, this increased error rate could also arise partially or entirely 
because there are fewer observations repeat-sales observations (173) in specification 2 than 
there are total postcode sectors (244). So although this finding is consistent with the 
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hypothesis that repeat-sales occur with greater ‘error’ relative to the location of the office 
stock, this finding is by no means definitive.  
 
It is informative to examine the residuals of the above regressions with respect to each 
postcode sector, as these will highlight areas experiencing relatively greater and lower sale 
and repeat-sales turnover with respect to the amount of total office stock. From East to 
West in Figure 19 we see that sales tend to occur at a disproportionately high level with 
respect to the amount of office space in area surrounding the bank of England (Postcode 
districts EC2R, EC2V), the area south of St Paul’s Cathedral on the Thames (EC4V), and 
along the southern end of the Holborn Viaduct north of St Paul’s Cathedral (EC4A, 
EC4M), south of Covent Garden (WC2E, WC2R), and surrounding Green Park station in 
Mayfair (W1J). On the other hand the northern fringes and areas around the houses of 
parliament in the south (SW1) experience disproportionately lower sales for their given 
amount of office stock.  
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Figure 19: Sales 2000-08 residual with respect to office stock. 
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Turning our attention to the repeat-sales’ residuals, we can see from Figure 20 that the 
incidence of repeat-sales with respect to the office stock occurs with similar spatial 
clustering to sales. The most marked difference between the spatial distribution of sales and 
repeat-sales is the relative sparsity of repeat-sales in the West End (W1).  
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Figure 20: Repeat-Sales 2000-08 residual with respect to office stock 
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Although sales and repeat-sales between 2000-08 tend to follow the location of the office 
stock on average, there is evidently a degree of spatial variation and perhaps clustering in 
these sales. Among the reasons this may be occurring is that certain areas are either more 
popular with speculative investors who have short-time horizons, and/or particular areas 
may have experienced local changes that induced greater sale activity.  
 
Central to the desirability of an office location is the density of employment. Locating close 
to other workers may facilitate knowledge spillovers, agglomeration economies, and signal 
quality to customers and employees (Jacobs, 1969; Porter, 1990; and Duranton and Puga, 
2004). Employment density also varies considerably within a city inter-temporally. 
Employment numbers in central London between 2000-08 are shown in Figure 21 below.  
 
Figure 21: Employment levels and Repeat-sales 
 
Employment numbers represent Annual Business Survey Employee Analysis 2003 SIC codes J and 
K representing the banking, finance, and business service industries in the 244 postcode sectors 
above. Due to a structural break in 2005-6 values are rescaled pro rata using the scaling factor 
provided by ONS for London SIC codes J and K using the pre-2005 methodology. Employment 
numbers are collected from surveys administered in September of the corresponding year. 
 
This inter-year variation also plays out spatially across central London. The images in 
Figure 22 below show the change in employment density across central London between 
September 2000 to September 2008. The notable changes evident from this time-series of 
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images are the systemic increase in employment density across postcode sectors in the 
West End, Midtown, and the City of London between 2000-02, followed by a fall in 
employment density between 2003-08 primarily experienced in the West End and 
Midtown, with the City of London only losing employment density from 2003-05, and then 
regaining earlier levels into 2008. 
 
Figure 22: Spatial distribution of London employment 2000-08 
2000         2001 
 
2002          2003 
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2008 
 
 
Employment density change bias 
If it is the case that the frequency of sales in a given location is influenced by changes in 
employment density, and if these local changes in employment density are not experienced 
universally across the whole market, then this selectivity in observed sales may impart bias 
into measured price indices. To test whether employment density changes are different for 
repeat-sales compared to the office stock as a whole we first construct a simulation for the 
employment numbers within 600m at each of the 6,848 synthetic office properties within 
central London for 2000-08. Then each synthetic property comprising this stock was 
randomly given a first and second sale date pair identical to one of the 173 properties which 
actually sold. Using these first and second sale dates the employment density change (EDC) 
between these hypothetical sale-pairs was calculated. In order to achieve greater accuracy, 
employment numbers were scaled pro-rata between the current and subsequent year values 
according to the month in which the property sold. In addition, for every property actually 
repeat-sold, an identical number of unsold synthetic office comparisons from the same 
post-code sector and with the same sale-pair dates were removed from the sale sample. This 
produced 6,848 – 173 = 6,675 non-repeat sold comparisons. 
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In order to compare sales with repeat-sales we also construct the change in employment 
density over the previous year (PYEDC)96. Similarly for the comparison between stock and 
sales, the synthetic stock was randomly assigned an actual sale date from the actually sold 
properties, and an identical number of sales and repeat-sales from the same postcode sector 
and with the same sale date were removed from the comparison sample.  Therefore we have 
a total of 6,848 – 582 = 6,266 never-sold comparisons. We utilize a probit regression to test 
whether the probability of repeat and non-repeat sale vs. non-sale is correlated with the 
previous year change in local employment density. For repeat-sales we use a probit to test 
whether EDC over the holding period is similar for synthetic and actual repeat-sales.  
 
Table 25: Probit of the probability of sale vs no-sale on employment density changes. 
 (1) 
PROBIT 
(2) 
PROBIT 
(3) 
PROBIT 
(4) 
PROBIT 
(5) 
PROBIT 
 
VARIABLES Repeat-Sales Sales† Repeat-Sales Only Third  
Repeat-Sales‡ 
No Third  
Repeat-Sales 
 
       
EDC 1.109***   2.114*** 0.657*  
 (0.354)   (0.610) (0.388)  
PYEDC  0.589 1.642***    
  (0.375) (0.558)    
Constant -2.164*** -1.963*** -3.645*** -2.839*** -2.227***  
 (0.0476) (0.385) (0.577) (0.0975) (0.0502)  
       
Observations 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
†Sales include repeat-sales. 
‡The subset of repeat-sales pairs consisting of the second and third 
instance of sale (29 instances). 
 
Interestingly we see from Table 25 specification 1 that the EDC is higher for repeat-sales 
properties than for the stock as a whole. Specifications 2 and 3 also show that although 
combined sales and repeat-sales are not related to changes in PYEDC, repeat-sales only are. 
Therefore repeat-sales are occurring with greater frequency relative to the office stock and 
non-repeat-sales in areas which have experienced greater increases in employment density. 
Interestingly, there were 29 instances of properties which sold three times in the repeat-
                                                 
96
 Since non-repeat-sales are not sold twice and therefore have no holding period, Employment Density 
Change between sales cannot be used to compare them with repeat-sales, and PYEDC is used to compare 
sales and repeat-sales instead.  
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sales sample of 173. Comparing specification 4 and 5 we see that these ‘third repeat-sales’ 
also saw even greater increases in employment density than the repeat-sales which did not 
sell again. Therefore much, but not all, of the selection effect of employment density 
changes is in fact due to these third sales. 
 
From the probit regression results in Table 25 above it is apparent that whereas non-repeat 
sale properties do not have statistically different PYEDC from the office stock, repeat-sales 
properties have different PYEDC than the stock of properties and non-repeat-sales. In and 
of itself the difference between repeat-sales and the office stock will not necessarily bias 
the measurement of price-indices unless changes in employment density also influence the 
sale-prices achieved in repeat-sales transactions. In order to test for bias imparted by 
employment density changes to the repeat-sales price index, we construct a repeat-sales 
price index from the 173 repeat-sales properties and include a variable measuring the 
change in local employment density within 600m. If the coefficient on changes in 
employment density is statistically different from zero (theory and evidence leads us to 
believe that it will be positive), then we can confirm that not only do repeat-sold properties 
experience greater increases in employment densities compared to the market as a whole 
(Table 25), but that this selectivity introduces a bias into the naïve calculation of price 
indices.  
 
However, employment density changes are likely to be endogenous with respect to prices 
and therefore non-causal. Within a repeat-sales regression this will be the case if 
unobserved building or environmental changes97 are correlated with employment density 
changes. Changes that would potentially confound the effect of EDC include; greater 
transportation connectivity, the arrival of a new local amenity such as a prominent retailer, 
                                                 
97
 Since the repeat-sales method is essentially a differencing approach to index measurement, fixed building 
and/or environmental characteristics will drop out of the estimation. Note that buildings with observed 
structural changes between sales (redevelopments, refurbishments) were removed from the repeat-sales 
sample. 
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or increases in the occupancy-rate of the building in question98. A valid instrument in this 
case will be both correlated with employment density changes, but uncorrelated with the 
unobserved building and environmental changes.  
 
In an attempt to control for this potential endogeneity two-sets of instruments are tested 
separately and concurrently. The first set comprises both the total floorspace of office stock 
within 600m of the building as of 2002, and the completed office floorspace within 600m 
of the building between 2002-2011. The argument behind instrument relevance is 
straightforward. In terms of exogeneity it could be argued that new construction takes many 
years to plan, permit, and build, and therefore any changes in the local environment (cyclic 
or otherwise) which may have precipitated new development may no longer be relevant by 
the time the space has filled. By the same token, it is not clear whether existing office stock 
is a net competitive impediment or incentive for the creation of new local amenities relative 
to other areas.  
 
The second set of instruments comes from the 1981 census and consists of the density of 
financial service workers, the density of financial service office-workers, and the density of 
all workers; all at the local authority level. In a similar vein to Ciccone and Hall (1996), the 
rationale behind the inclusion of historical employment density instruments is that places 
with high employment density in the past may be favoured today in terms of employment 
density increases. But if enough time has passed, the historical employment density levels 
will not necessarily be indicative of areas which experience local amenity changes today.  
 
Table 26 below shows the results of a restricted repeat-sales index which omits controls for 
employment density changes in specification 1, specification 2 includes employment 
density, and specification 3 and 4 instrument employment density with the office stock 
variables and historic employment density as discussed above, while specification 5 utilizes 
both sets of employment density instruments. All indices are annual since there are 
                                                 
98
 While increasing the building’s occupancy rate would simultaneously raise local employment density, the 
effect of greater revenue on the building sale price would falsely register as an entirely external market effect 
(see ‘Appendix D: Results of separately tested factors on repeat-sales’). 
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insufficient observations to produce quarterly price-level estimates, and all time-dummies 
are fractionally time-weighted according to Bryan and Colwell, 198299 in order to minimise 
temporal aggregation bias.  
 
                                                 
99
 See ‘Transaction-based price indices’ in Chapter 3. 
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Table 26: Repeat-sales price Index including Previous Year Employment Density Changes. Dependent variable is the natural-log of the price-relative. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
      
2000† 1.177*** 1.196*** 1.203*** 1.184*** 1.182*** 
 (0.313) (0.314) (0.312) (0.309) (0.306) 
2001 0.0832 0.0760 0.0347 0.00683 0.0184 
 (0.0890) (0.0890) (0.0906) (0.0878) (0.0896) 
2002 0.0327 0.0362 0.0380 0.0487 0.0425 
 (0.0937) (0.0936) (0.0926) (0.0901) (0.0915) 
2003 -0.110 -0.104 -0.121 -0.131 -0.124 
 (0.0887) (0.0887) (0.0878) (0.0854) (0.0868) 
2004 0.171** 0.161** 0.136* 0.0991 0.125 
 (0.0794) (0.0797) (0.0801) (0.0786) (0.0791) 
2005 0.114* 0.0999 0.105 0.0940 0.0999 
 (0.0642) (0.0651) (0.0636) (0.0619) (0.0629) 
2006 0.211*** 0.208*** 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0605) (0.0588) (0.0597) 
2007 -0.0512 -0.0757 -0.0743 -0.0990 -0.0876 
 (0.0745) (0.0771) (0.0744) (0.0727) (0.0739) 
2008 -0.130 -0.0864 -0.174 -0.216 -0.161 
 (0.175) (0.178) (0.174) (0.170) (0.171) 
EDC  0.441***    
  (0.164)    
Predicted EDC with office stock instruments   2.007**   
   (0.911)   
Predicted EDC with employment instruments    3.814***  
    (1.009)  
Predicted EDC with all instruments     2.605*** 
     (0.885) 
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Observations 173 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.699 0.712 0.708 0.724 0.714 
      
      
F-stat on inclusion of EDC variable - 7.17*** 4.85** 14.29*** 8.66*** 
(p-value)  (0.0082) (0.0291) (0.0002) (0.0037) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
†Omitted year dummy is 1999, which is part of the specification due to fractional time-weighting of the 
dummy variables, see chapter 3. 
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As can be seen in the table above, all four coefficients representing EDC are significant 
predictors of price changes and in the expected direction. However it should be noted that 
the office stock instruments and the historic employment density instruments are weak: 
with F-statistics on the first-stage regression less than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
Furthermore, Sargan-Hansen tests reject exogeneity of the office stock and historic 
employment density instruments100. 
 
With these difficulties in mind we can tentatively infer that employment density increases 
not only raise the probability of repeat-sales, but also increase the resultant sale prices of 
properties which then go under the hammer. In order to truly argue causality and not mere 
correlation, it is customary to invoke a story as why this phenomenon may be occurring. 
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation is simply that the owners of properties which 
pursue a second sale within the timeframe analysed have shorter investment horizons than 
the general population of investors. These investors may notice that demand in their local 
market has increased relative to the market as a whole, and that therefore selling now is 
also an opportunity to outperform that market. Notice that this argument is subtly different 
than a market-timing argument. While the market-timing argument would imply that these 
owners have special knowledge of the direction of future price movements, in our case the 
owners are engaging in sales because of the advantages of doing so relative to the market. 
From the point of sale, local demand could either increase or decrease, so there is no onus 
on the sellers to possess superior information and no onus on buyer to possess inferior 
information. The incentive for these owners to sell in this scenario may simply be that 
many are in fact professional investors who merely want to be able to look good in front of 
their clients or superiors upon their next evaluation. Alternatively, like Steele and Goy 
(1997), one could also invoke information asymmetry between the buyers and sellers of 
repeat-sale properties, with sellers being more sophisticated than the two. As argued by 
Steele and Goy this may be plausible since real estate markets are heterogeneous and it is 
costly to undertake research, and therefore the law of one price need not hold. In particular, 
informed investors could identify local trends that the broader market wasn’t aware of. 
                                                 
100
 Details of the first-stage regression results are contained in ‘Appendix A: EDC Instrumental variable first-
stage regressions’. 
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Moreover, although the returns from holding such properties would be greater than the 
market as a whole, since the acquisition of this information may be costly this does not 
necessarily imply that the returns accruing to these investors are disproportionate.     
 
One potentially possibility with the interpretation that employment density changes are 
driving repeat-sales and sale prices is that this could merely be an effect of new 
development. In particular, an empty office building could be erected, sold, then tenanted 
and finally resold. In this case ‘local’ employment density increases would be associated 
with both a sale and higher sale prices due to greater occupancy of the very building being 
sold. Fortunately, few office developments proceed in this manner in London, with many 
projects being mothballed or cancelled due to a lack of pre-let interest. In addition, there are 
only 8 buildings in our sample 173 repeat-sales whose first sale was in the same year as the 
building’s most recent refurbishment or redevelopment.       
 
Having confirmed the effect of employment density on price levels in Table 26 we now use 
the results from this table to construct a repeat-sales price index and compare these with the 
Investment Property Databank (IPD) appraisal-based capital growth index for inner 
London101. Despite the potential problems of using such valuation-based indices in 
measuring accurate price-levels (further discussed in chapter 3), this index is adopted here 
as a comparison merely in order to confirm the plausibility of the estimated repeat-sale 
values. A repeat-sales price index is constructed for all five specifications in Table 26 in 
Figure 23 and Figure 24 below. Since the year-dummy coefficients in Table 26 
specification 1 represents the change in price each year, the repeat-sales price index flows 
directly from these values. To construct the indices for specifications 2-5 however, we must 
specify the levels of previous year employment density change. Because we are interested 
in the market-wide levels of EDC and not just the levels attributable to the properties which 
have sold, we multiply each coefficient by the average EDC across all 6,848 properties 
each year. This adjustment will remove the bias associated with employment density 
                                                 
101The inner London index consists of properties located in the West End, Midtown, the City of London, and 
the surrounding inner boroughs. It is the closest geographic analogue for the location of office sales in our 
sample which IPD publishes at an annual frequency. 
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increases driving repeat-sales. Furthermore, due to the semi-log model specification, all 
estimated coefficients are reconciled for transformation bias according to Kennedy (1981). 
 
Figure 23: OLS price index comparison 
 
 
As we would expect, OLS specification 1 which omits a control for EDC exhibits a positive 
bias relative to specification 2 which directly includes EDC. This bias is on average 3% 
above specification 2. It is interesting to note as well that the EDC correction drives index 
values closer to the IPD inner London index, which is considered to be the industry 
standard in the UK. 
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Figure 24: IV2SLS price index comparison 
 
 
Comparing Figure 23 with Figure 24 we see that the IV index estimates are secularly lower 
than the OLS estimates, and importantly, also below specification 1 which excludes 
controls for EDC altogether. These results are consistent with our expectation that the 
existence of EDC biases a restricted index upward (specification 1), but that since EDC is 
endogenous with respect to prices due to omitted variables, EDC must be instrumented in 
order to yield accurate coefficient estimates. Looking closer at these IV indices, 
specification 3 using office stock instruments for EDC is slightly higher than the IPD index, 
while specification 4 using historic employment density is the lowest. Specification 5 
which is composed of both the office stock and employment density instruments is the 
closest match of all 5 specifications to the IPD index. 
 
Although the presence of bias due to employment density changes appears robust across the 
OLS and IV specifications, one must use care when interpreting the magnitudes indicated 
in Table 26 because exogenous and valid instruments for EDC were not found. Therefore 
the various coefficients on EDC may be inconsistent or biased (Chao and Swanson, 2005). 
In spite of this fact, the results point to a non-trivial bias (even if inaccurately measured) of 
EDC on prices and estimated repeat-sales price index returns.   
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We see from the results above that the repeat-sales price index more closely resembles its 
IPD counterpart when it is corrected for the observed selection effect of EDC. Although the 
composition of the IPD index may also be problematic in that it only reflects the particular 
class of properties favoured by institutions, because it based on regular appraisals it does 
not suffer the problem of only observing the prices of properties which are sold102. With 
EDC influencing sales and sale prices, the fact that not all properties are repeat-sold each 
period would account for the observed selectivity found here. Even though the series above 
appear visually dissimilar, in an ideal world we would run tests to verify whether the series 
presented above are in fact statistically ‘different’. However, due to the short duration of 
the time-series and comparatively large size of the indices’ time-coefficient standard errors 
this is regrettably infeasible.  
 
Submarket bias 
The next section examines the possible existence of another selectivity problem with 
repeat-sales, that of non-representative spatial aggregation. Consistent with real estate 
market practice, research into commercial office submarkets has shown that not only do 
submarkets exist, but that their influence is economically meaningful relative to the market 
as a whole103. If the incidence of sales across submarkets varies from year to year, and if 
these submarkets have different rates of price change overall, then this spatial selectivity 
could induce another form of bias into price indices. Submarket bias may also be distinct 
from the effect of EDC, such as for instance, the imposition of tighter supply controls in a 
given borough generating a relatively larger change in price for any given change in 
demand. 
 
Even though central London is only about 6km across, there may be substantial intra-
market variation. From West to East the real-estate professionals recognise three main 
                                                 
102
 Although an appraisal is not equivalent to a market transaction it observable and is an attempt to proxy for 
one. 
103
 See for instance Taylor, Rubin and Lynford (2000), Dunse and Jones (2002), and Stevenson (2007). 
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submarkets within this area104; these are the West-End, Midtown, and the City of London. 
This paper also follows Estates Gazette (EG) submarket definitions and includes the City of 
London Fringe (City Fringe) as a valid submarket within central London. These submarkets 
tend to cater to different industry clusters, with the West End predominantly tenanted by 
creative industries, hedge funds and private equity firms, Midtown by legal, media and 
publishing, the City of London dominated by financial services, whereas the City Fringe is 
less specialised. Rental levels currently are some 25% higher in the West End compared to 
the rest of central London. In terms of administration, the West End is run primarily by the 
City of Westminster and to a lesser extent by Camden, Midtown is divided between the 
City of Westminster, Camden and the City of London, and the City submarket is governed 
by its namesake along with a sliver of Tower Hamlets. Areas included in the City Fringe, as 
defined by EG, are administered by; Camden, Islington and small portions of Hackney and 
Tower Hamlets. A map of central London framed against the boundaries of these boroughs 
is shown below. 
  
                                                 
104
 Docklands/Canary Wharf is another major office submarket, but they located in inner and not central 
London. 
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Figure 25: London Boroughs, Submarkets, and Repeat-sales Locations 
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We also have reason to believe a priori that the sample selection of repeat-sales in London 
could be a problem because these submarkets have historically appreciated at markedly 
different rates according to series produced by IPD. Moreover, previous research by Hoesli, 
Lizieri and MacGregor (1997) found that the price movements of the City of London and 
the West End + Midtown office submarkets clustered differentially. The figure below 
shows the annual capital growth of these submarkets between 1980-2010 estimated by 
IPD105. 
 
Figure 26: Annual IPD central London Submarkets Price-Index comparison 1980-2010 
 
 
Interestingly, the series begins in the 1980s with the City of London exhibiting the most 
year-on-year price growth. But after the property crash of the late ‘80s, capital growth in 
Midtown and particularly the West End outstrips that of the City. Among the possible 
causes for this reversal of fortune is the relative relaxation of development restrictions in 
the City of London. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) argue that the City of London radically 
reduced its planning restrictiveness starting from the mid-1980s in response to the threat of 
a new financial-services cluster developing in the neighbouring Docklands. They note that 
                                                 
105IPD’s definition of City of London is contains both Estates Gazette’s definition of City of London and City 
Fringe.  
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at this time the City began to free up additional land for development, and fixed-plot-ratio 
limits on building size were enlarged by 25% and then finally removed with the Unitary 
Development Plan 1994 (Fainstein, 1994). In subsequent years this policy change made 
possible the construction of many new skyscrapers in the City of London. In contrast, 
permission to build at large-scale in the West End and Midtown has been all but non-
existent since the late 1960s.  
 
Moreover, as the City of London was becoming more permissive with regard to new office 
development, the other boroughs in central London may have simultaneously been 
becoming less so. As noted by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) in 1990 there was a ‘radical 
change’ to the taxation of all office property across the UK with the implementation of the 
Local Government Finance Act 1988. Before 1990 office property taxes had been set and 
collected by the local boroughs in accordance with the General Rate Act 1967. But in 
response to some boroughs imposing what the then conservative government believed to be 
anti-business rates of taxation aimed at redistribution, the central government replaced the 
local office tax rates with a uniform nation-wide rate, the so-called Uniform Business Rate 
(UBR). Crucially, all revenues associated with the UBR were now pooled by the central 
government and then redistributed to the local boroughs via Formula Grant (DCLG, 2012). 
As a result of this legislation, local boroughs now faced a disincentive to permit new office 
development: bearing the additional fiscal burden associated with new development but 
now being unable to directly recoup social benefits through taxation106. Uniquely, the City 
of London was granted a special exemption from the UBR to continue to set local rates and 
directly retain some of the revenues so raised. This policy change may have incited an 
                                                 
106
 Cheshire and Hilber (2008) argue that the sole remaining channel incentivising boroughs to allow 
commercial development is the local unemployment rate. However, this may not hold exactly as section 106 
of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 does permit local boroughs to be compensated for new 
developments, often in the form of contributions to infrastructure improvements, maintenance fees, public 
education, subsidised housing, and land concessions. However these are one-off payments as compared with 
recurring rental taxation. By way of comparison, the UBR stands between 42.6% and 45.3% of assessed 
annual rents in central London (Knight Frank, 2012), and nationally UBR receipts were a substantial 4.3% of 
total tax revenues in 2010-11 (HM Treasury, 2012) . The Tower Hamlets council on the other hand was set to 
receive a one-time payment of £7m through their section 106 agreement (Greater London Authority, 2009), or 
1.75% of estimated construction costs for the recently approved large-scale office known as Columbus Tower 
in Canary Wharf (Gardiner, 2011). If we conservatively assume capital yields of 5% and a sale-price to 
construction cost ratio of unity, estimated rents would be £20m and UBR payments would be £9m per annum.  
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increase in the restrictiveness of the other boroughs in central London relative to the City, 
and this may be a further reason for the divergence in capital returns beginning in the 1990s 
seen in Figure 26. Indeed, according to Pennington (2000), the “role of centrally raised 
taxation in the financing of UK local government may have been a key factor in explaining 
the general tendency towards anti-growth planning regimes”, pp.162. This difference in 
planning restrictiveness by borough also appears to be borne out in the relative office space 
completions in central London from 2002-2011 by postcode sector shown in Figure 27 
below.  
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Figure 27: Central London office space completions 2002-2011 
 
Source: PMA  
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It is clear from Figure 27 that the majority of new office space added to central London 
over the past decade has been built within the City of London. Although the West End, 
particularly in the south around Victoria and Westminster has also seen significant new 
development, over the same time-frame the West End has also experienced considerable 
office to residential conversions which the map above does not register107. By contrast the 
City of London sees its primary remit as promoting the growth of business, and is more 
reluctant to allow office conversions to residential use. Further evidence for the supply 
restrictions hypothesis is evident in that approximately 75% of the West End is designated 
as a conservation area where buildings cannot be altered externally, whereas the 
corresponding figure for the City of London is only 25%. In any case, the divergence 
between capital values in the City and the West End observed in Figure 28 has grown 
nearly monotonically since the Local Government Finance Act 1988. This gradual change 
in relative prices is what one would expect if supply constraints are in fact binding, as the 
effect of binding supply constraints on price grows cumulatively over time (Cheshire, 
2005).  
  
                                                 
107
 Unfortunately only data on gross and not net office completions by postcode sector could be obtained. 
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Figure 28: IPD West End vs the City of London annual price-growth and price-level differences 
 
Price-growth difference = West End capital growth rate – City capital growth rate 
Price-level quotient = West End price-level / City price-level 
 
Another possible compounding factor for the growth-rate reversal seen in central London 
submarkets since 1988 is that it coincides with the development of Canary Wharf as a rival 
financial services cluster to the east of the City. By contrast, the West End does not 
compete as directly as the City does with Canary Wharf by nature of its older stock of 
buildings and different tenant clientele. Consistent with the hypothesis that Canary wharf 
has been cannibalising demand for City office space is that we also see from Figure 26 that 
Midtown, which is located between the West End and the City, initially commoved with 
the West End for the first decade of the series, but then began to move secularly lower than 
West End series around the time tenants first began to occupy Canary Wharf in 1991. 
 
Regardless of the source of this variation, for the time-frame under consideration here West 
End offices have shown considerable price appreciation relative to the City and Midtown. 
As we can see from the quarterly IPD submarket series below, it is estimated that since Q4 
2000 alone the West End has experienced 25% greater appreciation than Midtown and 50% 
greater appreciation than the City.  
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Figure 29: Quarterly IPD London submarket price-index Dec 2000-Dec 2010 
 
 
It is clear that these large variations in submarket price movements could easily engender 
bias in repeat-sales indices if the locations of repeat-sales are not representative of the 
market as whole. To examine this possibility, the table below shows the extent to which 
office submarket sales and repeat-sales between 2000-08 reflect the submarket location of 
office stock. 
 
Table 27: Sales, Repeat-Sales, and Office building stock by submarket 2000-08 
 City Core City Fringe Midtown West End Total 
Office Stock 
(Proportion)† 
1,123 
(16.4%) 
1,354 
(19.8%) 
1,691 
(24.7%) 
2,680 
(39.1%) 
6,848 
(100%) 
Sales‡ 
(Proportion) 
88 
(21.5%) 
56 
(13.7%) 
91 
(22.2%) 
174 
(42.5%) 
409 
(100%) 
Repeat-Sales‡ 
(Proportion) 
79 
(45.5%) 
13 
(7.7%) 
26 
(15.3%) 
55 
(31.5%) 
173 
(100%) 
†Number of buildings 
‡Chi-squared tests find a significant difference at the p = 0.01 level in the submarket locations of the Office 
Stock and Sales (Chi-squared = 17.41), and the submarket locations of the Office Stock and Repeat-Sales 
(Chi-squared = 115.37). 
 
From Table 27 we see that sales and repeat-sales occur disproportionately in the City Core 
compared to the locations of office stock in central London as a whole. In addition, non-
repeat-sales appear to be much more representative of office stock locations than repeat-
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sales. Probit regressions shown below on sales and repeat-sales bear this relationship out. 
All submarket coefficients are significantly negative relative to the omitted dummy (City 
Core or City), and t-stats on repeat-sales are substantially more significant than those of 
sales. We also see from specification 3 that EDC has a selection effect on repeat-sales that 
is independent from submarket location. 
 
Table 28: Probit regression of Sales and Repeat-Sales on submarket location 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  PROBIT 
Sales 
 PROBIT 
Repeat-Sales 
PROBIT 
Repeat-Sales 
PROBIT 
Repeat-Sales 
       
EDC     0.954***  
     (0.367)  
City Fringe  -0.328***  -0.896*** -0.794***  
  (0.0817)  (0.124) (0.130)  
Midtown  -0.204***  -0.609*** -0.585*** -0.206*** 
  (0.0740)  (0.0941) (0.106) (0.0721) 
West End  -0.113*  -0.507*** -0.544*** -0.131** 
  (0.0662)  (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0584) 
Constant  -1.423***  -1.507*** -1.714*** -1.619*** 
  (0.0547)  (0.0578) (0.0707) (0.0403) 
       
Observations  6,848  6,848 6,848 6,848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications 1-3 omitted submarket dummy is City Core 
Specification 4 omitted submarket dummy is City = City Core + City Fringe 
 
It is interesting to speculate on what could be driving the disproportionate amount of 
repeat-sales in the City relative to the other submarkets. Perhaps the most likely explanation 
is that there is greater institutional and international interest in the City of London and as a 
result greater turnover compared to the rest of central London. 
 
Whatever the cause of this disparity in liquidity, because of the additionally lower price 
growth in the City of London recorded by IPD, it appears as though sample selection by 
submarket location may be a biasing factor for repeat-sales indices of central London 
offices. Given the relative sparsity of repeat-sales in the high capital-growth submarkets of 
Midtown and West End and the markedly greater price appreciation in the West End, we 
would expect a naïve repeat sale index to under-represent the true degree of price 
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appreciation experienced by central London as a whole. A repeat-sales regression is run 
below with submarket dummies included in the specification to test for statistically 
significant differences in capital appreciation within our dataset. Although ideally each time 
period would be interacted with each submarket dummy, limited sample size precludes 
those interactions here. Therefore the submarket dummy variables represent the average 
additional return accruing to each submarket relative to the City of London throughout the 
entire analysis period. 
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Table 29: Repeat-sales regression with submarket dummy variables 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  OLS IV2SLS 
    
2000  1.265*** 1.433*** 
  (0.478) (0.485) 
2001  0.109 0.0497 
  (0.0838) (0.0888) 
2002  -0.00620 0.0155 
  (0.0893) (0.0912) 
2003  -0.109 -0.113 
  (0.0840) (0.0861) 
2004  0.142* 0.116 
  (0.0756) (0.0790) 
2005  0.0860 0.0994 
  (0.0615) (0.0620) 
2006  0.243*** 0.181*** 
  (0.0564) (0.0593) 
2007  -0.0989 -0.0768 
  (0.0681) (0.0728) 
2008  -0.211 -0.225 
  (0.146) (0.181) 
City Fringe  0.0464 0.0183 
  (0.0698) (0.0741) 
Midtown  0.0801* 0.0460 
  (0.0445) (0.0473) 
West End  0.151*** 0.118*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0385) 
Predicted EDC with all instruments   0.0543 
   (0.0394) 
    
Observations  173 173 
R-squared  0.725 0.728 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted submarket dummy is City Core 
 
Consistent with our priors we see from Table 29 that properties located in Midtown and the 
West End have seen statistically greater average price appreciation than properties in the 
City Core. In addition, price changes in the City Fringe are not statistically different from 
the City Core, and therefore following IPD we no longer recognize a difference between 
the two in the subsequent analysis. An F-test that all the submarket dummies are equal to 
zero yields a p-value of (0.0005). Clearly submarket location matters with respect to 
estimated rates of return on commercial office repeat-sales. Specification 2 sees the 
instrumented EDC and Midtown lose their statistical significance, whereas the influence of 
the West End submarket remains strong even when EDC is included. The fact that 
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submarket location removes the significance of EDC may suggest that employment density 
changes have been correlated with submarket location throughout the study period. On the 
same token it could also be indicative of an omitted variable108. Table 29 specification 1 is 
used to calculate the repeat-sales index for each submarket in Figure 30 below. The index 
values represent the average price level growth achieved in each submarket throughout 
2000-08 as indicated in Table 29 specification 1. 
 
Figure 30: Repeat-sales indices by submarket  
 
 
As we can see from Figure 30, the repeat-sales regression not only picks up a substantial 
difference in index levels between the City, Midtown and West End submarkets, but like 
the IPD series these differences appear to be economically meaningful. The extent to which 
these submarket differences could influence a repeat-sales index of all of central London 
will depend upon the spatial (un)representativeness of the repeat-sales (Table 28).  
 
                                                 
108
 In fact what we find in Table 31 is that submarket dummies are simultaneously proxying for both local 
employment density (demand) and the restrictiveness of new development (supply). 
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Figure 31 below compares a naïve repeat-sales index which neglects the influence of its 
submarket composition with an index-corrected for this effect by weighting the index 
values by the actual proportion of the office stock within each submarket (Table 27). 
 
Figure 31: Comparison of Naïve and Submarket-Corrected Repeat-sales price indices 
 
 
Interestingly the impact of correcting for submarket composition in the repeat-sales index 
varies by period, with a relative increase in the early years and a decrease relative to the 
naïve index in later years. This pattern broadly follows the spatio-temporal spread of 
repeat-sales, with a greater proportion of first and second sales occurring in the City early 
in the naïve series (except 2001), and a consistently greater proportion of transactions in the 
West End taking place during the 2007-08 fall in prices. We can see this trend reflected in 
Table 30 below which disaggregates the submarket selection effect on repeat-sales 
according to year. 
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      Table 30: Proportion of First and Second Sales of Repeat-sales pair by year and submarket 
 City Midtown West End Chi-square Statistic 
p-value 
2000 0.67 0.16 0.16 0.434 
2001 0.42 0.15 0.44 0.142 
2002 0.60 0.16 0.24 0.321 
2003 0.63 0.15 0.22     0.015** 
2004 0.56 0.16 0.29     0.017** 
2005 0.48 0.26 0.26 0.150 
2006 0.52 0.11 0.37     0.020** 
2007 0.46 0.18 0.36 0.385 
2008 0.48 0.17 0.35 0.478 
** p<0.05 
 
As shown in Table 30, for the years 2003, 2004 and 2006 chi-square tests find statistically 
different submarket compositions of repeat-sales and unsold buildings, while 2001 and 
2005 are close to statistical significance. We also see that from 2003-08 the proportion of 
repeat-sales occurring in the West End increased relative to the City of London. If the West 
End appreciates faster than the City, as in the IPD series, this change in composition would 
cause the naïve index to increase over time relative to the submarket-corrected index, and 
that is exactly what we see in Figure 31. As a result of the different rates of price 
appreciation across these submarkets, naïve repeat-sales price indices may partly reflect the 
particular submarket composition of the locations where sales occur rather than the price-
movements attributable to the market as a whole. Again, although we would like to test 
whether the observed differences between the naïve and submarket corrected indices in 
Figure 31 are statistically significant, the short duration of the series and size of the 
standard errors (Table 31) precludes such analysis. 
 
The role of office supply restrictions 
As mentioned earlier, differences in office space supply restrictions across the local 
boroughs may be a factor in driving the spread of rates of return across the central London 
submarkets. According to Cheshire (2005), “there can be no real argument that in the UK 
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our planning system raises the price of all categories of real estate very substantially109.” In 
order to test whether differences in planning restrictiveness across boroughs accounts for 
the observed variations in capital growth we require a measure for the planning 
restrictiveness of each borough. The most obvious candidate is of course the refusal rate of 
proposed office development applications. Data on the planning application rejection rate 
by local authority for the period 1990-2008 was provided from the research of Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2010). However, as noted by Hilber and Vermeulen (2012) this direct measure 
of planning restrictiveness has at least two sources of endogeneity with respect to prices. 
The first stems from the fact that planning rejection rates will likely co-move with the 
economic cycle. When prices are high councils may be inundated with development 
applications and local opposition to new projects may be strongest. In contrast, during 
economically sluggish periods with high unemployment the incentives for councils to allow 
development are highest (Cheshire and Hilber 2008). Like Hilber and Vermeulen (2012), 
this pro-cylical endogeneity is controlled for by using the planning refusal rate averaged 
across the entire 1990-2008 period.  
 
The second source of endogeneity arises from the fact that the costly decision on the part of 
the developer to submit an application is dependent in the first place upon the developer’s 
perception of the likelihood of acceptance. Therefore low rejection rates could be more 
indicative of many discouraged developers anticipating rejection than a particularly pro-
growth stance from the local council. Following the insight of Hilber and Vermeulen 
(2012), the identification strategy we use is to exploit the exogenous variation from the 
introduction of the Best Value Performance Indicator 109 (BV 109) enacted in April 2002 
which replaced the government’s earlier single target to decide 80% of all planning 
applications within 8 weeks, with three separate targets to decide 60% of major110 planning 
applications within 13 weeks, 65% of minor applications within 8 weeks, and 80% of all 
other application within 8 weeks. The specific change Hilber and Vermeulen identify is that 
                                                 
109
 According to Cheshire’s estimates planning controls have, “incrementally over time approximately 
doubled total occupation costs for non-residential property.” 
110
 Major developments are defined as those involving either 10 or more new residential dwellings or office, 
industrial and retail developments involving at least 1,000 square metres of floorspace or where site areas are 
1 hectare or over (DCLG, 2007). 
167 
 
with BV 109 local planning authorities could no longer indefinitely delay major project 
decisions while simultaneously expediting decisions on minor applications and still meet 
the new government targets as they could with the old targets.  
 
The identifying assumption is that the 2002 policy reform caused more restrictive boroughs 
to switch from delaying major projects to quick rejection. This policy change should have 
had the effect of exogenously decreasing the delay-rate for major applications the most in 
the boroughs which were also in fact the most restrictive. As a robustness check for this 
hypothesis we should therefore see the ‘previous year change in the delay rate111 for major 
applications’ (PYCDR)  and the ‘previous year change in rejection rate for major 
applications‘ (PYCRR) to be uncorrelated pre and post-reform and then negatively 
correlated around the time of the reform. Although we do not have sufficient data on 
boroughs (5) to statistically determine whether PYCDR and PYCRR are uncorrelated for 
office applications pre and post-reform and negatively correlated during the reform, 
Cheshire, Hilber, and Kaplanis (2011) show that this is indeed the case for residential and 
retail applications in Local Planning Authorities across England. Therefore we use ‘change 
in delay rate for major applications’ (CDR) pre and post-reform (not previous year) for 
offices as an instrument to identify the potentially endogenous average planning application 
refusal rate between 1990-2008. 
 
Following Hilber and Vermeulen (2012), we define pre-reform CDR to be the average of 
the years 1994-96 and post-reform CDR to be the average of the years 2004-06. Hilber and 
Vermeulen state that 1994-96 is certainly before BV 109 could have been anticipated and it 
corresponds to a period where PYCDR and PYCRR are clearly uncorrelated, while 2004-
06 empirically corresponds to the period of greatest negative correlation between PYCDR 
and PYCRR. Therefore 2004-06 should be the period when adjustment to the new policy 
was primarily taking place. In addition to office planning application refusal rates, we also 
instrument for dwellings applications in an identical manner. The first-stages of these 
instruments are shown in ‘Appendix B: Planning application refusal rate instrumental 
                                                 
111
 The denominator of this ratio is; Total major office applications  + Total minor office applications + Total 
major dwelling applications  + Total minor dwelling applications.  
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variable first-stages’. Table 31 below shows planning refusal rates added as an additional 
control in the repeat-sales regression. 
 
Table 31: Repeat-sales and Instrumented Planning Refusal Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
      
2000 1.435*** 1.480*** 1.376*** 1.272*** 1.188** 
 (0.488) (0.483) (0.485) (0.444) (0.461) 
2001 0.0980 0.0813 0.0636 0.0734 0.0717 
 (0.0863) (0.0843) (0.0881) (0.0815) (0.0820) 
2002 0.0270 0.0428 0.0346 -0.0471 -0.0493 
 (0.0913) (0.0806) (0.0899) (0.0847) (0.0852) 
2003 -0.119 -0.129 -0.129 -0.0486 -0.0411 
 (0.0864) (0.0759) (0.0851) (0.0797) (0.0807) 
2004 0.157** 0.147* 0.149* 0.122* 0.118 
 (0.0781) (0.0775) (0.0785) (0.0729) (0.0735) 
2005 0.0976 0.0927 0.0892 0.0873 0.0857 
 (0.0636) (0.0620) (0.0628) (0.0603) (0.0607) 
2006 0.244*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0583) (0.0587) (0.0552) (0.0556) 
2007 -0.0706 -0.0947 -0.108 -0.0519 -0.0491 
 (0.0724) (0.0813) (0.0726) (0.0680) (0.0685) 
2008 -0.337* -0.266 -0.167 -0.414** -0.426** 
 (0.181) (0.170) (0.169) (0.183) (0.185) 
Office Refusal Rate 0.445***     
 (0.169)     
Predicted Office Refusal Rate  0.194*** 0.0278** 0.127*** 0.0453 
  (0.061) (0.0128) (0.0477) (0.119) 
Predicted EDC with all 
instruments 
  4.042*** 3.534** 3.595*** 
   (1.112) (1.358) (1.377) 
Predicted Dwelling Refusal 
Rate 
   -0.191* -0.0340 
    (0.103) (0.235) 
Midtown     0.0198 
     (0.0552) 
West End     0.0682 
     (0.0922) 
      
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.715 0.720 0.726 0.781 0.781 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As expected we see from Table 31 specifications 1 and 2 that office planning refusal rates 
have a statistically significant positive effect on the price difference between repeat-sales. 
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In addition, we see in specification 3 that the effect of office planning controls is robust to 
the inclusion of employment density changes. In specification 4 the instrumented major 
dwelling refusal rate is added, and perhaps surprisingly we see that its coefficient is 
significantly negative at the 10% level. The negative coefficient implies that the more 
lenient the local planning authority is with respect to allowing new residential 
developments, the greater the office price appreciation within that borough. If this effect is 
true there are at least two possible interpretations for it. The first is that residential space 
may be a complement to office space, so boroughs which allow more residential 
development increase the value of neighbouring office space. Although Thibodeau (1990) 
found that residential property located close (but not too close) to office space enjoyed a 
price premium, the converse may also be true in that offices located close to potential 
employees become more valuable locations. If true, then new residential developments 
approved in these boroughs may increase the prices of local offices. The second perhaps 
more powerful explanation is that the addition/conversion of more residential space serves 
as a further constraint on office supply. As noted earlier, the West End has seen 
considerable office to residential conversion in the last decade. In fact, according to the 
Greater London Authority (2012) over the period 2000-08 the City of Westminster (which 
is the primary borough comprising the West End) lost 120,000m2 or 8.1% of its total office 
stock. By contrast office stock in the City of London grew by 6.5% over the same period. 
Furthermore, when potential office sites are developed into residential property it lowers 
the expectation of future competing supply. Therefore it is plausible that the negative and 
significant coefficient on residential refusals could be picking up the reduction in present 
and future competing local office supply that stems from greater residential development. 
 
Table 31 specification 5 adds dummy variables for the Midtown and West End submarkets. 
When these additional controls are included, the refusal rate for offices and dwellings 
become insignificant while EDC retains its significance. Note the contrast of Table 31 
specification 5 with Table 29 specification 2, where EDC became insignificant with the 
inclusion of submarket dummies. As EDC is a measure of local demand and the Office and 
Dwelling Refusal Rate are measures of supply (restrictiveness), it seems plausible that 
when you control for both these factors submarket dummies lose their ability to explain 
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repeat-sales price movements. In fact, the R-squared of specification 5 is no larger than 
specification 4 which omits the submarket dummies. Therefore it appears that when 
submarket location dummies are included in a repeat-sales regression they are functioning 
as a surrogate for both employment density changes (a measure of demand) and the 
restrictiveness of new development (a measure of supply). 
 
Unobserved sample heterogeneity  
Having examined the effect of observable sample heterogeneity on repeat-sales indices, we 
now turn our attention to the possibility of unobserved sample heterogeneity. Although we 
cannot explicitly control for unobserved sample heterogeneity with an unrestricted 
regression, the Heckman (1979) correction allows for this bias to be modelled indirectly. 
As in the case of observed heterogeneity, the Heckman procedure treats the sample 
censoring112 as a specification error in which a variable is incorrectly omitted from the 
proper estimation equation. And similarly, the expected value of the error term in an 
uncorrected estimation equation is non-zero, resulting in biased coefficient estimates 
depending on the correlation with the error. Heckman’s solution to model unobserved 
heterogeneity is to use a probit regression with a set of instruments to estimate the 
probability that the dependent variable is censored from the sample. The estimated probit 
errors are then used to model the selection bias in the outcome regression with the inverse 
Mills-ratio or hazard-rate (Amemiya, 1985). The Mills-ratio is then included as an 
additional independent variable in the now correctly specified estimation equation. 
 
The key requirements in order to perform the Heckman correction is that we have data on 
the entire population of buildings and instruments which influence selection but which will 
not lead to misspecification when omitted from the outcome regression (Johnston and 
Dinardo 1997). Following Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) we use characteristics of the 
surrounding environment and macroeconomic variables in order to model selection. Owner 
attributes and physical characteristics of properties which may yield additional explanatory 
                                                 
112
 Censoring in the sense that not all office properties in central London are sold and observed each period. 
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power in the probability of sale as in Fisher, Geltner, Gatzlaff and Haurin (2004) and 
Devaney and Diaz (2011) are unfortunately unavailable.  
 
The selection variables used are; EDC, submarket, CDR, postcode district113, interest-
rates114, Euro exchange rate115, US$ exchange rate116, quarterly submarket vacancy rate, 
quarterly submarket take-up, quarterly submarket availability117, quarterly London 
unemployment rate118, current quarter office price levels, and cumulative office returns 
over the previous 4 quarters119. By including submarket dummies and postcode sectors, the 
postcode sectors should primarily represent areas which experience the highest sales 
turnover net of submarket price-trends (see Figure 20 above of repeat-sales turnover by 
postcode sector). In addition, since local areas in cities and in London in particular are often 
associated with broadly similar office stock characteristics (Taylor, Rubin and  2000, and 
Stevenson 2007)120, location data at the postcode sector level may be granular enough to 
also partly control for heterogeneous building characteristics omitted here. Euro and US$ 
exchange rates were chosen as US and European buyers account for 71% of all foreign 
buyers and 42% of all buyers foreign and domestic in the City of London (Lizieri, Reinhart 
and Baum, 2011). Commercial real estate transaction volume has been shown to be pro-
cyclic with market conditions (see Fisher, Geltner, Gatzlaff and Haurin, 2003 and 2004), 
which forms the basis for the inclusion of the real estate and labour market performance 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
113
 Some 23 of the 70 postcode districts had to be merged with other districts in order to ensure all districts 
contained uncensored observations and thereby assisting model convergence in the first-stage. These postcode 
districts were merged to adjacent districts. 
114
 End month UK banks’ base interest rates. Source: Bank of England. 
115
 End month spot exchange rate Euro into Sterling. Source: Bank of England. 
116
 End month spot exchange rate US$ into Sterling. Source: Bank of England. 
117
 Real estate submarket data on vacancy rates is from Land Securities. Submarket data on take-up and 
availability comes from CBRE. 
118
 Unemployment data consists of all people economically active but unemployed living in the London 
Region. Source: NOMIS. 
119
 Price levels and changes derived from repeat-sales regression of 354 Inner London office properties 1998-
2010, see Chapter 3. 
120
 This fact has become increasingly true since the introduction of conservation areas in 1967 and the desire 
to maintain the distinctiveness of each particular area. Other planning rules such as the London View 
Management Framework would also confine certain types of buildings to particular locations, see City of 
London (2010). 
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An important difference with the Heckman-based correction for selectivity employed by 
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997)121 is that this paper uses a standard Heckman’s correction, 
whereas the Gatzlaff and Haurin paper especially derive and apply a bivariate sequential 
Heckman’s selection for repeat-sales. Gatzlaff and Haurin use this sequential selection 
estimation equation because they are concerned with the possibility of sample selection bias 
occurring at the time of both sales. The standard Heckman procedure was chosen here 
instead because evidence for sample selection bias was found to be present only in 
properties that sold twice or more during the study period and not in non-repeat-sales (see 
Table 25 and ‘Appendix C: Heckman corrections on hedonic regressions’). Hwang and 
Quigley (2004) for instance also find that only repeat-sales and not single-sale properties 
appear to exhibit selection bias. In the absence of selection at the time of the first-sale 
Gatzlaff and Haurin’s sequential selection procedure collapses to a simple univariate probit. 
To see this we begin with the two selection equations. The selection equation for first sales 
is; 
 5 !∗ = ∑ 789 8:8 + ; !<	5 ! = 1		5 !∗ ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise   (6) 
 
And the selection equation for second sales is; 
 5 "∗ = ∑ 789 8:8 + ; "<	5 " = 1		5 "∗ ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise 
 
Where; 
 5 !∗ = threshold value of office i observing a first-sale 
 5 "∗ = threshold value of office i observing a second-sale 
 
                                                 
121
 This is the only other example that was found in the literature of a Heckman’s correction being used to 
remedy selection bias in a real-estate repeat-sales index. 
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5 +   = indicator variable for sale number , = 1,2 
 78 	 = coefficient on 98 
 9 8 = characteristic m of office i which influences the probability of sale 
 ; +   = normally distributed error term on office i at sale number	, = 1,2. 
 
As in Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) we assume that the specifications of both selection 
equations are identical, but the coefficients in both equations are estimated separately. 
 
As in equation (2) and (3), first and second sale prices are assumed to be determined by; 
 
 ! =#	$ !%&! +#'(!
)
&! +	* ! 
 
 " =#	$ "%&! +#'("
)
&! + * "   (7) 
 
Where the variables are defined as previous. The covariance matrix of the four equation 
errors ?; !, ; ", * !, * "@ is; 
 
A 1 B!" B!C B!DB!" 1 B"C B"DB!C B"C BCC BCDB!D B"D BCD BDDE    (8) 
 
With unobserved selection bias the expectation of the first log sale-price conditional on 
sales being observed in both periods is; 
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F? !|5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ =#	$ !%&! +#'(!
)
&! +	F?* !|	5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ 
 
Which reduces to; 
 	
F? !H5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ =#	$ !%&! +#'(!
)
&! + I!CJ! + I"CJ"  (9) 
 
And the expectation of the second log sale-price conditional on sales being observed in 
both periods is; 
 
F? "|5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ =#	$ "%&! +#'("
)
&! + F?* "|	5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ 
 
Which becomes; 	
F? "|5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ =#	$ "%&! +#'("
)
&! + I!DJ!+I"DJ"  (10) 
 
Again assuming ∀∀($ ! = $ " ), differencing equations (9) and (10) yields; 
 F? "H5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@ − F? !|5 " = 1, 5 ! = 1@
=#'((")&! − (!) + (I!D − I!C)J! + (I"D − I"C)J"  (11) 
 
In the event of selection in the first and second-sale, equation (11) will produce unbiased 
estimates of the index levels '. However with selection in the second-sale only, J!	is zero 
and the first selection equation (6) collapses to a purely random error term that cannot be 
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correlated with the error in second outcome equation (10)122. Therefore the I"C term in 
variance-matrix (8) is also zero, and equation (11) collapses to a standard Heckman; 
 
F? "H5 " = 1@ −  ! =#'((")&! − (!) + 7J   
 
Whose estimation equation becomes; 
 
 " −  ! =#'((")&! − (!) + 7J + K   (12) 
 
Equation (12) will estimate unbiased coefficients when there is possible unobserved sample 
selection bias in the second-sale only. Therefore a standard Heckman’s correction should 
be sufficient to capture the relevant structure of repeat-sales selectivity in our sample. 
Furthermore, there can be much to lose by adopting Gatzlaff and Haurin’s sequential 
selection method in the absence of selection in both sales, as models with multiple selection 
are often non-robust and especially sensitive to sample size and departures from normality.  
Table 32 and Table 33 below present the selectivity-corrected repeat-sales indices, and then 
successively include the instrumented EDC and submarket variables into the outcome 
equation for comparison 
                                                 
122
 Moreover, the results of Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) which test for selection in both sales are consistent 
with errors from the first sale occurrence only being correlated with the first sale price, and the second sale 
occurrence only being correlated with the second sale price. Therefore it is plausible that I"C could be zero 
even if there were selection in both sales. 
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Table 32: Heckman’s corrected Repeat-sales indices: Naïve and Instrumented EDC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Heckman 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills- 
Ratio 
Heckman 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills- 
Ratio 
       
2000 0.972* -0.151  0.948 -0.151  
 (0.583) (1.309)  (0.578) (1.309)  
2001 -0.0361 -0.0193  -0.0384 -0.0193  
 (0.0956) (0.220)  (0.0947) (0.220)  
2002 0.0910 -0.0354  0.0940 -0.0354  
 (0.0931) (0.208)  (0.0923) (0.208)  
2003 -0.180** 0.00748  -0.181** 0.00748  
 (0.0873) (0.199)  (0.0865) (0.199)  
2004 0.105 0.00447  0.103 0.00447  
 (0.0793) (0.190)  (0.0786) (0.190)  
2005 0.0722 -0.00226  0.0681 -0.00226  
 (0.0614) (0.158)  (0.0610) (0.158)  
2006 0.183*** 0.0154  0.182*** 0.0154  
 (0.0598) (0.161)  (0.0592) (0.161)  
2007 -0.0839 -0.0216  -0.0968 -0.0216  
 (0.0744) (0.204)  (0.0751) (0.204)  
2008 -0.351** 0.0877  -0.332** 0.0877  
 (0.165) (0.422)  (0.165) (0.422)  
       
Postcode Sector Dummies  YES   YES  
       
Interest Rate  0.0547   0.0547  
  (0.217)   (0.217)  
Euro FX  0.120   0.120  
  (0.942)   (0.942)  
US FX  -0.111   -0.111  
  (0.826)   (0.826)  
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Vacancy Rate  0.000616   0.000616  
  (0.0342)   (0.0342)  
Take Up  -0.000665   -0.000665  
  (0.00442)   (0.00442)  
Availability  0.00141   0.00141  
  (0.0119)   (0.0119)  
Unemployment Rate  -0.00210   -0.00210  
  (0.160)   (0.160)  
Cumulative Office Return over Previous 4 Qtrs  0.0742   0.0742  
  (0.282)   (0.282)  
Office Price Level  -0.000243   -0.000243  
  (0.00772)   (0.00772)  
EDC  1.069***   1.069***  
  (0.405)   (0.405)  
Predicted EDC with all Instruments    0.704   
    (0.786)   
Predicted Office Refusal Rate  -8.701   -8.701  
  (17.17)   (17.17)  
Predicted Dwelling Refusal Rate  6.346   6.346  
  (9.284)   (9.284)  
Midtown  -1.214***   -1.214***  
  (0.408)   (0.408)  
West End  -0.785*   -0.785*  
  (0.431)   (0.431)  
Lambda   0.0668***   0.0398 
   (0.0187)   (0.0354) 
Constant  -1.869   -1.869  
  (2.716)   (2.716)  
       
Observations 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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From column (1) and (3) we see from the significant lambda term that the standard repeat-
sales regression contains unobserved sample heterogeneity. The lambda term is positively-
signed which establishes that the error terms in the selection and outcome equations are 
positively correlated. Therefore, unobserved factors which make repeat-sales more likely 
tend to be associated with higher price-relatives. As a result, the coefficients in the outcome 
equation are biased (primarily upward), and the resulting index will overestimate actual 
returns. We can see that the insertion of predicted EDC into outcome equation (4) halves 
the coefficient on Heckman’s lambda and removes its statistical significance. Therefore 
when EDC is observed, unobserved characteristics appear to be no longer biasing the 
coefficients of the outcome equation. Table 33 below extends this analysis by including 
office and dwelling refusal rate and submarket location as controls for unobserved sample 
heterogeneity. 
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Table 33: Heckman’s corrected Repeat-sales indices: Submarkets and Instrumented EDC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Heckman 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills- 
Ratio 
Heckman 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills- 
Ratio 
       
2000 0.906 -0.462  1.044* -0.462  
 (0.576) (1.656)  (0.564) (1.656)  
2001 -0.0164 -0.191  -0.0167 -0.191  
 (0.0949) (0.272)  (0.0927) (0.272)  
2002 0.0798 0.0711  0.0584 0.0711  
 (0.0918) (0.249)  (0.0900) (0.249)  
2003 -0.163* -0.0803  -0.153* -0.0803  
 (0.0860) (0.230)  (0.0840) (0.230)  
2004 0.109 0.0782  0.105 0.0782  
 (0.0786) (0.216)  (0.0766) (0.216)  
2005 0.0675 0.0521  0.0624 0.0521  
 (0.0605) (0.174)  (0.0591) (0.174)  
2006 0.182*** -0.0356  0.201*** -0.0356  
 (0.0591) (0.173)  (0.0583) (0.173)  
2007 -0.103 0.0544  -0.112 0.0544  
 (0.0745) (0.216)  (0.0728) (0.216)  
2008 -0.295* 0.185  -0.286* 0.185  
 (0.166) (0.443)  (0.163) (0.443)  
  (1.736)   (1.736)  
       
Postcode Sector Dummies  YES   YES  
       
Interest Rate  0.0766   0.0766  
  (0.249)   (0.249)  
Euro FX  -0.548   -0.548  
  (1.048)   (1.048)  
US FX  -0.447   -0.447  
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  (0.948)   (0.948)  
Vacancy Rate  0.00268   0.00268  
  (0.0413)   (0.0413)  
Take Up  0.00115   0.00115  
  (0.00506)   (0.00506)  
Availability  0.0125   0.0125  
  (0.0138)   (0.0138)  
Unemployment Rate  -0.117   -0.117  
  (0.182)   (0.182)  
Cumulative Office Return over Previous 4 Qtrs  0.164   0.164  
  (0.319)   (0.319)  
Office Price Level  0.00602   0.00602  
  (0.00869)   (0.00869)  
EDC  1.407***   1.407***  
  (0.453)   (0.453)  
Predicted EDC with all Instruments  1.074   0.740   
 (0.941)   (0.955)   
Predicted Office Refusal Rate -0.483 39.11***  -0.282 39.11***  
 (0.537) (3.024)  (0.530) (3.024)  
Predicted Dwelling Refusal Rate 0.360 -11.36***  0.332 -11.36***  
 (0.489) (1.736)  (0.482) (1.736)  
Midtown  -0.719  0.0612 -0.719  
  (0.444)  (0.0524) (0.444)  
West End  -0.471  0.115** -0.471  
  (0.455)  (0.0449) (0.455)  
Lambda   0.0169   -0.00184 
   (0.0179)   (0.0191) 
Constant  -2.785   -2.785  
  (3.061)   (3.061)  
       
Observations 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 6,848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Indeed we see that the office refusal rate in specification (1) and that the combined effect of 
the office refusal rate and submarket dummies in specification (4) further decreases the 
relevance of Heckman’s lambda. The inability of Heckman’s lambda to explain price 
movements when the additional controls for EDC and planning refusal rate are included is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the data is no longer being biased by unrepresentative 
external effects. Although it would be premature to conclude that there are no other factors 
at work that are imparting bias on this repeat-sales index, this result is at least encouraging 
that much of whatever external bias exists is contained within these two measures. 
Conclusion 
The primary advantage of repeat-sales indices is that their construction requires no more 
than the sales price, the identity of the property and the dates of paired sales. However, the 
assumptions that allow this procedure to produce an accurate price index may be violated in 
practice with important consequences. This study showed that repeat-sales of office 
properties in London are over-weighted by their specific temporal and locational attributes 
relative to the office stock as a whole. The factors contributing to this bias were found to be 
employment density changes and the restrictiveness of office supply in the corresponding 
local authority area. This bias arises because of the effect of employment density and 
supply restrictions on prices and the fact that repeat-sales occur disproportionately in areas 
where these attributes differ compared to the stock as a whole. Although other factors not 
examined here may be simultaneously causing bias in the repeat-sales index, when 
employment density changes and planning restrictiveness are controlled for, a Heckman’s 
correction for unobserved sample heterogeneity loses its ability to explain index levels. 
These findings are consistent with the conjecture that employment density changes and 
development restrictiveness are the key external drivers of sample heterogeneity and bias. 
The methodological contribution to this paper is that it may be enough to run a standard 
Heckman’s correction when there is only selection occurring in the second-sale. 
 
Although these findings are compelling they may not be conclusive as there were a number 
of potential problems encountered by this research. A key problem with the employment 
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density analyses was that an exogenous instrument could not be identified, and the 
instruments that were used were weak. As a result, the magnitude of the effect of 
employment density changes on prices is still an open question. Fortunately, the planning 
refusal rate instruments encountered no such difficulties. Of perhaps foremost concern 
however is the fact that the sample size of 173 repeat-sales is modest. It could be the case 
that as more data is collected the issues of sample bias encountered with this study will 
fade. In fact, it might even appear logical to argue that this could undoubtedly be the case 
since practically every property eventually sells twice123, and the information contained 
between sales will eventually be made available to researchers. However as Wang and Zorn 
(1999) note this is not necessarily true. Although practically every property may indeed sell 
twice, these sales may not be usable in a repeat-sales regression because of refurbishments 
or redevelopments between sales. Moreover, even if all properties eventually sell, the fact 
that other properties which differ on relevant dimensions are selling with greater frequency 
can still impose biases on the index. In a word, even as the sample size grows indefinitely 
large there is no guarantee that the sample of repeat-sales observed will resemble the actual 
stock. A further difficulty encountered by this research is that the sample of sales is not the 
total population of all repeat-sales (as may possibly be obtained through tax-records), but 
rather the sample of repeat-sales which were made available to RCA and EG, and for which 
relevant data could be obtained. Therefore if this particular sample of repeat-sales differs 
from the actual population of repeat-sales these results would fail to be generalisable. 
 
One potential implication of the modest sample size is that although selection bias for 
employment density changes and planning restrictiveness were found to be statistically 
significant in a regression setting, the resulting price indices derived from them were not 
statistically different from the naïve repeat-sales index124. This might be expected as the 
index only reports price levels at the annual rather than quarterly frequency. Moreover this 
finding is common in much of the commercial property literature, as sample size 
                                                 
123
 As perhaps a counterexample the Grosvenor estate consisting of 300 acres of land in the West End has 
practically never sold any property since 1677 as a matter of policy. 
124
 Although it is not reported here, the standard errors are large enough in both instances that one standard 
error exceeds all index corrections above. 
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restrictions often make bias corrections of indices statistically insignificant. For instance, in 
analysis of commercial office sales in Phoenix, US, Munneke and Slade (2000) find 
evidence for sample selection bias when utilizing a Heckman’s correction. However, when 
the Mills-ratio adjusted values are applied to the resulting price index in general they did 
not change the index values more than a confidence interval of 10% in both directions. 
Clapp and Giacotto (1992) find a similar result in modelling the representativeness of house 
price indices in US cities. Even though the corrected indices here were not statistically 
different from uncorrected indices, the differences between the two may still be practically 
important. Where these indices are used as performance benchmarks or in order to assess 
the cross-correlation of returns with respect to other assets for investment purposes, 
accurate indices are essential to informed decision-making. As such, perhaps a more 
relevant metric than statistical significance is economic significance for the particular 
question at hand. 
 
The correlation between planning restrictiveness by submarket and the realized returns of 
office properties within that submarket has important implications. As argued by Cheshire 
(2005), to a large extent the current level of office prices in the United Kingdom is a 
product of the system of planning controls currently in force which effectively restrict 
supply. There is no denying the fact that office prices in London are among the highest in 
world. Comparing the price of office space in UK cities to similar metropolises in other 
developed nations shows a marked price gap between the two (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). 
Moreover, it is not just in the arena of office space that these controls appear to have had a 
serious effect. Research by Cheshire, Hilber and Kaplanis (2011) has demonstrated that the 
productivity of retail space has been curtailed as a result of the further expansion of these 
policies into ‘town centre first’ initiatives. Moreover, Hilber and Vermeulen (2012) show 
that house prices have also been very substantially inflated in the London area by planning 
restrictions. This present study is entirely consistent with those findings and provides 
additional evidence for the inflationary effect of planning restrictiveness on office property 
price levels. 
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In spite of the problems with sample selection bias identified here, the relative ease with 
which RSPIs can be created makes them still useful in the context of other index 
construction methods. This is especially true in the case of commercial price indices, where 
the characteristics of individual properties tend to be highly idiosyncratic and therefore the 
advantages of controlling a property’s characteristics with previous observations through a 
fixed effects method are greater. Although the measured biases were not statistically 
significant, in the context of constructing price indices for use in industry EDC may very 
well be important to control for, and the difference observed in submarket returns is 
notable, even if the measured bias from these effects were small.  
 
Practically speaking however, it is unlikely that controlling for employment density in 
repeat sales will enter into industrial protocol in the near future. Aside from the fact that it 
is doubtful that such a process could be mechanised, currently there is a three year gap 
between when NOMIS collects and then publishes employment data. Due to this 
considerable time-lag, employment density corrections are likely to only be feasible in the 
arena of academic work and historical record-keeping.  Of course, cities other than London 
may have more timely employment reporting, and therefore it may be possible that some 
commercial uses such as perhaps performance benchmarking may prove viable. Submarket 
corrections however are much more simply controlled for and would not suffer time-lags in 
reporting the way that employment density corrections in London do. Looking forward, 
London may yet produce a commercially viable repeat-sales index for use in industry and 
finance. At such time that it does so, it is hoped that the findings of this paper can be used 
to inform market participants of the potential pitfalls of this index, and therefore to help 
them better position it within the universe of existing alternatives. 
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Appendix A: EDC Instrumental variable first-stage regressions 
Table 34: Dependent variable is Previous Year Employment Density Change 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
VARIABLES Employment 
Density Change 
Employment 
Density Change 
Employment 
Density Change 
    
Density of office completions 600m, 2002-11 8.91e-07**  9.16e-07** 
 (4.12e-07)  (4.34e-07) 
Density of office stock 600m, 2002 -3.58e-05**  -3.45e-05** 
 (1.52e-05)  (1.57e-05) 
Density financial service workers 1981  0.0139 0.0134 
  (0.0112) (0.0111) 
Density financial service office workers 1981  1.68e-05 1.62e-05 
  (1.36e-05) (1.34e-05) 
Density total workers 1981  -0.0103 -0.00991 
  (0.00820) (0.00813) 
Constant 1.059*** 1.064*** 1.083*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0252) (0.0272) 
    
Observations 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.032 0.011 0.041 
    
F-test on regression 2.78* 0.63 1.41 
(p-value) (0.065) (0.599) (.2218) 
    
Sargan-Hansen test 6.82*** 10.92*** 17.68*** 
(p-value) (0.009) (0.0042) (0.0013) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B: Planning application refusal rate instrumental variable first-stages  
 
Table 35: Dependent variable is Planning Refusal Rate Average 1990-2008 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Average Office 
Refusal Rate 
1990-2008 
OLS 
Average 
Dwelling 
Refusal Rate 
1990-2008 
   
Change in Delay Rate Major 
Offices 1994-96, 2004-06 
22.21***  
 (2.282)  
Change in Delay Rate Major 
Dwellings 1994-96, 2004-06 
 -7.719*** 
  (0.972) 
Constant 0.270*** 0.0914*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0128) 
   
Observations 173 173 
R-squared 0.357 0.269 
   
F-test on regression        94.74   63.08 
(p-value)      (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Sargan-Hansen test† - - 
(p-value)   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
†Sargan-Hansen tests cannot be performed unless the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of endogenous variables. Since these are equal in both cases above we cannot run 
this exogeneity test. 
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Appendix C: Heckman corrections on hedonic regressions  
In Table 36 below we run our hedonic model of London office prices with a Heckman’s 
correction on the sample of properties which were not repeat-sold (single-sale only) and for 
which we have the required hedonic data (173 observations, coincidentally the same as the 
number of total repeat-sales). We combine this with 6,848 – 173 = 6,675 synthetic offices 
proxying for the office stock. The synthetic offices are located in the same postcode sector 
as the actual offices they represent. The 6,675 synthetic offices are randomly ’sold’ 
between 2000-08, and the corresponding characteristics for use in the selection instruments 
are calculated at this sale date. The relevant question from this exercise then is whether the 
lambda coefficient in the Heckman’s correction is statistically significant, which would 
indicate the presence of unobserved sample selection bias. 
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Table 36: Heckman’s correction of Non-Repeat-sales sample hedonic regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Heckman Ln(Price-
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills-Ratio 
    
EDC  1.088  
  (0.705)  
Midtown  0.200  
  (0.380)  
West End  -0.0962  
  (0.464)  
    
Postcode Sector Dummies  YES  
    
Interest Rate  -0.319**  
  (0.154)  
Euro FX  0.267  
  (0.680)  
US FX  1.168**  
  (0.532)  
Vacancy Rate  0.0109  
  (0.0269)  
Take up  0.00120  
  (0.00417)  
Availability  -0.0193**  
  (0.00775)  
Unemployment Rate  0.0668  
  (0.136)  
Previous Period Office Return  -0.262  
  (0.385)  
Office Price Levels  0.00560  
  (0.00479)  
Within Conservation Area -0.0458   
 (0.0742)   
Listed -0.0655   
 (0.0859)   
Ln(Office Refusal Rate) 0.0498*   
 (0.0274)   
Built 1950s -0.464***   
 (0.127)   
Built 1960s -0.239*   
 (0.126)   
Built 1970s -0.226*   
 (0.121)   
Built 1980s -0.0360   
 (0.0860)   
Built 1990s 0.0195   
 (0.0924)   
Built 2000s 0.211**   
 (0.0996)   
2001 6.203***   
 (1.011)   
2002 6.147***   
193 
 
 (1.038)   
2003 5.857***   
 (1.056)   
2004 6.101***   
 (1.050)   
2005 6.048***   
 (1.023)   
2006 6.339***   
 (1.013)   
2007 6.477***   
 (1.009)   
2008 6.328***   
 (1.001)   
Midtown 0.152*   
 (0.0863)   
West End 0.499***   
 (0.0995)   
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.174**   
 (0.0816)   
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) -0.0164   
 (0.0749)   
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.158**   
 (0.0763)   
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) 0.00300   
 (0.00456)   
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.101   
 (0.0840)   
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) -0.169***   
 (0.0526)   
Ln(Total Floors) 0.0547   
 (0.106)   
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.00366   
 (0.0105)   
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0125   
 (0.0158)   
A/C 0.232   
 (0.184)   
EG Office Grade A/B -0.0152   
 (0.0779)   
EG Office Grade A 0.0543   
 (0.0695)   
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0173   
 (0.0109)   
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.123**   
 (0.0595)   
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.0105*   
 (0.00627)   
Lambda   -0.0560 
   (0.121) 
Constant  -4.835**  
  (2.367)  
    
Observations 6,848 6,848 6,848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As we can see the lambda coefficient is not statistically significant, demonstrating that 
unobserved sample heterogeneity does not appear to be biasing coefficients in the non-
repeat-sales sample. This finding is consistent with our earlier results which show that non-
repeat-sales are more spatially representative of the office stock than repeat-sales, and 
sometimes indistinguishable (Table 25 and Table 28).  
 
Table 37 below runs the same hedonic model with a Heckman’s correction on the sample 
of repeat-sales for which we have the required hedonic data. Uncensored observations 
equal 83, and therefore there are 6,848 – 83 = 6,765 censored synthetic office observations 
proxying for the building stock. As previously, these synthetic offices are located in the 
same postcode sector as the actual offices they proxy for, and the values of their 
instruments in the selection equation were derived by capturing their values at a random 
date between 2002-08 as if they had sold. 
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Table 37: Heckman’s correction of Repeat-sales sample hedonic regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Heckman 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
Selection 
Equation 
Mills-Ratio 
    
EDC  2.177**  
  (0.860)  
Midtown  -0.251  
  (0.435)  
West End  -0.293  
  (0.341)  
    
Postcode Sector Dummies  YES  
    
Interest Rate  -0.290  
  (0.204)  
Euro FX  -0.907  
  (0.837)  
US FX  0.867  
  (0.709)  
Vacancy Rate  0.00299  
  (0.0361)  
Take up  -0.000523  
  (0.00531)  
Availability  -0.00510  
  (0.0104)  
Unemployment Rate  0.303*  
  (0.172)  
Previous Period Office Return  -1.116**  
  (0.512)  
Office Price Levels  0.0117*  
  (0.00632)  
Within Conservation Area -0.0565   
 (0.0476)   
Listed 0.158**   
 (0.0715)   
Ln(Office Refusal Rate) 0.0288   
 (0.0223)   
Built 1950s 0.344***   
 (0.103)   
Built 1960s -0.327**   
 (0.146)   
Built 1970s -0.215**   
 (0.106)   
Built 1980s -0.0951   
 (0.0744)   
Built 1990s 0.209***   
 (0.0664)   
Built 2000s 0.0641   
 (0.0627)   
2003† -0.0180   
 (0.112)   
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2004 -0.0126   
 (0.0976)   
2005 0.334***   
 (0.103)   
2006 0.306***   
 (0.0991)   
2007 0.459***   
 (0.0950)   
2008 0.205*   
 (0.113)   
Midtown 0.0552   
 (0.0689)   
West End 0.750***   
 (0.0846)   
Ln(Employment Density 500m) 0.440***   
 (0.0412)   
Ln(Conservation Area Density 300m) 0.0750   
 (0.0457)   
Ln(Listed Bldg Density 300m) 0.127***   
 (0.0481)   
Ln(Park and Garden Density 300m) -0.00734**   
 (0.00334)   
Adjacent to Park or Garden -0.139*   
 (0.0713)   
Ln(Nearest Rail Station Distance) 0.0134   
 (0.0350)   
Ln(Total Floors) 0.222***   
 (0.0665)   
Ln(Depreciation Age) 0.0141   
 (0.0146)   
Ln(Basements/Total Floors) -0.0630***   
 (0.0151)   
A/C 0.902***   
 (0.130)   
EG Office Grade A/B 0.210***   
 (0.0688)   
EG Office Grade A 0.192***   
 (0.0651)   
Ln(Percent Occupied) -0.0974***   
 (0.0228)   
Multiple Tenant Bldg -0.0109   
 (0.0444)   
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.00228   
 (0.00437)   
Lambda   0.128** 
   (0.0647) 
Constant  -6.289**  
  (2.923)  
    
Observations 6,848 6,848 6,848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
†No repeat-sales with complete hedonic data are observed in 2000 or 2001. 
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In contrast to non-repeat-sales, when a hedonic regression is performed on the repeat-
selling properties we see a significant lambda term in Table 37 indicating that the 
uncorrected regression is subject to unobserved sample heterogeneity bias. Of course the 
sample of uncensored observations at 83 is relatively small, but again the finding that 
repeat-sales differ from non-repeat-sales is consistent with our earlier results. 
  
198 
 
Appendix D: Results of separately tested factors on repeat-sales 
Congestion Charge 
A test for the effect of the congestion charging zone (CCZ) was also run on the repeat-sales 
sample. This was done by coding the CCZ dummy variable 1 if the congestion charge had 
been imposed since the previous sale and remained in force at the time of the current sale, 
and it was coded -1 if the congestion charge was in force at the time of the previous sale but 
was rescinded at the time of the current sale (Western CCZ only). 
 
The CCZ variable is applied to the repeat-sales sample with successive controls in Table 
39. The CCZ remains significant with controls for employment density change, and office 
refusal rate, but loses significance when the dwelling refusal rate is added as well. Given 
this mixed result it is difficult to infer causality of the CCZ on office prices one way or the 
other, as the imposition of the congestion charge may have also been contemporaneous 
with increased residential conversions in central areas, and this may be biasing 
specifications 1-3. Notice that if specification 2 did not find a significant result for the CCZ 
this would not necessarily be evidence against the effect on the CCZ, as one of the channels 
through which this could occur is through making greater employment densities feasible. 
 
Regardless of the CCZ’s effect on office prices, the imposition of the CCZ will only bias 
repeat-sales indices if the location of repeat-sales inside and outside of the zone was also 
influenced by this policy. To test this we utilize a sample of 354 repeat-sales occurring both 
inside and outside of the central London to run a probit testing for a difference before and 
after the imposition of the CCZ. As Table 38 shows no differences was found. Therefore 
regardless of the existence of an independent effect of the CCZ on prices, there is no 
evidence to suggest that significant bias will be registered in a price index derived from 
repeat-sales.   
  
199 
 
Table 38: Probability of Repeat-sales outside the Congestion Charging Zone (CCZ) 
  (1) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Outside CCZ 
   
 Congestion Charging Zone Imposed 0.368 
  (0.356) 
 Constant -1.565*** 
  (0.344) 
   
 Observations 354 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 39: Congestion charge Repeat-sales regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS  
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
IV2SLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
     
2000 1.454*** 1.532*** 1.391*** 1.270*** 
 (0.492) (0.482) (0.480) (0.446) 
2001 0.127 0.0664 0.0879 0.0720 
 (0.0877) (0.0885) (0.0880) (0.0825) 
2002 -0.0611 -0.0491 -0.0474 -0.0423 
 (0.101) (0.0990) (0.0978) (0.0917) 
2003 -0.237** -0.243** -0.242** -0.0397 
 (0.105) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) 
2004 0.211*** 0.168** 0.186** 0.120 
 (0.0806) (0.0803) (0.0798) (0.0757) 
2005 0.0932 0.0765 0.0804 0.0877 
 (0.0642) (0.0631) (0.0624) (0.0606) 
2006 0.226*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.233*** 
 (0.0598) (0.0589) (0.0586) (0.0560) 
2007 -0.0480 -0.0875 -0.0929 -0.0530 
 (0.0733) (0.0730) (0.0722) (0.0685) 
2008 -0.182 -0.212 -0.172 -0.414** 
 (0.171) (0.168) (0.167) (0.183) 
Ln(Predicted EDC with all 
instruments) 
 2.466*** 3.946*** 3.514** 
  (0.873) (1.096) (1.367) 
Ln(Office Refusal Rate)   0.0263** 0.118*** 
   (0.0120) (0.0441) 
Ln(Dwelling Refusal Rate)    -0.184* 
    (0.101) 
Congestion Charge 0.171** 0.162** 0.158** -0.0112 
 (0.0811) (0.0795) (0.0785) (0.0808) 
     
Observations 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.711 0.725 0.733 0.781 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
201 
 
Occupancy 
An obvious channel through which repeat-sales could produce biased estimates is through 
changes in the property occupancy-rate between sales. A subset of 191 of the 354 repeat-
sales used in the Congestion Charge example has accurate data on the occupancy-rate at the 
time of both sales, and is used to test for an omitted effect of change in occupancy rate in 
Table 41 below. As we can see the effect is only significant at the 10% level and is not 
robust to the inclusion of submarket dummies. Unfortunately we do not have data on 
occupancy rates of office buildings across London to compare the sample of repeat-sales 
with the market. However, we can compare the repeat-sales occupancy rate with that of 
sales. Table 40 below shows that there does appear to be a small selection effect of higher 
occupancy rates being associated with repeat-sales. Perhaps some speculative owners are 
purchasing properties with high vacancy rates, restoring their income streams by filing 
them with new tenants, and then selling them on quickly. However, the occupancy rate is 
different from the change in occupancy, and only if we could compare the change in 
occupancy rates from unsold buildings could we infer whether repeat-sales are biased by 
occupancy rate differences. 
 
Table 40: Repeat-sales vs Sales on Occupancy rate probit 
  (1) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Repeat-sales 
   
 Occupancy Rate 0.358* 
  (0.211) 
 Constant -0.713*** 
  (0.200) 
   
 Observations 600 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 41: Occupancy-rate Repeat-sales regression 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
   
1995 1.233** 1.473*** 
 (0.500) (0.521) 
1996 0.393 0.317 
 (0.407) (0.429) 
1997 -0.295 -0.481 
 (0.382) (0.375) 
1998 0.217 0.311 
 (0.295) (0.284) 
1999 -0.207 -0.128 
 (0.169) (0.168) 
2000 0.230* 0.0949 
 (0.125) (0.126) 
2001 0.0379 0.0522 
 (0.120) (0.115) 
2002 0.0458 0.0636 
 (0.130) (0.125) 
2003 -0.0830 -0.135 
 (0.112) (0.109) 
2004 0.0985 0.101 
 (0.0787) (0.0806) 
2005 0.129* 0.104 
 (0.0705) (0.0704) 
2006 0.276*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0714) (0.0685) 
2007 -0.276*** -0.293*** 
 (0.0729) (0.0712) 
2008 -0.0855 -0.139** 
 (0.0599) (0.0589) 
Occupancy Rate Change 0.157* 0.112 
 (0.0869) (0.0840) 
City Fringe  0.0726 
  (0.0668) 
Docklands  -0.281 
  (0.236) 
Midtown  0.0811 
  (0.0503) 
North Central  0.276* 
  (0.158) 
South Central  -0.00572 
  (0.0900) 
Southern Fringe  -0.00385 
  (0.122) 
West Central  0.0435 
  (0.0895) 
West End  0.171*** 
  (0.0371) 
   
Observations 191 191 
R-squared 0.593 0.646 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Sale Leaseback 
Although the previous analyses have focused on attributes of the building and its location, a 
further characteristic that may influence prices is the structure of financing. In particular, 
cheaper credit or the ability to purchase the building with less capital may increase sale 
prices achieved. Along this vein we analysed the same subset of 191 properties above for 
which we also had data on whether or not the property was financed with a Sale-Leaseback 
structure. A sale-leaseback is where the building and land are purchased but the land is then 
sold and the building owner now subsequently leases the land. The advantage of this 
strategy is that it requires less capital to finance building purchases, and the lessee can reap 
tax shield benefits from lease payments. As a result, potential buyers may be willing to pay 
a premium if they are able to execute a sale-leaseback deal on the transaction (Rutherford 
1990, Sirmans and Slade, 2000).   
 
To test for the effect of sale-leaseback financial structure, the dummy variable is coded 1 if 
the building was sold as a sale-leaseback in the second-sale but not in the first, and the 
dummy variable is coded -1 if the building was sold as a sale-leaseback in the first-sale but 
not the second. Including change in sale-leaseback in Table 43 shows that there is no 
measurable effect. However, the small effect of occupancy rate remains when it is included. 
Comparing sales with repeat-sales in Table 42, we see that there appears to be a preference 
for repeat-sales not to be financed by sale-leasebacks. However since repeat-sales will only 
pick up changes in financial structure between sales, the significant result in Table 42 
would not be immediate evidence for potential bias on sale-leasebacks even if a significant 
coefficient had been found in Table 43. 
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Table 42: Repeat-sales vs Sales on Sale-leaseback probit 
  (1) (2) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Repeat-Sale Repeat-Sale 
    
 Sale-Leaseback -0.815** -0.842** 
  (0.330) (0.331) 
 Occupancy Rate  0.386* 
   (0.212) 
 Constant -0.360*** -0.708*** 
  (0.0561) (0.201) 
    
 Observations 600 600 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 43: Sale-leaseback Repeat-sales regressions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
OLS 
Ln(Price- 
Relative) 
   
1995 1.235** 1.233** 
 (0.510) (0.502) 
1996 0.390 0.393 
 (0.415) (0.408) 
1997 -0.298 -0.295 
 (0.390) (0.383) 
1998 0.220 0.217 
 (0.301) (0.296) 
1999 -0.142 -0.207 
 (0.169) (0.170) 
2000 0.157 0.230* 
 (0.123) (0.126) 
2001 0.0555 0.0379 
 (0.122) (0.120) 
2002 0.0223 0.0456 
 (0.132) (0.130) 
2003 -0.0810 -0.0825 
 (0.115) (0.113) 
2004 0.111 0.0979 
 (0.0817) (0.0805) 
2005 0.123* 0.130* 
 (0.0729) (0.0717) 
2006 0.297*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0723) (0.0718) 
2007 -0.287*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0732) 
2008 -0.0943 -0.0855 
 (0.0608) (0.0600) 
Sale-Leaseback Change 0.0229 0.00297 
 (0.0792) (0.0794) 
Occupancy Rate Change  0.156* 
  (0.0888) 
   
Observations 191 191 
R-squared 0.576 0.593 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3 Transition 
The previous chapter dealt with sources of bias arising in repeat-sales indices of 
commercial offices. It was shown that unrepresentative employment density changes and 
development restrictiveness were the primary drivers of this bias. Knowledge of these 
effects may be used to improve future repeat-sale indices constructed for London, and 
potentially for other cities which produce such indices as well. Although corrections for 
these biases were undertaken in the previous paper, in many practical instances such 
modifications may prove infeasible, with possibly deleterious consequences for 
stakeholders relying on repeat-sales indices as a representation of the actual market. 
Fortunately, repeat-sales are just one of a number of price indices available for use in real 
estate industry and research. Indeed, within industry the most prevalent indices are 
currently valuation-based, whereas hedonic indices are favoured in economic research for 
their versatility in tackling a variety of causal questions. However, like the issues identified 
with the repeat-sales index examined above, different index construction methods may in 
turn possess problems of their own, with greater or lesser potential for correction depending 
on the case in question.  
 
The final paper builds on the previous chapters’ analyses of capital returns in the London 
office market by comparing and contrasting an inclusive array of transaction and valuation-
based indices. This comparison finds substantial differences in the timing of market turning 
points and various descriptive statistics of these indices. Although it cannot be known a 
priori which of these indices represent the most accurate depiction of the actual market, this 
paper is able to uniquely demonstrate that a transaction-based hedonic model is not only 
feasible for London, but surprisingly that it outperforms the repeat-sales index due to the 
greater inclusivity of sale observations. Furthermore, by comparing and contrasting many 
different indices in concert while taking into account the inherent limitations specific to 
each, it is hoped that the most authentic impression of historical market movements can be 
obtained. 
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Chapter 3: Commercial real estate price indices: A comparative analysis of the 
London office market 
Abstract 
This paper sheds light on the history of London office market prices between 1998-2010; a 
period containing two of the most significant boom and bust real estate cycles experienced 
in recent times. As no universally accepted real estate price index exists, this is done by 
comparing seven indices produced by competing methodologies of index construction. 
These indices include; valuations, desmoothed valuations, transaction-linked indices, real 
estate securities, stock market equities, repeat-sales, and a sophisticated hedonic model of 
London office property. This comparison finds significant differences between the 
valuation and transaction-based indices primarily related to inertia and dampened price 
movements, especially in the most recent market gyrations beginning in 2007. In addition, 
it is shown that our well specified hedonic index appears to outperform the repeat-sales 
index due to sensitivity of transaction-based indices to sample selection bias, and the 
greater inclusivity of observations possible with hedonic estimation. This result is derived 
from the use of a nearly identical sample of observations in both the hedonic and repeat-
sales indices to confirm the validity of the hedonic specification employed in this paper. 
Other notable results include the fact that the 3SLS procedure conventionally used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity in housing appears to be superfluous with regard to office 
property, and that the valuation desmoothing technique developed by Geltner (1993b) 
appears to exaggerate the price movements of actual transaction-based series. Finally, an 
original fractional-time weighting procedure for repeat-sales is developed which allows for 
simpler calculation of transformation-bias while maintaining a minimum of temporal 
aggregation bias.  
208 
 
Introduction 
The construction of an accurate price index to assess the performance real estate has been a 
constant source of research and debate. In contrast to stock markets whose assets are 
divisible, highly liquid and centrally traded, real estate is indivisible, transactions are 
infrequent, and bid, offer and price information remain primarily private. Moreover stock 
markets can benchmark a broad-based index of assets trading in the same marketplace, 
whereas real estate often lacks ready definitions of the extent of their respective markets. 
To compound these problems real estate assets are highly heterogeneous (if not unique) 
across physical characteristics and space. This definitionally calls into question the 
representativeness of samples and precludes the use of naïve first moments to measure 
prices. All of these features impede the creation of representative price indices in 
commercial real estate to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the market and time-
frame in question.  
 
As a result of these difficulties there are often multiple price indices competing for status as 
the industry standard within any given marketplace. In the UK, the focus of this analysis, 
the primary source of real estate indices comes from large agents which have access to 
transaction data through their proximity to deals or specialist industry and research 
organisations. Due to the relatively closed-nature of the UK market and since trading in 
commercial markets is infrequent, not only do valuation-based return indices dominate the 
landscape, no institution currently publishes a transaction-based index for use in industry. 
This is a key deficiency in the coverage of the market as transaction-based indices may 
both present a more objective picture of actual price levels and vary markedly from indices 
based on valuations. 
 
This paper utilizes a unique dataset of office sales in the London to construct transaction-
based hedonic and repeat-sales indices during the period 1998-2010. These indices are then 
compared with each other and with valuation-based IPD (Investment Property Databank) 
and desmoothed IPD indices, the new transaction-linked IPD series, and real estate 
securities. Our purpose in comparing and contrasting these various indices is not to crudely 
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claim that one method is superior to another, but rather to see what insights we gain by 
analysing their respective price movements while casting a critical eye on the assumptions 
and methodology lying behind each index. Since the conceptual weaknesses and supporting 
assumptions underlying each index are different, we may interpret the common messages 
that emerge across all indices as a relatively robust indicator of historical reality. This 
comparison finds significant differences between the valuation and transaction-based 
indices primarily related to inertia and dampened price movements, especially during the 
pronounced market oscillations experienced in the latter half of the 2000s. 
 
With our unique dataset this paper is able to further develop previous comparisons of 
commercial real estate.  We find that the use of the hedonic method to produce time-series 
of commercial offices is not only feasible but likely superior to the more common method 
adopted in the real estate industry of repeat-sales. This result holds due to the reduction in 
effective sample size and the concomitant decrease in representativeness that occurs as a 
result of the need to exclude all property sales which do not occur in comparable multiples 
over the study period. We can be confident in this result due to the introduction of a novel 
methodology for verifying the validity of our hedonic model: comparing the hedonic price 
index with a repeat-sales index consisting of the same sample of sales.  
 
With regard to repeat-sales this paper finds that the 3SLS procedure conventionally used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity in housing is indistinguishable from an uncorrected OLS 
regression. In addition, this paper also introduces an original fractional-time weighting 
procedure for repeat-sales that allows for simpler calculation of transformation-bias while 
maintaining a minimum of temporal aggregation bias. Other notable findings include the 
fact that, contrary to previous research, real estate securities in the UK follow the 
movements of London office property more closely than the stock market as a whole, the 
method of desmoothing valuations as introduced by Geltner (1993b) produces lead-lag 
relationships that  are a surprisingly close analogue to transaction-based series but which 
appear to exaggerate price movements, and that IPD’s new transaction-linked index is 
extremely similar to its primitive uncorrected valuation series. 
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This paper continues with an overview of the two valuation-based and five transaction-
based indices compared in this paper, along with an original fractional time-weight matrix 
for use in simplifying the correction of transformation bias in repeat-sales. Next the original 
dataset used to produce the hedonic and repeat-sales index is presented, followed by the 
datasets of the other indices, and a comparison of all seven indices. The paper then 
proceeds to discuss these results and concludes. 
Valuation-based price indices 
Valuations 
Valuation indices dominate the market for commercial property in both the US and the UK. 
The primary advantage of valuation-based indices in principle is continuous observation of 
prices (simulated liquidity), even though as valuations these ‘prices’ are only a subjective 
approximation of market values. This observability mitigates problems inherent with low 
transaction volume, such as high standard estimation errors and sample selection bias. 
However with regard to price index construction, valuations suffer limitations of their own 
related to: (i) the accuracy of price levels at any given point in time, (ii) the 
representativeness of asset price variance, and (iii) lethargic reactions to actual market price 
movements125. Typically all three of the problems are present in valuation-based indices 
and are known collectively as ‘smoothing’. 
 
Valuation accuracy 
The problem of valuation accuracy was first highlighted to dramatic effect in a paper 
published by Hager and Lord (1985). This paper contained an analysis of two properties 
appraised by a random sample of 11 professional valuers. The results of this exercise were 
standard deviations of nearly 10% with some valuations differing more than 25% from the 
mean. This finding deeply troubled the valuation industry and initiated a series of more 
formal academic inquiries into the accuracy of property valuations. Among the first of these 
was Miles, Cole, and Guilkey (1990), who found that office properties had a 10% average 
                                                 
125
 Although valuers can impart their own bias on individual transactions, and individual sales may be 
unrepresentative of the market, these idiosyncratic errors are less relevant to price-index construction because 
should cancel out when the population of valuations are aggregated in an index (RICS, 2011). 
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bias in estimated average annual performance over an 8-year period, and that valuations 
underestimate prices when returns are high and over overestimate prices when returns are 
low (that is to say, actual peaks and troughs are more pronounced than valuations suggest). 
Similarly, Adair et al (1994) also recorded around a 10% mean variation in office 
valuations, but did not test whether these errors were systemically biased or varied with the 
real estate cycle. In perhaps the largest study to date, the co-founder of IPD, Ian Cullen 
used proprietary data on 7,000 sale-valuation pairs and found that two-thirds of sales (one 
standard deviation) were within 20% of the most recent valuation, and valuations tended to 
systemically fall below realized prices and under-represent market movements (1994). 
Webb (1994) also noted that the direction of valuation error was inverse to market 
movements, and was additionally related to low quality properties and high vacancy rates. 
However unlike previous studies he found that these errors averaged out over time such that 
over long-periods there was no bias in estimated returns. Matysiak and Wang (1995) 
reported standard deviations on the difference between valuations and sales prices of 20% 
with a 7% undervaluation of properties on average, and their valuations also showed inertia 
(lagged adjustment) with respect to market movements. Blundell and Ward (2008) also 
found an average undervaluation of 7%, a standard error of 18%, and undervaluation in 
rising markets and overvaluation in falling markets.  
 
The common theme of these valuation performance analyses is that they tend to 
underestimate (overestimate) price levels in rising (falling) markets, and valuation accuracy 
across a sample of properties, as defined by standard errors, appears to lie between 10-20%. 
The fact that many of these studies find that valuation indices tend to under-report prices on 
average is almost certainly because nominal and real real estate asset prices have continued 
to rise over time126. For instance, it is telling that the annual rate of inflation in the UK over 
these studies’ sample periods; covering the 1970s and 1980s, is commensurate with the 
magnitude of the downward errors found in these papers: close to 7% (ONS, 2012). 
Therefore in spite of cyclical variation, at any given moment it is most probable that 
appraised properties have undergone or are in the process of undergoing price increases, 
                                                 
126
 Real estate prices have secularly risen in nominal and real terms due to the imposition of discretionary 
central bank-led money creation without a gold-standard and strict land-use controls. 
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and since these price increases only enter valuation indices with a time-lag, we observe 
valuation-based indices under-reporting prices. 
 
Valuation variance 
In addition to the problem of valuation accuracy at a given point in time, there has also 
been concern about the representativeness of valuation variance across time-periods. In 
contrast to market prices, price-indices based on valuations tend to understate the true 
volatility of their underlying assets. Valuations may also miss some apparent price 
movements altogether or only register them long after the fact, especially when the market 
moves rapidly or in opposite directions. For instance in the late 1980s the US NCREIF 
valuation index failed to register significant declines in commercial property values at a 
time when many financial institutions were being declared insolvent, with sharply falling 
real estate values being cited as the primary cause of their insolvency (Fisher et al, 1994). 
Another shorter but also remarkable episode occurred in the third quarter of 1998, where 
the US real estate market suffered a sharp decline but quick recovery that was altogether 
missed by the NCREIF index, and institutional investors looking to the index as a gauge of 
risk cried foul (Fisher and Geltner, 2000). 
 
Lai and Wang (1998) identify an additional potential source of variance dampening. In the 
same way that accountants may face institutional pressure to announce official figures for 
their clients that are more favourable than the underlying reality, valuers may be under 
pressure from fund managers to embellish their reported price fluctuations. For instance, 
Crosby, Lizieri, and McAllister (2010) find that the identity of the client influenced the rate 
at which valuers reported losses in the end-2007 recession. It has even been suggested that 
successive valuations are anchored by the most recent valuation. Instead of, as is best 
practice, beginning each successive valuation de novo, valuers may be influenced by 
previous valuations, and in order to appear consistent may base consecutive valuations off 
of previous ones. 
 
Variance dampening can also arise less deliberately from the fact that although valuations 
in an index will be conducted at different points in time within a computation period, they 
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will all be pinned to a common date when constructing the index. When non-synchronous 
valuations are aggregated in an index, this creates a potentially non-trivial degree of 
smoothing known as temporal aggregation bias (Geltner, 1993a). Naturally this problem is 
inversely proportionate to the duration of computation period, and could easily be 
eliminated by dating valuations precisely and using this information to fractionally time-
weight the index127. In practice this problem is now mitigated by index producers by 
requiring that valuations be stated as at the end of each month, or no more than ten working 
days previous to that date. Therefore it is not surprising that Bond and Hwang (2007) only 
found weak evidence for non-synchronous appraisal in the UK with the IPD index, and no 
evidence in the US with the NCREIF (National Council of Real Estate Investment 
Fiduciaries) index. 
 
Valuation inertia 
As noted in the section on valuation accuracy above, it has been widely documented that 
price-indices based on valuations tend to lag behind movements in the actual market128. A 
major cause of valuation variance error appears to arise from the valuer’s need to filter out 
random noise in the variation of property prices from true market signals. Any given sale-
price is a reflection of not only current price levels, but also random noise in the form of 
observational error, asymmetric negotiation skills, asymmetric information, and unique 
motivations of the sellers and buyers (Crosby, 1991). Therefore, in order to reduce the 
component of random noise in valuations it may be rational for valuers to combine the most 
recent comparable sale with other sales from the more distant past (Geltner, 1989, 1991; 
and Ross and Zisler, 1991). Incorporating this older information implies that current 
valuations will not only contain some dated information, but that the estimated current 
prices will also be smoothed over time reflecting a type of moving average rather than a 
true spot price. Thus the valuer faces an inherent trade-off. Recognising more (fewer) 
previous sales decreases (increases) the timeliness of price fluctuations, but also reduces 
                                                 
127
 See ‘Appendix B: FTW level-based index time-weights’ Table 54 for an example of how this would work 
in practice for valuations dated with monthly precision. 
128
 For instance, Lee, Lizieri and Ward (2000) found that the IPD monthly index lagged behind the FTSE Real 
Estate price series, with a highest correlation of 0.27 at a 7 month lag vs. 0.04 contemporaneously. 
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(increases) the random error associated with the idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
comparable sales. This tradeoff between transaction error and market movement error in 
the valuation process is modelled in the literature as follows129; 
 ∗ = L!∗ + (1 − )     (13) 
 
Where; 
 ∗ = property valuation in period t 
  = true market property value in period t 
  = a fraction between 0 and 1 which governs the relationship between the previous 
valuation, true market value, and optimal present valuations 
 
Solving for  we have; 
  = (∗ − L!∗ ) (1 − )⁄     (14) 
 
As is evident from equation (13) and (14), larger values of  are indicative of greater 
smoothing within the original time-series, and therefore a greater proportion of the previous 
valuation must be removed from the current valuation in order to arrive at the true market 
value of the property, . 
 
Another potential driver of valuation inertia is the valuation and reporting regime of 
property companies themselves. In quarterly valuation-based price indices, property 
companies have been known to report previous-period valuations in lieu of revaluing the 
properties each period, in accordance with the index-reporting frequency. Naturally an 
                                                 
129
 For example see Booth and Marcato (2004b). 
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index which unwittingly incorporates these stale valuations in current periods will be 
lagged by construction.  
 
Although over sufficiently long periods valuation indices should reflect a relatively 
unbiased metric of the true appreciation of the real estate market, in the presence of 
smoothing the index will be lagged and the variance of short-interval returns across time 
and the covariance of these returns with other assets will be biased towards zero. Following 
Markowitz (1952) and successive work on portfolio theory, for purposes of optimal asset 
allocation and diversification it is these variances and cross-correlations that are of interest 
to asset managers. Booth and Matysiak (2004) show that adjusting for valuation smoothing 
along these criteria makes a material difference to asset allocation decisions. In practice 
consultants already use assumptions to adjust for volatility not captured by valuation-based 
real estate indices, and institutional investors only allocate between 5-10% of their 
portfolios to real estate in spite of the fact that naïve models not accounting for this 
distortion would weight real estate much higher (Marcato and Key, 2007).  
 
Recent years have also seen growth in the interest for property derivatives. Property 
derivatives have the potential to increase the efficiency of risk-allocation and address the 
long-standing issues in real estate markets of; high-transaction and management costs, lack 
of liquidity, and inability to sell short. However, in order for real estate derivatives trading 
to achieve these putative benefits they must be based off of an accurate index of prices. A 
practical problem common to both valuation and transaction-based indices however, is that 
as new transaction information comes into the index over time130, the index will need to 
recalculated, invalidating previously reported price levels. The standard method of dealing 
with this problem in industry is to simply ‘freeze’ old index values at their formerly 
reported levels, while incorporating the new information in all subsequently published 
values. Although this means that the reported historical values will be technically ‘wrong’, 
                                                 
130
 In the case of valuation-based indices this would come about due to the recruitment of new data providing 
members. For repeat-sales indices, future-sales invariably create new sale-pairs. And for hedonic indices, 
unless all hedonic variables are time specific (which is data intensive), new sales will change the hedonic 
coefficients, driving corrections in previous time-dummies. 
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this method at least has the benefit of being temporally consistent, precluding the need for 
continual updating and trading compensation. Valuation-based indices in particular have 
additional problems when used for derivatives trading related to accuracy and smoothing. 
These problems have been the principal motivating factors driving both the use of 
transaction-based indices and the development of ‘desmoothing’ techniques for valuation 
data. 
 
Desmoothed Valuations  
Rather than abandon valuation-based indices due to their smoothing problems, an 
alternative is to attempt to desmooth these indices explicitly. In order to desmooth a 
valuation-based time-series it is necessary to assume the structure of the smoothing with a 
formal model. This assumed model is then inverted in order to arrive at what the original 
desmoothed series would have looked like if the assumptions of the smoothing model were 
true. Naturally the effectiveness of this technique rests entirely upon the validity of the 
assumed model of smoothing. One common approach is to assume that, while the smoothed 
valuation returns are generally positively auto-correlated, the returns of the true series are 
uncorrelated from one period to the next (Quan and Quigley, 1991). This assumption is 
essentially the classical hypothesis of weak-form efficiency in asset markets, and amounts 
to saying that successive returns are unpredictable based on past information. Using the 
efficient market assumption, the parameters of the smoothing model can be empirically 
estimated with regression analysis. Fisher, Geltner, and Webb (1994) produce such a model 
of smoothing and expand upon it by additionally assuming that, like the consensus of real 
estate practitioners, the true volatility of commercial real estate valuation-based returns is 
approximately one half that of the domestic stock market.  
 
Although informational efficiency assumption appears to hold quite well for relatively 
transparent and liquid markets such as securities, real estate markets are noted for their 
cyclicality and the fact that successive returns tend to resemble those of the recent past 
(Case and Shiller, 1989; Lee, Devaney and Young, 2007). Rather than invoking the 
efficient market assumption in order to empirically choose values for  in equation (14), 
Geltner (1993b) instead proposes to reverse engineer valuation indices by subjectively 
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assuming a plausible value for 131. The benefit of this method is that it does not require 
that real estate markets be informationally efficient, which is likely to parallel reality more 
closely. 
 
The two model-based desmoothing procedures described above all imply a constant 
smoothing parameter. However, if valuation bias is period specific, then the application of a 
constant smoothing parameter will result in a series containing a mixture of under and 
oversmoothed terms. Based off of Geltner’s (1993b) methodology, Chaplin (1997) 
proposes a model which allows for the desmoothing parameter to vary according to the 
volume of transactions, and therefore, the degree to which prior information is being 
incorporated into current valuations. Lizeri, Stachell and Wongwachara (2012) introduce a 
regime-switching approach which uses indicators for market performance to switch 
between high and low smoothing regimes.  However, Clayton, Geltner and Hamilton 
(2001) while confirming the hypothesis that greater valuation smoothing occurs during 
periods of illiquidity when fewer transactions are consummated, they also find that the 
approximation of this time-varying smoothing parameter with a constant may not lead to 
grossly different price index results. 
Transaction-based price indices 
Hedonic 
Hedonic price indices are based on the method introduced by Rosen (1974) for pricing the 
constituent elements of composite goods. In the case of real estate, hedonic indices replace 
the valuation process with an econometric evaluation procedure in which the index value 
for each calendar period is based on the actual ex post transaction prices of the properties 
which have sold. The hedonic variables in the regression control for the location, 
composition and quality of these properties relative to the market as a whole. At present, 
the use of hedonics in constructing real estate price indices is primarily the domain of 
single family homes, where samples are far larger and generally more homogeneous than 
commercial property. Hedonics is also used extensively in applied real estate research to 
                                                 
131
 Geltner (1993b) argues that for annual appraisals the optimal value for  in his data series is around 0.5. 
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measure the effect of a given property attribute or environmental characteristic on sale or 
rental prices.  
 
In the hedonic approach property transaction prices (usually per square metre) are regressed 
onto a vector of property and environmental characteristics and a vector of time-dummies 
(the intercepts of the cross-sectional model), one for each calendar period. These time 
dummies are ideally fractionally-time weighted according to Brian and Colwell (1982) so 
as to peg the estimated return to values representative of the end of each year and minimise 
temporal lag bias132. In theory the hedonic regressors capture the effect that cross-sectional 
(i.e. across those properties sold within a given time-interval) differences in property 
characteristics have on average transaction prices for each time period. With the property 
characteristics (hopefully) adequately controlled for, the time dummies will capture the 
pure effect of time on a set of constant quality properties, and thus price index levels can be 
read off of these time-dummy coefficients. The estimation equation in both housing and 
commercial property has generally been found to be most satisfactory when modelled with 
a log-log specification, as in the equation used in this paper and outlined below.   
 
  = 7N +#	$ %&! +#'( 
)
&! + *    (15) 
 
Where; 
    = Log sale price per meter for sale of property I and time t 
 7N  = The constant term 
 	  = Coefficient on $ 
 
                                                 
132
 See ‘Appendix B: FTW level-based index time-weights’ for these weights. 
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$  = Log characteristic j of property i 
 '   = Price-level at time t 
 (   = Dummy variable indicating sale of property i at time t 
 *    = i.i.d. error term for property i and sale at time t 
 
Of course, hedonic models are only as good as the specifications used to derive them. If 
influential variables are omitted, then unless the heroic assumption is made that these 
variables are also orthogonal to the time-dummy coefficients or other variables of interest, 
their omission will induce bias on the pure price changes. Furthermore, if the functional 
form of how property attributes affect price is misspecified, then the resulting error on the 
property characteristic coefficients will likely transfer through to the time-dummies and the 
estimated price index.  
 
Another problem frequently noted with the hedonic technique is that if the cross-sectional 
property characteristic parameters are non-constant, then this non-constancy will be 
erroneously picked up as part of the time-dummy effect. There are however two ways to 
mitigate but not eliminate this problem. The first, known as hedonic imputation, is to re-
estimate these parameters every time period. With this method parameter constancy is only 
assumed within each estimated period rather than across the entire timespan of the dataset. 
However, in general this technique is infeasible when constructing commercial real estate 
indices due to the sparsity of the available data. The second method that can be adopted to 
deal with parameter inconstancy is simply to interact the coefficients with the time 
dummies, but again data constraints in the form of sufficient degrees of freedom often 
preclude this. In practice the problem of parameter inconstancy is generally ignored, as 
estimated inter-temporal parameter differences have been shown empirically to be small 
(Glascock, Kim, and Sirmans 1993; and Dombrow, Knight, Sirmans 1997). Interestingly, 
the issue of parameter constancy is one area in which valuations could potentially 
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outperform transaction-based indices, assuming valuers indeed have the ability to recognise 
such changes. But again there would likely be lags to these updates as with the price 
volatility problems mentioned earlier. 
 
By using actual transaction prices, hedonic indices avoid the smoothing inherent in 
valuations. However, even with a perfect hedonic model there will still be some smoothing 
or lagging due to the aggregation of sales that occur at different points in time into a 
common time-interval. This so-called temporal aggregation bias, can be halved for any 
given number of time-periods however by utilizing Bryan and Colwell’s method mentioned 
above. Estimation error also injects random noise into the hedonic index, artificially adding 
volatility into the estimated returns. These estimation errors are purely random and will 
have the effect of imparting negative first-order (i.e. between successive periods) 
autocorrelation in the return index. Aside from potentially more accurate price index 
construction, a working hedonic model of commercial real estate prices could substitute for 
valuations which can take anywhere from 2-4 weeks to complete, whereas a hedonic 
analysis, once properly modelled, could be performed within hours and for a fraction of the 
cost (Crosson, Dannis and Thibodeau, 1996). Repeat-sales on the other hand do not have 
the same potential as hedonic indices to replace valuations, as they would be infeasible 
whenever a building had been considerably altered between sales or if it had never 
previously been sold. 
 
Repeat-sales 
Repeat-sales price indices are a variation of the hedonic technique, first introduced as an 
index modelling procedure in the seminal article by Bailey, et al (1963) and later extended 
by Case and Shiller (1987). Like hedonics, repeat-sales exclusively use transaction prices. 
However, as opposed to assembling a wide and complete range of hedonic controls, the 
repeat-sales technique is a fixed-effects procedure which utilizes previous sales of the 
property as the hedonic control. By matching these comparable sales the entire universe of 
constant observed and unobserved property characteristics in principle can be controlled 
for, and changes to prices affected by the environment and market conditions are registered 
in the index. Therefore repeat-sales should not suffer from the specification problems 
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which plague hedonic indices on the condition that these characteristics are held constant 
between sales. In order to ensure that the earlier sale of the repeat-sales pair is 
representative of the later sale, these indices remove properties from the sample which have 
been altered physically (such as capital improvements) between sale dates. However, 
repeat-sales indices are themselves problematic in that their estimation requires that sales of 
the same asset occur in multiples, which usually means that many years must elapse 
between the start of the dataset and when one can begin to construct a viable index. 
Furthermore, the fact that the index can only utilize sale-multiples represents an inefficient 
use of the total transaction data which can result in considerable issues of selectivity (Case 
et al 1991; Clapp and Giacotto, 1992; and Gatzlaff and Haurin, 1997). In addition, because 
there is perfect collinearity between the periods-held dummy variables and building age, 
the effect of structural obsolescence cannot be modelled linearly, and this can lead to a 
downward bias in the resulting price index133.  
 
Following equation (15) and assuming separate hedonic estimation equations for both the 
first and second sale we have; 
 
 ! = 7N +#	$ !%&! +#'(!
)
&! +	* !   (16)  
 
 " = 7N +#	$ "%&! +#'("
)
&! + * "   (17) 
 
Where; 
  + = Log sale price for sale number , = 1,2 
 	 = Coefficient on $ 
                                                 
133
 Chau, Wong, and Yiu (2005) however are able to overcome this fact by incorporating non-linear age 
effects into the model.  
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 $ +  = Log characteristic j of property i for sale , = 1,2 
 '  = Price-level at time t 
 (+ = Dummy variable indicating sale , = 1,2 at time t 
 * + = i.i.d. error term for property i and sale , = 1,2. 
 
Assuming property characteristics are constant between sales, ∀, ($ ! = $ " ), differencing 
equation (3) with equation (2) yields; 
 
 " −  ! =#'((")&! − (!) + 1 !,"   (18) 
 
Where 1 !," = * " − 	* !.  
 
If we assume that sales 1 and 2 occur at time  and 	 + 2, respectively, the estimation of 
equation (18) simplifies to; 
  34 −   = '34 − ' + 1 ,34   (19) 
 
From which index levels constructed via the estimated ' terms. However the method for 
deriving the index from the ' terms is dependent upon the particular time-dummy 
specification used in equation (18). There are two possible types of time-dummy matrix 
specifications which can be used to produce repeat-sales price indices, but neither has been 
explicitly named by researchers or industry. For clarity this paper will refer to these two 
matrix formulations as index-level matrices and index-growth matrices. Both level and 
growth-based matrices were introduced as possible time-dummy specifications in the 
seminal paper by Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) and will produce identical uncorrected 
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index estimates when calculated from identical data. In their paper, Bailey, Muth and 
Nourse chose to use a level-based specification on the grounds that it was computationally 
simpler. The level-based index matrix is specified as follows; on the date of the first sale 
the index is coded as -1, on the date of the second sale the index is coded as +1, zeros 
everywhere else, including in the first column regardless of properties sold in that period. 
Setting the first column to zeros is done as a normalization which sets the index base value 
to 1 and to prevent multicollinearity. An example will make this specification clear. Say we 
have 4 properties; the first sold in 2000 and again in 2003, a second sold in 2001 and again 
in 2002, a third sold in 2002 and again in 2003, and a fourth bought in 2001 and again in 
2003 producing Table 44 below. 
 
Table 44: Example 1, X-marks the sale. 
 Year of Sale 
Sale-Pair Observation 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 X - - X 
2 - X X - 
3 - - X X 
4 - X - X 
 
The corresponding level-based time matrix with successive sale-pairs represented by rows 
and successive time-periods represented by columns would then be; 
 
A0 0 0 10 −1 1 00 0 −1 10 −1 0 1E = (O         (20) 
 
The ratio of the second to the first sale prices ( ,34  ,⁄ ) can then be used to estimate the 
index values ('34, ') at the time of the second ( + 2) and first sales () as follows; 
  ,34 , = '34' × ; ,,34         (21) 
 
224 
 
With ; representing an error term unique to the sale of property  at times  and  + 2. 
Notice that equation (21) is equivalent to an exponentiated equation (19), with QRS ,T = .  In logs equation (21) becomes; 
 
ln W ,34 , X = −ln(') + ln('34) + lnS; ,,34T 
 
We can now see how the first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation map out the 
matrix in equation (20) above. In vector notation we now have; 
 y = 	(O + Z 
 
Where [ is the vector of logged price relatives, (O is the level-based time-dummy matrix, 	 
is the vector of logged index values, and	Z is the vector of error terms.  
 
Successive price levels in the index can now be estimated as follows. 
 '\ = ]^_` 
 
However because 	\ 	is a random variable and not a constant, the estimate for ' must be 
corrected for transformation-bias (Goldberger 1968)134. If the error term in the logged 
specification is log-normally distributed, as is conventionally assumed, then following 
Kennedy (1981) an almost unbiased135 estimator for '  is; 
 
'\∗ = ]^_`Labcd?ef(^_)@g          (22) 
                                                 
134
 Since 	  is a dummy variable and not continuous, it is inappropriate to interpret it directly as a rate of 
change as is generally done in log-log regressions (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
135
 Although the transform-corrected coefficient estimate is still biased due to the convexity of the exponential 
function, it is less biased than an uncorrected coefficient (Goldberger 1968). Giles (1982) presents the 
formulation for the unbiased estimator, however it is computationally inconvenient due to infinite sums and is 
unlikely to be meaningfully different from Kennedy’s (1981) estimator. 
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Note that the index value and its transformation-bias correction for each period are 
constructed solely from the coefficient and standard error estimates of the period in 
question. The independence of the calculation of index levels for each period from other 
periods is an inherent feature of level-based indices. 
 
Growth-based index estimation 
In recent years the second matrix formulation based on the estimation of period price 
growth-rates has gained popularity in the literature and in the construction of tradable real 
estate indices (Geltner and Pollakowski, 2007). This matrix specification consists of 
placing +1 in each of the columns representing the periods for which the property was held, 
and zeros in columns representing the periods before the property was purchased and after 
the property was sold. Taking the four property example above the corresponding growth-
based time matrix would now be; 
 
A1 1 1 10 1 1 00 0 1 10 1 1 1E = (h          (23) 
 
Again the ratio of the second to the first sale prices is used to estimate the index values, 
except now the specification uses the base index period to calculate successive index levels 
indirectly from rates of growth. Following the format above we have; 
  ,34 , = 'N × ]_ × ]_ib × …× ]_ik × l ,,34 
 
Now in logs; 
 
ln W ,34 , X = ln('N) + m + m3! +…+ m34 + lnSl ,,34T 
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And in vector notation; 
 y = Γ(h + 1           (24) 
 
Now where y is the vector of logged price relatives, (h  is the growth-based time-dummy 
matrix, Γ is the vector of logged index growth rate parameters, and 1 is the error vector. 
The growth index is then constructed by chained multiplication where the base period is; 
 'N\ = ]op          (25) 
 
And successive periods are; 
 '3!` = '\]_ibq            (26) 
 
Where mN is the first element of vector Γ. Again however equations (25) and (26) must be 
corrected respectively for transformation-bias as follows; 
 
'N\ ∗ = ]opLabcdef(o)g           (27) 
 
'3!`∗ = '\∗]_ibqLabcdef(o3b3⋯3_ib)g        (28) 
 
As opposed to level-based indices, the estimated coefficients of growth-based indices 
represent the rate of price appreciation accruing during the corresponding interval (from 
beginning to end of period t). Therefore, to construct an index from the estimated growth 
rates for any given period requires chained multiplication of rates of return from all 
previous periods. Recall that this differs from level-based estimation, where each period is 
calculated independently. 
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Following (25), (27), and (28) we see that when correcting for transformation-bias the 
calculation of the index levels for a given period  + 2 then becomes; 
 
'34`∗ = ]o3p bp3⋯3_ikqLabcdef(o3b3⋯3_ik)g       (29) 
 
As we can see from (29) the transform-corrected growth index requires calculating the 
variance of chained sum of current and previous period returns. Since the level-based index 
calculation (22) can be explicitly rewritten as; 
 
'\∗ = ]^_`Labcdef(^_)g          (30) 
 
Comparing (29) and (30) we see that whereas level-based indices undergoes a simple 
transformation-bias correction with respect to the current period, growth-based indices 
must calculate the variance of a sum, which is not generally standard output in statistical 
packages. Therefore the level-based method of index calculation may be superior in 
practice as it allows for a simpler calculation of transformation bias. 
 
Fractional time-weighting 
If the intervals between time-periods are too short, the estimated dummy variables will 
excessively register the random component of the time series under analysis due to 
insufficient observations. If on the other hand the time-intervals are too long, the resulting 
price-movements may not be able to vary sufficiently and the resulting price-path will be 
smoothed, missing a part of the seasonal or any other significant intra-period fluctuation 
(Birch and Sunderman, 2003). Therefore, index construction strategy faces a tradeoff 
between decreasing (increasing) random noise on the one hand and increasing (decreasing) 
temporal smoothing error/bias on the other.  
 
In what may represent the best of both worlds, Bryan and Colwell (1982) introduced the 
possibility to weight explicit time variables in hedonic equations according to the fraction 
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of year (month) in which they are sold such that all fractional time-dummies sum to unity.  
Henceforth this technique is referred in this paper as fractional time-weighting (FTW). This 
terminology is not generally accepted in the literature but is adopted here for clarification 
purposes. The FTW specification reduces intra-year averaging of values and effectively 
pegs the returns to end-of-year points in time. These annual indexes generally have no lag 
bias and represent end-of-year to end-of-year price changes. Moreover for each time-period 
interval they have as little noise as possible given the amount of data that can be collected 
(Bokhari and Geltner, 2010). However this reduction in temporal smoothing bias comes at 
the cost of a less efficient use of the data, increasing estimation noise compared with non-
fractionally time-weighted matrix specifications; henceforth referred to as unitary time-
weighting (UTW). Simulation analysis of repeat sale regressions comparing FTW and 
UTW by Geltner (1997) however, found that the increase in noise bias arising from FTW 
was small relative to the concomitant decrease in temporal smoothing bias.  
 
In the repeat-sales literature and industry, FTW has been used to weight the time-matrix for 
growth-based indices only; such as (h  in equation (24) above. For instance, if we specify 
the intra-year monthly sale dates of example 1 as follows; the first sold in Jan 2000 and 
again in Jul 2003, a second sold in Aug 2001 and again in Jul 2002, a third sold in May 
2002 and again in Sep 2003, and a fourth sold in Dec 2001 and again in Mar 2003, we can 
write Table 45 as; 
 
Table 45: Example 2, Monthly sales data 
 Year and Month of Sale 
Sale-Pair Observation 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Jan - - Dec 
2 - Aug Jul - 
3 - - May Sep 
4 - Dec - Mar 
 
The corresponding FTW growth-based time matrix would then be; 
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A11.5/12 1 1 6.5/120 3.5/12 6.5/12 00 0 7.5/12 9.5/120 0.5/12 1 2.5/12E = (hwxy      (31) 
 
Level-based indices and fractional time-weighting 
The index values from the level and growth-based UTW time-matrices outlined above [(O 
in equation (20) and (h in equation (23)] are apodictically identical, but as shown 
previously the computation of the respective indices from their estimated coefficients are 
different. Under the time-matrix specifications previously explored in the literature, in 
order to avoid the more complicated calculation of growth-based indices one would have to 
use level-based index estimation using a UTW specification (identical to the matrix (O  
constructed above) which suffers from temporal aggregation bias. The methodological 
contribution of this section is to propose a novel matrix specification which combines the 
simpler transformation-correction of level-based index estimation, with the superior 
temporal performance of fractional time-weighting, leading to simpler transformation bias 
correction or more timely index estimation than was possible before.  
 
For the annual case the proposed level-based FTW matrix is as follows. As in UTW, the 
first sale FTW time-weights sum to -1, but are allocated between the current year and the 
previous year in proportion to the difference between the current date and the beginning of 
the current year136. The second sale time-weights sum to +1 and are similarly allocated 
between the current and previous years. As in the UTW case, the first column of time 
weights matrix is set to zero regardless of first-sales straddling that period as a 
normalisation. A distinctive characteristic of this specification is that unlike UTW, if the 
interval between sales is less than two-times the interval between time-periods, the time-
weightings on the first and second sale observations may overlap. In this case the time-
weight for the overlapping year is constructed by summing the overlapping negative first-
                                                 
136
 See ‘Appendix B: FTW level-based index time-weights’ for details on the annual and quarterly level-based 
index fractional time weights. First and second sale quarterly level-based fractional time weights do not 
overlap for our analysis because sales which occur less than 12 months after the previous sale of the same 
property are filtered out of the sample. 
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sale and positive second-sale time-weights. As in the in level-based UTW case, regardless 
of overlapping the sum of the first and second sale time-weights for each sale pair will sum 
to 0, unless the property in question has a first sale that straddles the base period. Like the 
FTW growth-based index specification, this weighting procedure conveniently centres 
estimated index values at the end of each year.  
 
Applying the level-based FTW matrix specification to the four sale example in Table 45 
yields the following weight-matrix. 
 
A0 −0.5/12 0 7.5/12 4.5/120 −3.5/12 −3/12 6.5/12 00 0 −7.5/12 −1/12 8.5/120 −0.5/12 −11.5/12 9.5/12 2.5/12E = (Owxy      (32) 
 
Notice that with only four repeat sale observations this level-based FTW matrix now 
becomes singular due to the addition of a new base column representing the year 1999. 
However, since a maximum of only one new period-column will need to be added to this 
matrix in order to accommodate FTW (one before the former base-period), the possibility 
of singularity arising from this specification is non-existent with statistically viable 
datasets137. A unique feature of the growth and level-based FTW series is that they allow 
for the estimation of an additional prior year of price levels compared to what is possible 
with a UTW index. FTW can also estimate price-levels for time periods where data is 
altogether missing so long as there is data on the subsequent period, such as the dataset in 
Figure 41 above. 
 
To demonstrate the composition of the indices resulting from the level-based FTW matrix 
specified above we present two examples below. The first represents the 4th sale from Table 
45 whose time-weights for first and second sales do not overlap. Reading from the 4th row 
of equation (32), estimation for the 4th sale now becomes; 
                                                 
137
 To encounter this problem in practice, datasets would have to be exactly identified and therefore 
statistically trivial to begin with. 
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{|,}~	coo{|,	coob = (coo)c./bc×(cooc)./bc(coob)bb./bc×(cooo)o./bc × ;D,	"NN!,:f	"NNC    (33) 
 
In effect, the exponents separate the contribution of the four index values straddling the 
time of both sales, and the multiplicative form assumes geometric interpolation of index 
values between each pair of sale-straddling periods. 
 
It is also instructive to examine the third sale in Table 45 as this sale will have overlapping 
time-weights according to our specification. Reading from equation (32) row 3 we have; 
 C,	"NNCC,:f	"NN" = ('"NNC)./!"('"NN")!/!" × ('"NN!)./!" × ;C,	"NNC,:f	"NN" 
 
Notice that the exponents on either side of the divisor sum to the same value: 8.5. If we 
reinstate the original '"NN" terms between the divisor lost during cancelation, the right-hand 
side again becomes; 
 C,	"NNCC,:f	"NN" = ('"NNC)./!" × ('"NN")C./!"('"NN")D./!" × ('"NN!)./!" × ;C,	"NNC,:f	"NN" 
 
Which we see is compositionally identical to the non-overlapping 4th sale-pair in equation 
(33) above. 
 
Returning now to equation (19), this specification has generally been found to be 
heteroskedastic, with heteroskedasticity growing in proportion to the period between the 
first and second sales. Case and Shiller (1987) propose that this finding is due to properties 
possessing both a common and idiosyncratic variance, the latter of which causes the 
property’s return to diverge from the index as a whole the longer the time period between 
sales. In order to correct for this bias, two weighted least squares estimation procedures 
have been proposed in the literature to underweight property-pairs in the regression 
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estimation with long periods between first and second sales. The first is simply to run a 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression with the length between sales as weights138. We 
call this specification WLS1. The second method proposed by Case and Shiller (1989) is 
also a WLS procedure, but it proposes letting the data estimate the appropriate size of these 
weights with the following three-stage least squares process. We call this method WLS2.  
The three-step procedure is implemented by first running a standard OLS in order to 
estimate the model residuals; 
 
 *̂ = [ − $	  
 
These residuals are then squared, and a second regression is run on these squared residuals, 
with a constant term and the length of time the property has been held as regressors.  
 *" =  + (]m	ℎ]Q ) +   
 
Where	  is an error term assumed to be i.i.d. 
 
From this second stage, the estimates of  and  are used to predict the squared residuals in 
the third stage. 
 *\" =  + (]m	ℎ]Q ) 
 
And then these predicted squared residuals *\" are used to weight the dependent and 
independent variables of the original first-stage regression139, whose coefficients are then 
used to produce the heteroskedasticity-corrected index. 
 
                                                 
138
 As is standard for WLS, this would entail multiplying both sides of the regression equation by 1 ]m	ℎ]Q ⁄ . Where ]m	ℎ]Q  can be any period (annually, quarterly, daily) as long as it is consistently 
applied. Of course, the shorter the period the more accurate the correction for heteroskedasticity can be. 
139
 The weights are now 1  + (]m	ℎ]Q )⁄ = 1 *\" ¡ . 
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Note that the WLS1 procedure is equivalent to WLS2 where the constant in the regression 
on the squared residuals has been set to 0 and the coefficient on the term held has been set 
to 1 arbitrarily. Since the WLS2 procedure allows the data to determine the appropriate 
magnitude of these coefficients, this is perhaps the more sophisticated procedure. Finally, it 
should also be borne in mind that homoscedasticity is a necessary assumption for the 
transformation-bias correction proposed by Kennedy (1981) and Giles (1982). Therefore, in 
order for the level-based fractional time weighting procedure outlined in the section above 
to be applicable for Kennedy’s and Giles’s standard transformation-bias correction, 
homoscedasticity must either be assumed or dealt with explicitly. For transformation-bias 
corrections consistent with heteroskedastic data see Manning and Mullahy (2001). 
 
Repeat-sales are used extensively in the US to produce housing price indices for 
government and industry. The most prominent are the indices produced by the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the 
S&P Case-Shiller house price index. The Case-Shiller index is also tradable, with options 
and futures contracts available for hedging. Although repeat-sales have been used to 
monitor housing prices in the US since the early 1990s, commercial repeat-sales price 
indices have been slower to gain acceptance. After an initial failed attempt in 2007, as of 
2012 Moody’s in association with Real Capital Analytics are again promoting a tradable 
repeat-sales index for US markets which covers the major commercial property types. 
 
Like transaction-based indices in general, repeat-sales indices are demonstrably more 
volatile and contain less autocorrelation than valuation-based indices. Using tax records 
Gatzlaff and Geltner (1998) analyse the entire population of commercial repeat-sales 
occurring in the metropolitan areas of the state of Florida between 1981 and 1996 and 
compare the index produced with the corresponding NCREIF valuation-based index140. The 
repeat-sales index was shown to have comparable volatility (standard deviation=4.07% vs 
3.86%) but markedly lower autocorrelation (-0.08 vs 0.61) Although the two indices do co-
move to a considerable degree (correlation=0.59), the relative magnitudes of these 
                                                 
140
 Like the IPD in the UK, the NCREIF index is considered the US industry standard. 
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movements are significantly dissimilar, differing by as much as 20% per period and with 
noticeable lag. Analyzing house price movements Shimizu, Nishimura, and Watanabe 
(2010) find that repeat-sales indices lag hedonic indices due to sample selection issues. 
Also looking at housing, Meese and Wallace (1997) recommend hedonic indices to repeat-
sales as this method is less sensitive to sample selection bias, and Clapham, et al (2004) 
shows that hedonic indexes appear to be substantially more stable than repeat-sales indexes, 
being less prone to substantial revision in light of new information. Not all studies find 
hedonics to be superior to repeat-sales however, as Crone and Voith (1992) find that repeat-
sales are the most robust when it comes to reduced sample sizes, and Hansen (2006) finds 
no appreciable difference between repeat-sales and hedonic indices looking at Australian 
housing markets.  
 
Although repeat-sales have been compared to hedonic indices in the context of housing, 
this paper may be the first comparison of hedonic and repeat-sales price indices in 
commercial property141. This housing/commercial distinction could prove important 
because commercial properties, especially in the case of offices, are fewer in number and 
generally more heterogeneous than housing. Therefore there may be important limitations 
of the hedonic method to accurately capture prices over time due to inadequate model 
specification, and for the repeat-sales method to gather sufficient and representative data. 
 
Real Estate Securities 
A further approach to analysing real estate price movements is to assemble an index of 
securities on the stock exchange which exclusively hold direct real estate assets. This type 
of index may differ markedly from the other transaction-based indices introduced above 
because real estate securities markets possess greater liquidity, publicly available 
information, low transaction costs, the ability to sell short, and a plenitude of small-scale 
buyers. As to whether the price movements of real estate securities are more similar to the 
performance of the broad stock market or their underlying properties, the evidence has been 
mixed. Early studies such as Giliberto (1990, Liu et al (1990), and Myer and Webb (1993) 
                                                 
141
 Perhaps the most similar extant paper in this regard is Chau et al. (2005), who only compares a commercial 
repeat-sales index of Hong Kong with valuation-based indices and a hybrid index. 
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noted similar return behaviour between real estate securities and stocks, but the results of 
later studies like Morawski, Rehkugler, and Fuss (2008) and Hoesli and Oikarinen (2012) 
have been more nuanced, finding that over the short-term securitized real estate resembles 
the stock market, whereas over the long-run the correspondence with direct real estate is 
stronger. 
 
In terms of the price movements themselves, Mueller and Mueller (2003) and Brounen and 
Eichholtz (2003) show low contemporaneous correlation between securitized real estate 
and ‘real’ real estate. Moreover, relative to direct property, real estate securities certainly 
exhibit a higher high degree of negative autocorrelation, pronounced volatility142, and lead 
the price movements of direct property143. This intuitively makes sense, as it is to be 
expected that price discovery take place in the most efficient market (Wang, Lizieri and 
Matysiak, 1997; Lizieri and Satchell, 1997).   
 
However, the differences between real estate securities and direct property established in 
these studies may be have been confounded by lags inherent in the valuation process itself 
(Myers and Webb, 1993; Gyourko and Keim, 1992). With regard to studies which define 
direct property price movements in terms of a transaction-based index: Fisher, Geltner, and 
Webb, (1994) find evidence that public markets move sooner than private markets144, while 
Boudry et al (2012) found either no such relationship or much shorter lags compared to 
previous literature, and Hoesli, Oikarinen, and Serrano (2012) find divergent results 
according to the property sector in question. Hoesli, Oikarinen, and Serrano also pioneer 
the examination of whether the presence of ‘escrow lag145’ in direct property can account 
for the apparent slower price adjustment relative to real estate securities found in many 
studies, and they conclude that this is indeed the case for some property sectors. Given the 
                                                 
142
 Phenomena which are indicative of the excessive ‘noise’ common to stock markets (Geltner, 1997; Black, 
1985; and Lee, Schleifer and Thaler, 1991). 
143
 For a negative result see Glascock, Liu and So (2000) and Boudry et al (2012). For a contrary result refer 
to Tuluca, Myer, Webb (2000). 
144
 But a problem with their conclusion is that their time-dummies are not fractionally time-weighted, and 
therefore will be subject to artificial temporal lag bias by fault of their model specification (Geltner, 1997). 
145
 As defined as the time interval between when buyers and sellers have arrived at a ‘meeting of minds’ on 
the sale price, and when the transaction is legally consummated. 
236 
 
dearth of transaction-based comparisons of real estate securities and the unsettled questions 
of its correspondence with direct property within the extant literature, this paper stands to 
make a meaningful contribution to our understanding of the linkages between public and 
private commercial real estate.  
 
An important difference between real estate securities and direct property assets is that the 
magnitude of mean price movements and variance observed in real estate securities will 
also reflect the amount of leverage in the constituent companies (Lizieri and Satchell, 
1997), whereas private real estate assets are sold at prices exclusive of contractual debt 
obligations against the property. Because of this difference, leveraged real estate securities 
will automatically register higher levels of risk than direct property, even when in point of 
fact the underlying assets may be no more volatile. However, if the real estate securities 
index contains debt both on the asset and liability side of the balance sheet, this will 
counteract debt-induced volatility to an extent, leaving the returns to equity as a reasonable 
reflection of changes in value of the properties held by the institution as a whole (Fisher, 
Geltner, and Webb, 1994). However this offsetting relationship is unlikely to be perfect at 
all points in time, and so securitized real estate returns are ideally corrected for leverage on 
both sides of the balance sheet when comparing the riskiness of returns to other indices146. 
The standard method to degearing securities is to assume a simple weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) model, and use this to derive the returns of the underlying properties from 
the return to equity. Following Fisher, Geltner, and Webb (1994) our model begins by 
simplifying the composite balance sheet of all companies in the index to read; 
  	+	 = ( + F     (34) 
Where; 
  = Value of property assets held at time t 
 
                                                 
146
 Depending on the analysis in question unlevering real estate returns may not be strictly necessary. For 
instance, Yunus (2012) argues that questions of lagging and causality in price indices are unaffected by 
leverage. 
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= Value of mortgages and other debt-like securities held at time t 
 ( = Value of outstanding liabilities (mortgages and other debt held against corporate 
assets) at time t 
 F = Value of shareholder equity at time t 
 
Following this accounting identity and assuming capital structure irrelevance as outlined by 
Modigliani-Miller (1958), it follows that the returns to the equity index will be separately 
composed of; 
 
m¢ = m{ F + m:F − m (F    (35) 
 
Where; 
 m¢  = return to equity (the naïve real estate securities series) iat time t 
 m{ = return to real estate property at time t 
 m: = return to real estate debt at time t 
 m = cost of capital at time t 
 
Assuming that the return to and cost of debt are approximately equal147 m: ≈	m 	∀, 
equation (35) becomes; 
 
m¢ ≈ m{ F + m ¤1 − F¥    (36) 
                                                 
147
 This assumption will naturally be most accurate where the debt held and issued is of similar riskiness and 
where efficient markets price risk uniformly. 
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With equation (36) holding as an approximation we can now estimate the return to the 
underlying properties in the portfolio of assets as; 
 
m{ = m¢ F + m ¤1 − F¥    (37) 
 
Invoking (34) simplifies (37) to; 
 
m{ = m¢ F + m (¦      (38) 
 
Where (¦ equals net debt, or ( −. Note that with algebraic manipulation (38) can be 
shown to be identical to the rather cumbrous and less intuitive expression more common in 
the literature; 
 
m{ = Wm¢ + m (¦F X W1 + (¦F X§  
 
Given that the cost of debt m will predominantly be lower than the return on equity148, 
equation will progressively blunt the estimated index returns the greater the corporate debt, 
and by corollary the smaller the ratio of F ⁄ . 
Hybrid Indices 
Transaction-linked Indices 
A relatively recent addition to the universe of real estate index construction methods is the 
so-called transactions-linked or transactions-based valuation index now produced by 
NCREIF and IPD. This hybrid methodology combines property valuations with hedonic 
data on sales. Starting with the hedonic model in equation (15) this method recognizes that 
the vector of hedonic variables relating property characteristics to sale price, ∑ 	$ %&!  can 
                                                 
148
 Or investors would otherwise altogether shun the contractually riskier equity. 
239 
 
be replaced with a single variable representing the property valuation price, in which case 
equation (15) becomes; 
 
  = 7N + 
  +#'( )&! + *    (39) 
 
Where; 
  = the coefficient on valuations 
 
  = the log of the valuation price of property i at time t 
 ' = the systemic difference between valuations and transaction prices in period t 
 
An important issue related to this estimation procedure is the question of how well 
appraised prices effectively represent differences in quality between properties. If the 
valuation itself contains error, then the relationship between appraised and market value is 
not direct. In particular, since the literature has often found both systemic and non-systemic 
components to these errors (Clapp, 1990; Kochin and Parks, 1982) this relationship can be 
modelled as; 
 
  = 7N +   + 1      (40) 
 
Where; 
 
    = appraised price of property i at time t 
 7N    = constant factor in the systemic error in valuations 
       = scaling factor in the systemic error in valuations 
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      = the unobservable true market value of property i at time t 
 1     = the idiosyncratic error in the valuation of property i at time t 
 
In most studies comparing real estate valuations with sales it has been found that 7N is 
either zero or positive and  is less than one (Brown, 1985; Matysiak and Wang, 1995; 
Blundell and Ward, 2008). The net effect of these two coefficients indicates that valuers are 
systemically biased in underestimating the sale price of properties. Rearranging (40) we see 
that with respect to actual market value  , equation (39) is more accurately depicted by; 
 
  = 7N +  ¤
 −	7N − 1  ¥ +#'( 
)
&! + *   
 
Which with further rearrangement yields; 
 
  = 7N +  ¤
 −	7N ¥ +#'( 
)
&! + *  −  1     (41)  
 
We can now see the consequence of errors in the use of assessed values to model market 
values in a hedonic price model. The compound error term of equation (41) is now *  − ©¨ 1  , making it negatively correlated by construction with , which means that  is 
now biased under standard OLS assumptions. To resolve this issue one approach is to adopt 
an instrumental variables (IV) technique: finding an instrument which is both correlated 
with 
  but not with 1 . Once an acceptable instrument for 
  is found it can replace 
  
in equation (39) and this will allow for consistent estimation of the parameters in the model. 
In the seminal paper on using assessed values as a proxy for hedonic controls, this 
instrumental variable technique was adopted by Clapp (1990) to analyse land prices. 
However, subsequent studies on the assessed value method which compare the results of 
OLS and IV specifications found them to be virtually identical in large samples (Clapp and 
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Giacotto, 1992; Devaney and Diaz, 2011). As a result, in both empirical work and in 
industry the effect of the valuation error on assessed value estimates is now routinely 
ignored. 
 
Once equation (39) has been estimated the coefficients so derived are used to correct the 
appraised value of the rest of the properties which did not transact for each time period, as 
shown below in equation (42). 
` = 7N + 
  +#'\( )&!    (42) 
 
In this way the appraised values 
  can be econometrically corrected to more accurately 
reflect current price movements `. In order to derive average capital returns, the estimated 
value of each ` is then exponentiated and divided by the exponentiated previous return L!g , and the resulting returns across all properties can be either equal-weighted or value-
weighted to produce an average capital return and construct a price index149.  
 
A possible accoutrement to this model is the use of a Heckman (1979) procedure to control 
for unobserved sample selection bias in the transactions which are observed. Theoretically 
the Heckman procedure has the potential to correct the model coefficients for the fact that 
the properties which sell every period may not be representative of the total population of 
properties appraised that period. This method is carried out by first defining a selection 
equation which identifies the effect of property and environmental characteristic on the 
probability of sale by running a probit regression, as in equation (43) below. 
 
5 ∗ = 7N + 
 +#79 ) + ; ª	5  = 1		5 ∗ ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise             (43)  
 
Which can then be estimated as a probit model; 
                                                 
149
 Equal-weights apply to indices viewed as statistical samples and value-weights to indices which are a 
population census. Indices used for research are best viewed as a statistical sample (Geltner and Ling, 2007). 
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Pr	?5  = 1	@ = Φ®7N + 
 +#79 ) ¯   (44) 
Where; 
 5 ∗  = threshold value of property i being transacted 
 5   = an indicator variable for whether property i sold in time t 
 Φ(∙) = the cumulative density function (cdf) of the normal distribution 
 7	 = coefficient on 9 
 9  = characteristic of office i at time t which influences the probability of sale 
 ;    = normally distributed error term on property i at time t 
 
In the next step is to use the estimated coefficients in equation (44) to construct the inverse 
Mills ratio; 
 
J  = ±S²op3¨³´_3∑ ²_ µ´_x_ T¶S²op3¨³´_3∑ ²_ µ´_x_ T  
 
Where; 
 ·(∙) = the probability density function (pdf) of the normal distribution 
 
In the presence of unobserved sample selection bias the correct specification of equation 
(39) will now be; 
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 |5  = 7N + 
  +#'( )
&!
+ ?* |5 @ 
 
With the error term likely leading to bias in the estimated index coefficients '. But with our 
estimates from the selection equation (44) the biasing effect of the error term can now be 
modelled with the inverse Mills-ratio. 
 
 |5  = 7N + 
  +#'( 
)
&!
+ IJ  + ¸   (45) 
 
Where; 
 
I = the estimated coefficient on the Mills-ratio for period t 
 
¸  = the new unbiased error term for property i in period t 
 
However the standard errors in equation (45) are now heteroskedastic and must be 
corrected according to Greene (1981). Coefficient estimates from the following equation 
can now be used to update valuations and produce an average capital return corrected for 
unobserved sample selection bias. 
 
|5g = 7N + 
  +#'\( 
)
&!
+ I\J  
 
Although the Heckman procedure is currently used in academic work, neither the NCREIF 
in the US nor the IPD in the UK use it in their transaction-linked indices produced for 
industry. IPD states that the reason that they do not use the Heckman procedure in their 
models is because they found that it to be generally unstable, and highly sensitive to small 
samples of sales common when liquidity is low (IPD, 2012).  Furthermore, in analyzing 
NCREIF data Fisher, Geltner, Pollakowski (2007) found that the influence of unobserved 
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sample selection bias was not significant on the estimated price series. These objections are 
common to the use of the Heckman procedure across many areas of economics in general, 
and the question of whether this method will be adopted by industry in future is still open. 
Data 
Valuation-based 
Valuations 
As a comparable benchmark to the transaction-based indices produced by this paper, the 
valuation-based office property capital-growth index for Inner London produced by 
Investment Property Databank (IPD) is used. The IPD commercial property indices are 
generally considered to be the ‘gold standard’ in the UK, and the ‘Inner London’ geography 
series used here is the closest geographic analogue to our transaction data available from 
IPD. As a ‘capital growth’ series it also excludes income from estimated returns in order to 
be directly comparable to the transaction-based hedonic and repeat-sales indices.  
 
Desmoothed Valuations 
The desmoothed index is derived directly from the IPD Inner London Office capital growth 
index. Although there are currently more sophisticated desmoothing models in existence, 
we feel that given its simplicity, ease of interpretation, and widespread historical use, the 
first-order autoregressive filter used by Geltner (1993b) is the most general choice for an 
expository comparison of indices. This desmoothing procedure was applied to the UK 
market by Barkham and Geltner (1994) and more recently by Booth and Marcato (2004b). 
Following these papers we assume; 
 
m = /m∗ − mL!∗ 0 /1 − 0⁄     (46) 
 
m∗ = rate of return on the valuation-based index in period t 
 
m = true market rate of return in period t 
 
 = first-order autoregressive parameter between 0 and 1 
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According to Geltner (1993b) the optimal value for  in equation (14) is approximated by; 
 
 = B:
"
B:" + B¹"     (47) 
 
Where; 
 
B:"  = the true variance of real estate returns in the market 
 
B¹" = the variance of valuations with respect to the true market price 
 
As we can see from the descriptive statistics of the hedonic and repeat-sales transaction-
based Table 49 below, a reasonable approximation for the standard deviation of the market 
rate of return over the duration of our dataset is 20%, and from the discussion of valuation 
variance in the valuation-based indices section above a realistic approximation of the 
standard deviation of valuations is also 20%. Via equation (47) these two assumptions 
imply a value for  in our dataset of 0.5, which Geltner (1993b) states suggests a value for 
 in equation (46) of 0.6150. In our desmoothed valuation-based series this is also the value 
for  which we use. 
 
Transaction-based 
Hedonic and Repeat-sales 
The index samples were constructed with 3,351 unique sale instances in central and outer 
London between 1978 and 2010 using databases from Estates Gazette and Real Capital 
Analytics. However, there were insufficient repeat-sales prior to 1998 to viably estimate an 
annual return series index, so values for years prior to 1998 are not constructed. The 
remaining observations were then culled with the following methodology.  
                                                 
150 In point of fact, the value Geltner’s (1993b) uses for his  is 0.4. However, since his analog of equation 
(46) is actually, m = ?m∗ − /1 − 0mL!∗ @ /0⁄ , the equivalent value of  in equation (46)is 0.6.  
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1. Removed non-central London building sales, as defined by EG and RCA. 
2. Removed all portfolio sales. 
3. Removed all predominantly non-office space building sales. 
4. Removed sales of buildings which had been rebuilt, refurbished, or otherwise 
altered between transactions. 
5. Removed sales which occurred less than 12 months after the previous sale151. 
6. Removed sales in the hedonic estimation for which complete data on relevant 
controls could not be identified. 
7. Removed repeat-sales which exhibited annualized price movements greater than 
50% of the previous sale price. 
 
This data culling yielded 529 hedonic sales and 354 repeat sale-pairs. 173 of the hedonic 
sales are also present in at least one of the repeat-sales pairs. We have slightly more 
hedonic observations in this dataset than in chapter 1 (513) because we have sufficient 
observations to estimate an annual series for 1998 and 1999 at the annual frequency, but not 
the quarterly frequency which is used in chapter 1. For the hedonic sample, as complete a 
set of hedonic controls as possible is included in the regressions. In the interest of brevity 
the interested reader is referred to a full description of these variables in chapter 1 of this 
thesis, and the results of the regression and the full specification used to construct the 
hedonic index are displayed in Figure 32 below This comprehensive suite of controls 
combined with the use of a fractional time-weight specification outlined in ‘Appendix B: 
FTW level-based index time-weights’ represents a sophisticated hedonic model of the 
London office market. 
  
                                                 
151
 Rapidly resold properties have been shown to have a distorting effect on repeat-sales price indices (Clapp 
and Giacotto, 1999). 
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Figure 32: Hedonic index model specification and results 
  
VARIABLES Ln(Price/Sqm) 
  
Within Conservation Area 0.0537 
 (0.0347) 
Listed 0.00153 
 (0.0480) 
Ln(Office Refusal Rate 9yr Moving Average) 0.0275* 
 (0.0140) 
Built 1950s -0.0884 
 (0.0750) 
Built 1960s -0.146** 
 (0.0648) 
Built 1970s -0.202*** 
 (0.0658) 
Built 1980s -0.0471 
 (0.0471) 
Built 1990s 0.0423 
 (0.0441) 
Built 2000s 0.116** 
 (0.0496) 
Built 2010s 0.351 
 (0.227) 
Sold 1999 0.213 
 (0.209) 
Sold 2000 0.208 
 (0.159) 
Sold 2001 0.378** 
 (0.159) 
Sold 2002 0.394** 
 (0.162) 
Sold 2003 0.271* 
 (0.151) 
Sold 2004 0.492*** 
 (0.154) 
Sold 2005 0.466*** 
 (0.148) 
Sold 2006 0.773*** 
 (0.149) 
Sold 2007 0.720*** 
 (0.150) 
Sold 2008 0.276* 
 (0.155) 
Sold 2009 0.383** 
 (0.149) 
Sold 2010 0.541*** 
 (0.154) 
City Fringe -0.281*** 
 (0.0734) 
Docklands 0.205 
 (0.205) 
Midtown 0.0164 
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 (0.0562) 
North Central 0.104 
 (0.135) 
South Central -0.0536 
 (0.109) 
Southern Fringe 0.0687 
 (0.0988) 
West Central 0.330*** 
 (0.124) 
West End 0.400*** 
 (0.0662) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.172*** 
 (0.0322) 
Ln( Conservation Area Density 300m) 0.00653 
 (0.00834) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0169 
 (0.0137) 
Ln(Parks and Gardens Density 300m) 0.00772*** 
 (0.00251) 
Adjacent to Park or Garden 0.122*** 
 (0.0425) 
Ln(Nearest Station Distance) -0.0377 
 (0.0252) 
Ln(Floors) 0.0854 
 (0.0538) 
Ln(Depreciation Age) -0.00646 
 (0.00664) 
Ln(Basements/Floors) -0.0156** 
 (0.00786) 
A/C 0.203*** 
 (0.0750) 
EG Office Grade A/B 0.0133 
 (0.0416) 
EG Office Grade A 0.0529 
 (0.0375) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0299*** 
 (0.00770) 
Multiple Tenants -0.0797** 
 (0.0335) 
Ln(Parking Spaces) 0.000455 
 (0.00330) 
Constant 5.843*** 
 (0.450) 
  
Observations 529 
R-squared 0.631 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Naturally the repeat-sales index is likewise fractionally time-weighted according to 
‘Appendix B: FTW level-based index time-weights’. The result of this repeat-sales 
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regression is shown below for the unweighted OLS and weighted WLS1 and WLS2 
homoskedasticity corrections. 
  
Table 46: Repeat-sales price index heteroskedasticity correction comparison 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES RSPI 
OLS 
RSPI 
WLS 1 
(1/yrs held) 
RSPI 
WLS 2 (3SLS) 
[1/(a+b*yrs held)] 
    
1998 0.128 -0.00312 0.107 
 (0.130) (0.140) (0.132) 
1999 -0.00959 0.0419 -0.00168 
 (0.108) (0.117) (0.110) 
2000 0.195** 0.178** 0.192** 
 (0.0814) (0.0897) (0.0825) 
2001 0.000469 0.0867 0.00787 
 (0.0723) (0.0724) (0.0726) 
2002 -0.00906 -0.0502 -0.00954 
 (0.0804) (0.0775) (0.0800) 
2003 0.00463 -0.0148 0.000528 
 (0.0730) (0.0665) (0.0720) 
2004 0.0660 0.116** 0.0710 
 (0.0622) (0.0528) (0.0610) 
2005 0.142** 0.112** 0.140** 
 (0.0551) (0.0476) (0.0541) 
2006 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0465) (0.0517) 
2007 -0.121** -0.0889* -0.118** 
 (0.0582) (0.0505) (0.0575) 
2008 -0.371*** -0.353*** -0.368*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0616) (0.0701) 
2009 0.249*** 0.209*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0689) (0.0741) 
2010 0.0688 0.138* 0.0764 
 (0.0824) (0.0790) (0.0825) 
    
Observations 354 354 354 
R-squared 0.589 0.526 0.575 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second stage regression used to calibrate the WLS2 procedure in Table 46 specification 
3 is shown in Table 47 below. 
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     Table 47: Repeat-sales price index WLS2 2nd stage 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Residuals-squared 
  
Years Held 0.00338** 
 (0.00171) 
Constant 0.0344*** 
 (0.00806) 
  
Observations 354 
R-squared 0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Real Estate Securities 
The three real estate securities that were considered for this paper are outlined in Table 48 
below. Although the ideal index would have been the FTSE UK Office Property Index 
since it is only comprised of office properties, its base date only begins in 2006 limiting its 
usefulness as a comparison with our other indices. The next index, the FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Index has an earlier start date of 1989, but is composed of six property 
sectors including retail, public storage, and healthcare (FTSE Group, 2012). This is 
problematic because different property sectors will tend to move idiosyncratically relative 
to the office-only indices we intend to compare them with (Hamelink et al, 2000). The 
Datastream Office and Industrial REITs UK (DS REITs) series on the other hand begins 
early enough and is composed only of securities which invest primarily in office and 
industrial properties. Because this index corresponds most closely to the other indices 
analysed here, the DS REITs index is used as this paper’s real estate securities comparison.  
 
Table 48: UK Real Estate Securities 
 Levered Base Date Sectoral Composition 
FTSE UK Office Property Index NO 2006 Office 
FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Index YES 1989 All 
Datastream Office and Industrial REITs UK Index YES 1965 Office, Industrial 
 
Booth and Marcato (2004b) also use the DS REITSs series as their preferred real estate 
securities index in their analysis of real estate price indices. Naturally we use the pure price 
index of this series which excludes dividends. As the DS REITs series is also levered, we 
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unlever it following equation (37) using; annual balance sheet data on all the index’s 
constituents to construct the ratio of equity to assets, and annual average UK bank’s base 
interest rates provided by the Bank of England for the cost of capital. Roughly following 
Booth and Marcato (2004a)152, we add 150 basis points to this interest rate as an 
approximation for the spread to real estate assets. Although a more accurate method may be 
to adjust spreads annually according to, say, De Montfort numbers153, the choice of interest 
rate is of second order of magnitude, and therefore the precise choice of interest rate is 
unimportant (Booth and Marcato, 2004a). Index values are then taken at year-end to 
correspond to the price-capture dates of the valuation and transaction-based indices.  
 
As Crosby and McAllister (2004) find that the median duration of escrow lag for office 
property in the UK is only 50 days, and our indices are only reported at the annual 
frequency, we do not attempt to follow Hoesli, Oikarinen, and Serrano (2012) and correct 
for ‘escrow lag’. This decision is reinforced by the fact that even at a quarterly frequency 
Hoesli, Oikarinen, and Serrano do not universally find evidence that ‘escrow lag’ affects 
indices across all real estate sectors. 
 
In addition to the real estate securities series, we also compare the performance of the FTSE 
All Shares price index. The index we use is the pure price index which excludes dividends 
and consists of a capitalisation-weighted basket of 602 of the roughly 2,000 stocks listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. This index comprises approximately 98% of the UK stock 
market’s capitalisation (FTSE Group, 2012). Since he FTSE All Shares Index consists of 
financially levered equities, to increase comparability we also unlever the FTSE All Shares 
Index in the same manner as the DS REITs series. 
 
Hybrid Indices 
The transaction-linked index utilized in this paper is produced by IPD. Unfortunately the 
only transaction-linked index they current report for the UK is for the entire country and 
covers office, industrial, retail, residential, hotel, and healthcare property types. Because 
                                                 
152
 They add 12.5 basis points per month to the benchmark yield for five year gilts. 
153
 The author was unable to acquire their commercial lending reports. 
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this geographic extent and inclusion of other property types differs from all the other 
indices examined here, the transaction-linked index is not directly comparable to them. To 
date, no other transaction-linked index is produced in the UK, and due to these 
dissimilarities its inclusion in the analysis is for expository purposes only. Like the other 
indices presented here, the IPD transaction-linked index is however also a capital return 
index.  
Empirical comparison of alternative indices 
The time period analysed here (1998-2010) encompasses two boom and bust phases. The 
first real-estate boom phase stems from the so-called Dot-com bubble which peaked 
sometime around the beginning of 2000 and then continued falling through 2003. From this 
point the big real estate boom of the middle 2000s begins and continues apace until 
sometime around 2006-07, at which point the market stalls and then falls precipitously, 
bottoming out around late 2008 or early 2009. We can see these events clearly unfolding in 
the IPD Inner London series in Figure 33. Since the IPD indices are currently the de facto 
industry standard in the UK, we superimpose this index on the other indices in this paper as 
the benchmark comparison. 
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IPD Inner London 
Figure 33: IPD Inner London Index 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100.  
 
Desmoothed IPD Inner London 
Figure 34: Desmoothed IPD Inner London Index 
  
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. First-order autoregressive parameter is 0.6. 
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As we see in Figure 34 the desmoothed IPD series has a greatly more pronounced variance 
than the uncorrected version154, with higher peaks and lower troughs in three out of the four 
market turning points. The two indices are equivalent by construction at the 2003 trough, as 
this is the year selected as the index base. This year was chosen as it maximizes the 
comparability of the hedonic and repeat-sales series, for reasons we will see shortly. 
Although a more formal investigation into the existence of lead-lag relationships would 
invoke tests of Granger causality, the length of the annual dataset used here is not adequate 
to produce a test of sufficient statistical power. Therefore, similar to Fisher, Geltner, and 
Webb (1994), in analysing lead-lag and other relationships we restrict ourselves to visual 
comparisons of the data. It is clear from visual inspection that the desmoothed series also 
leads the uncorrected index by about a year at those same 3 market turning points. Along a 
similar vein, it would be ideal to be able to test whether the desmoothed series is actually 
statistically different in general from its benchmark: IPD inner London. Previous literature 
such as Clapp and Giacotto (1999) utilize Wilcoxon’s signed rank test (Conover 1980, p. 
280) for equality of means and Run Tests (Lindgren 1976, p. 498) for consistent positive or 
negative divergence in a time series for this purpose. However, none of the indices 
produced here are statistically different from their respective benchmark according to these 
tests, and again this is likely due to the fact that these annual series are of insufficient 
duration to register differences statistically. From Table 49 we also see that the 
desmoothing procedure has successfully reduced the degree of autocorrelation present in 
the data. However, given the extreme fluctuations of this series relative to the others below, 
it would appear as though the value of  = 0.6 used in equation (46) to desmooth the IPD 
series here is excessive. However, since it is not clear a priori what lower value of  would 
be appropriate, this analysis retains the more objective value of 0.6.  
                                                 
154
 See Table 49 for quantification of this difference. 
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Hedonic 
Figure 35: Hedonic Index 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
In general, the hedonic index is comparable to the IPD valuation index, though there are 
some obvious differences. The lead-lag relationship of the hedonic series appears similar to 
the desmoothed series: turning about a year in advance of IPD valuations. Moreover the 
2002 and 2006 peak occurs at a more extreme value than the IPD valuation index, though 
unlike the desmoothed index, the 2008 turning point is less extreme than the IPD valuation 
series. The hedonic index marginally falls between 2004-05, and this is the only index 
studied here which exhibits this behaviour. Given this and the appearance of more ‘jagged’ 
returns compared to the repeat-sales series exhibited below it may be reasonable to assume 
that this idiosyncratic fall is a result of mere noise manifesting itself in the form of 
excessive negative autocorrelation. However as we will show subsequently, the jagged 
appearance of this series is in fact a result of sample selection and not estimation error 
emanating from the relatively smaller sample of sales observations in the hedonic 
methodology. Another notable feature of the hedonic, and indeed the repeat-sales series 
below, is the low degree of persistence in these indices, as evident from the negative first-
order autocorrelation in Table 49 and Table 50 which follow. 
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Repeat-sales 
Figure 36: Repeat-sales price index heteroskedasticity corrections comparison 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values =100. 
 
Although the second-stage regression of the WLS2 procedure in Table 47 finds statistically 
significant linear heteroskedasticity present in the OLS return series, as we can see from 
Figure 36 the resulting WLS2 index calibrated for this observed heteroskedasticity is not 
noticeably altered by this correction. On the other hand, the more arbitrarily applied WLS1 
specification does exhibit a noticeable divergence from the OLS series, tracking secularly 
higher. Interestingly, although it would superficially appear that the inverse weighting 
WLS1 procedure increases the volatility of the repeat-sales series, both the WLS1 and 
WLS2 series have slightly smaller standard deviations at 15.65% and 16.36% respectively, 
relative to the OLS index at 16.61%. Given the close correspondence between the 
heteroskedasticity calibrated WLS2 procedure and OLS, and since the WLS2 procedure is 
the only heteroskedasticity correction utilized by industry, it was decided to use the 
computationally simpler OLS series instead of WLS1 and WLS2 as the basis for the 
comparison with other indices. This OLS series is illustrated in Figure 37 below. 
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Figure 37: Repeat-Sales Index 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
The correspondence between the repeat-sales and IPD series in estimated index levels in 
Figure 37 is striking. Aside from more muted price movements in the early 2000s, the only 
major difference between the repeat sale and IPD indices occurs in 2009 when the repeat-
sales index tracks sharply higher as the IPD index continues to fall. That said, the repeat-
sales series clearly leads the IPD series in the late 2000s in much the same way as the 
desmoothed and hedonic series; registering a fall in 2007 rather than 2008, and recovering 
in 2009 rather than 2010. Note as well that the excessive negative autocorrelation apparent 
in the hedonic series is now absent. Of all the transaction-based indices studied here, the 
repeat-sales index is the most similar to the IPD.  
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Real Estate Securities 
Figure 38: Datastream REITs 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
Like the repeat-sales series, the DS REITs index moves only slightly in the early 2000s, 
with a mild peak occurring in 2000, perhaps reflective of the ‘so-called’ dot-com bubble 
occurring at the time155. After treading water for several years it then exhibits the most 
extreme rise of any index examined here during the middle and late 2000s real estate 
boom156. Furthermore, this uptick in the real estate market begins earlier (2002) than any 
other index in this series, perhaps indicative of price discovery. However, contrary to the 
private-market real estate indices, the DS REIT series does not experience any sort of 
rebound in prices in either 2009 or 2010. At first blush one might expect this to be due to 
downward pressure from the stock market in general. But as Figure 39 shows, the stock 
market, as represented by the FTSE All Share Index, rebounded strongly in both 2009 and 
2010. A possible explanation for this is that, while London rebounded quickly from the last 
recession, the rest of the country did not, and as the constituents of the DS REITs series do 
not operate exclusively in London, this index does not see a similar uptick for this period. 
                                                 
155
 The very modest growth occurring during this period is in stark contrast to the precipitous rise of internet 
stocks and the broad stock market at the time (see Figure 39). However, this is hardly surprising given that 
value sectors including real estate greatly under-performed internet stocks during this period. 
156
 Note the larger variation in the y-axis values than in the other graphs need to accommodate this rise. 
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Overall, the index price-path appears relatively smooth for a transaction-based index, with 
levels of autocorrelation similar to the IPD index157. This finding is surprising, and perhaps 
again may be due to the geographic diversification of the index constituents, reducing 
‘noise’ at the local London level158. 
 
Stock Exchange 
Figure 39: FTSE All Shares Index 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
The FTSE All Share Index shows some interesting variation from the IPD Inner London 
and real estate securities series. The early years of the FTSE series experience the most 
massive fall in values beginning in 2000 in the wake of the Dot-com bubble. This large 
reversal in prices in the late 1990s and early 2000s is unlike any of the real estate indices 
studied here. The series then begins to recover in 2003, but unlike all other indices except 
IPD Inner London, the FTSE index continues to rise through 2007. Like the other 
transaction-based indices it then recovers quickly in 2009. Given the results of the other 
securities-based index in Figure 38, the evidence for a lead-lag relationship with respect to 
the private real estate market, at least at the annual frequency, is mixed.  
                                                 
157
 See Table 49 and Table 50 below. 
158
 Always avoid alliteration. 
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IPD Transaction-Linked 
Figure 40: IPD Transaction-Linked Index 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
To date, the transaction-linked UK index has only been published for the years 2001-2010, 
and this is reflected in Figure 38. In addition, the TLI series covers the universe of IPD 
office properties in the UK, and therefore the comparison used in Figure 38 is the IPD UK 
All Property valuation series, rather than IPD Inner London offices. The TLI series is very 
similar to the pure valuation-based series except for the fact that it tracks marginally higher 
for much of the period. This upward adjustment is consistent with the findings of Blundell 
and Ward (2008), Matysiak and Wang (1995), and Cullen (1994) that pure valuations 
systemically underestimate market values. On the main, however, the two indices do not 
appear to possess substantial differences. 
 
The four tables below outline the descriptive statistics and contemporaneous cross-
correlations of the indices illustrated above. These tables separately cover the period 1998-
2010 and 2001-2010. The reason for this dual coverage is to be able compare the IPD 
Transaction-Linked series which only extends back to 2001 with the other indices, while at 
the same time also showing the entire time period available for the other indices’ data. For 
the 1998-2010 series, the IPD TLI index is replaced by the IPD UK All Property capital 
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return index, which is identical to the uncorrected IPD TLI index: also covering all property 
types (office, industrial, retail, residential, hotel, and healthcare) across the entire UK. The 
seven indices compared in these tables are organised into two column groups indicating 
those indices which cover only office property in inner London (Inner London Offices) and 
indices which cover additional asset types throughout all the UK (UK All Property). 
Table 49: Index Descriptive Statistics 1998-2010, all indices are unlevered 
 Inner London Offices UK All Property 
IPD Inner London Desmoothed IPD Hedonic Repeat-Sales DS REITs FTSE IPD UK ALL† 
Mean 3.15% 9.99% 6.43% 5.07% 4.76% 3.27% 2.06% 
Median 5.67% 13.36% 6.67% 3.65% 2.76% 9.01% 3.71% 
Standard Deviation 13.24% 36.64% 19.47% 16.61% 17.78% 15.95% 10.96% 
First-order Autocorrelation* 0.41 0.21 -0.24 -0.15 0.30 -0.04 0.41 
Kurtosis 1.31 1.22 0.72 0.78 -0.46 -0.62 3.54 
Minimum Annual Return -27.33% -68.69% -35.92% -31.03% -25.53% -26.61% -26.33% 
Maximum Annual Return 20.40% 76.01% 35.88% 28.31% 29.25% 21.97% 12.77% 
First Peak 2001 2000 2002 2001 2000 1999 - 
Fall 1st Peak to Trough -8.59% --27.50% -11.71% -0.01% -4.59% -34.12% - 
First Trough 2003 2003 2003 2002 2001 2002 - 
Rise 1nd Trough to Peak 49.04% 63.63% 64.98% 55.32% 127.15% 65.61% - 
Second Peak 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2006 
Fall 2nd Peak to Trough -34.11% -68.69% -39.20% -38.90% -44.50% -26.61% -34.48% 
Second Trough 2009 2008 2008 2008 2009 2008 2009 
*First order autocorrelation refers to the correlation of the rate of return in the present period with the rate of return in the prior period. Thus it is an indicator of the degree to which prior 
information (just the first lag in this case) explains the present state of affairs. 
†The IPD UK ALL property index increases monotonically from 1998-2007, and therefore unlike the other indices it cannot be said to possess either a first peak or trough in the early 
2000s. 
 
Table 50: Index Descriptive Statistics with TLI 2001-2010, all indices are unlevered 
 Inner London Offices UK All Property 
IPD Inner London Desmoothed IPD Hedonic Repeat-Sales DS REITs FTSE IPD TLI UK 
Mean 0.64% 9.70% 3.95% 4.47% 4.50% 4.26% 1.35% 
Median 0.75% 9.98% 1.96% 6.83% 1.29% 9.61% 6.14% 
Standard Deviation 14.26% 42.13% 21.27% 18.37% 20.13% 16.65% 13.02% 
First-order Autocorrelation 0.38 0.37 -0.21 -0.11 0.34 -0.25 0.36 
Kurtosis 0.77 0.51 0.45 0.57 -0.95 0.31 2.20 
Minimum Annual Return -27.34% -68.69% -35.92% -31.03% -25.53% -26.61% -27.25% 
Maximum Annual Return 20.40% 76.01% 35.88% 28.31% 29.25% 21.97% 14.23% 
First Peak 2001 2000 2002 2001 2000 1999 2002 
Fall 1st Peak to Trough -8.59% --27.50% -11.71% -0.01% -4.59% -34.12% -0.72% 
First Trough 2003 2003 2003 2002 2001 2002 2003 
Rise 1nd Trough to Peak 49.04% 63.63% 64.98% 55.32% 127.15% 65.61% 41.94% 
Second Peak 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2006 
Fall 2nd Peak to Trough -34.11% -68.69% -39.20% -38.90% -44.50% -26.61% -34.99% 
Second Trough 2009 2008 2008 2008 2009 2008 2009 
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Table 51: Contemporaneous Cross-Correlation of Returns IPD UK All 1998-2010 
 Inner London Office UK All Property 
IPD Inner London Desmoothed IPD Hedonic Repeat-Sales DS REITs FTSE IPD UK ALL 
IPD Inner London 1 0.54 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.47 0.86 
Desmoothed IPD 0.54 1 0.58 0.85 0.52 0.76 0.64 
Hedonic 0.64 0.58 1 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.75 
Repeat-Sales 0.64 0.85 0.63 1 0.71 0.61 0.70 
DS REITs 0.65 0.48 0.58 0.71 1 0.50 0.86 
FTSE 0.47 0.76 0.50 0.61 0.50 1 0.60 
IPD UK ALL 0.86 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.86 0.60 1 
Average Correlations  
Full Sample 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.64 0.57 0.74 
Inner London Office 0.61 0.66 0.62 0.71 0.62 0.59 0.74 
UK All Property 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.55 0.73 
Valuation-Based (+UK ALL) 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.73 0.68 0.61 0.75 
Transaction-Based (-UK ALL) 0.60 0.67 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.73 
Valuation-based (+UK ALL) consists of IPD Inner London, Desmoothed IPD, and IPD UK ALL. 
Transaction-based (-UK ALL) consists of Hedonic, Repeat-Sales, DS REITs, and FTSE. 
 
Table 52: Contemporaneous Cross Correlation of Returns TLI 2001-2010 
 Inner London Office UK All Property 
IPD Inner London Desmoothed IPD Hedonic Repeat-Sales DS REITs FTSE IPD TLI UK 
IPD Inner London 1 0.55 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.91 
Desmoothed IPD 0.55 1 0.66 0.87 0.45 0.83 0.52 
Hedonic 0.70 0.66 1 0.80 0.68 0.56 0.80 
Repeat-Sales 0.65 0.87 0.80 1 0.68 0.79 0.67 
DS REITs 0.65 0.46 0.68 0.68 1 0.55 0.78 
FTSE 0.61 0.83 0.56 0.79 0.55 1 0.49 
IPD TLI UK 0.91 0.52 0.80 0.67 0.78 0.49 1 
Average Correlations  
Full Sample 0.68 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.63 0.64 0.70 
Inner London Office 0.63 0.69 0.72 0.77 0.62 0.70 0.73 
UK All Property 0.72 0.60 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.52 0.64 
Valuation-Based (+TLI) 0.73 0.54 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.64 0.72 
Transaction-Based (-TLI) 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.64 0.63 0.69 
Valuation-based (+TLI) consists of IPD Inner London, Desmoothed IPD, and IPD TLI UK.  
Transaction-based (-TLI) consists of Hedonic, Repeat-Sales, DS REITs, and FTSE
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Discussion 
Referring to Table 49, all the indices’ first moments are uniformly low and positive, but 
consistent with prior empirics, the valuation-based real estate indices’ first moments are 
somewhat lower than the transaction-based indices’. The volatility of the valuation-based 
index as defined by its standard deviation appears to be roughly 50% higher for transaction-
based indices (securities included) compared to their valuation counterparts159. This greater 
volatility was expected160. First-order auto-correlation is also markedly different between 
the valuation and transaction-based indices. In the pure valuation-based indices the 
autocorrelation is decidedly positive, and with the exception of the DS REITs series, the 
autocorrelation in the transaction-based indices are slightly negative or zero. The positive 
autocorrelation in the valuation-based indices may be indicative of smoothing problems, 
whereas the negative autocorrelation in the transaction-based indices may suggest excessive 
‘noise’ in the data161. Consistent with expectations, the lead-lag relationships exhibited in 
Table 49 appear to follow a pattern where valuation-based indices either move 
contemporaneously or with a one-year lag relative to transaction-based indices. This is 
most clearly evident in the timing of the 2006-07 peak and the 2008-09 trough, although 
the securitized series contradict this trend slightly. Given that our indices only indicate 
prices annually, the universality of this lead-lag effect may be somewhat subdued relative 
to an index with more frequent price reporting. For instance in a similar analysis using 
annual data Gelter, Fisher, and Webb (1994) found that, contrary to expectations, 
valuations did not lag transaction-based indices. 
                                                 
159
 The standard deviation of the uncorrected levered FTSE All Shares Index between 1998-2010 is 19%. The 
standard assumption made by investment practitioners is that the levered stock market indices have roughly 
double the volatility of the corresponding “true volatility” valuation-based real estate series in the US (Fisher, 
Geltner, and Webb, 1994). For the case of the FTSE All Shares Index the comparable index is the IPD UK All 
Property index. As we can see from the standard deviation in of the IPD UK All Property index in Table 49 
(10.96%), this assumption may understate the true volatility of commercial UK property. 
160
 Note that the lower standard deviation present in the IPD TLI UK index compared to the IPD Inner 
London series in Table 50 is not necessarily anomalous since they comprise different geographical 
consituents. 
161
 Efficient markets imply autocorrelations with all past index values of zero. However, this may be too 
strong an assumption here, as various research such as Case and Shiller (1989); and Lee, Devaney, and Young 
(2003) have shown some persistence (positive autocorrelation) in real estate market returns. Therefore the 
observance of negative autocorrelation can be considered robust evidence for superfluous ‘noise’, whereas 
positive autocorrelation may simply reflect underlying tendencies of the market. 
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Comparing the various indices it is interesting to note that the mechanical desmoothing 
technique outlined in equation (46) exhibits lead-lag relationships in Table 49 that more 
closely resemble those of the transaction-based series, but the descriptive statistics, in 
particular the standard deviation, are clearly exaggerated. In this respect we may consider 
the desmoothed series to be somewhat of an improvement on naïve valuations, and may in 
fact be a reasonable proxy for transaction-based data so long as the magnitude of the 
desmoothing parameter is not excessive: as it appears to be in this case.  
 
As was already evident in Figure 35 and Figure 37, the hedonic index is more volatile than 
the repeat-sales series and exhibits a greater degree of negative autocorrelation. In response 
to this finding, Occam’s razor might suggest that these differences are likely due to 
inadequate model specification generating spurious ‘noise’ in the index. Whereas, since 
repeat-sales automatically control for all constant property characteristics, in the face of 
heterogeneous properties, model specification problems in repeat-sale indices are relatively 
immaterial. However, an alternative interpretation could also be that since the samples of 
properties used to construct these indices are not identical, the average rates of return of 
these different properties at each time-period may also be divergent. In order to test which 
of these two assumptions may be true, we rerun the hedonic and repeat-sales models 
throwing out all hedonic sales which are not also in the full repeat-sales sample and 
likewise the repeat-sales pairs which do not have at least one sale in the hedonic sample. 
The resulting sample of sold properties used for the hedonic and repeat-sales indices is 
similar but not strictly identical, as we also retain observations in the repeat-sales pair 
which have a either a first or a second sale in the full hedonic sample but whose other 
paired sale is not. This is done in order to preserve a reasonably large comparison sample 
size. The resulting sample consists of 173 hedonic and repeat-sales pairs between 2000-
2010: years prior to 2000 have no observations in this sample. The price indices derived 
from this sample are exhibited in Figure 41 below. 
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Figure 41: Repeat-sales and Hedonic indices same sample comparison 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values = 100. 
 
Immediately we notice that both price series tracks very closely indeed except for years 
prior to 2003. However, if we look at the distribution of observations in the hedonic model 
sample according to year in Table 53 we see that there are precious few observations per 
year prior to 2004. So if in fact the two series are, for all practical purposes, identical with 
their similar samples, it is not surprising that we see substantial deviation in these early 
years162. 
 
 Table 53: Hedonic observations by year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
1 0* 5 6 11 21 31 25 14 25 34 173 
*The 2001 time-dummy can still be estimated even though there are no observations in this year due 
to the fractional-time weighting of sales in 2002. 
 
With the new sample the repeat-sales series now exhibits a distinctive hump in the early 
2000s which it lacked previously, and which is characteristic of most of the other indices 
                                                 
162
 The nonparametric Wilcoxon’s Signed Ranks Test for equality of means (Conover 1980, p. 280) and Run 
Tests for consistent positive or negative divergence in a time series (Lindgren 1976, p. 498) also do not 
register significant differences between the hedonic and repeat-sales indices in Figure 41. But again, the short 
duration of the sample impinges upon the power of statistical tests to detect significant differences. 
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including the hedonic index. It is interesting that unlike the hedonic index, the repeat-sales 
series does not appear appreciably more volatile in the early 2000s even though the sample 
size during this period is minimal. As noted earlier, the result that repeat-sales indices are 
more robust than hedonic indices with respect to small sample sizes was also found by 
Crone and Voith (1992). The repeat-sales index also takes on the higher 2003-06 rise 
apparent in the hedonic index in Figure 35 and the hedonic index in Figure 41 now has the 
more precipitous 2006 peak of the repeat-sales index in Figure 37. Thus with a more similar 
sample it appears that the two indices are now collectively taking on their distinctive 
features in Figure 35 and Figure 37 which previously made them different.  
 
The repeat-sales index in Figure 41 is actually based off of almost twice (316) the number 
of total observations (including second and first sales) as the hedonic index alongside it, 
and yet the hedonic series performs almost identically to when it uses the same sample of 
properties. Although the test in Figure 41 is not perfect due to the fact that the hedonic and 
repeat-sales samples are not completely identical (they do contain the same sample of 
properties however), the available evidence suggests that the extra volatility observed in the 
full sample hedonic index in Figure 35 compared to the repeat-sales index in Figure 37 is a 
result of the different (and larger 529 vs 354) sample of observations, and not a flaw with 
the specification of our model, or difficulties to do with modelling commercial property 
markets with hedonic methods in general.  
 
The finding that the particular sample studied is significant in determining the outcomes of 
hedonic and repeat-sales indices was also identified by Shimizu, Nishimura, and Watanabe 
(2010), who noted that the differences observed between the their hedonic and repeat-sales 
indices were due to sample selection issues. As mentioned earlier, a major critique of the 
repeat-sales index is inefficient use of data. The result that repeat-sold properties are not 
representative of more numerous hedonic sales is also consistent with the conclusion of 
chapter 2, that repeat-sold properties differ from the market as whole in ways that interfere 
with the construction of accurate indices. As we have also seen in the present chapter, 
sample selection can compromise the representativeness of repeat-sales indices relative to 
hedonic indices, and therefore if a working hedonic model can be constructed it will likely 
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be superior to a repeat-sales index. Furthermore, because hedonic indices only observe 
prices when properties sell, future research may indicate that even hedonic indices may also 
be less representative of the market than valuation indices which at least observe proxies 
for prices every period. 
 
According to IPD the stated purpose of their Transaction-Linked valuation index correction 
is to better identify the true volatility present in the market. Table 50 compares the 2001-
2010 transaction-linked series to the other indices constructed in this paper. As we can see, 
in spite of the transactions-based correction, the standard deviation of the underlying 
valuation index only marginally increases from 12.68%163 to 13.02%. This level of risk is 
markedly below the other transaction-based and desmoothed indices which have standard 
deviations closer to 20%. Of course, this is not quite a one-for-one comparison because the 
TLI index covers all property-types across all the UK, whereas the other indices mentioned 
only cover offices in inner London. But since the difference between the standard 
deviations of the IPD UK All Property Index and the IPD Inner London in Table 49 is only 
about 2%, it may be the case that the TLI index does not increase valuation volatilities to 
levels commensurate with the actual market. However, in order address this question with 
greater rigour, further research into the validity of the TLI procedure is needed.  
 
From Table 51 we also see that the performance of real estate securities appears to be more 
similar to that of the other real estate indices than the stock market in general. The source of 
this difference would primarily appear to be the expansive Dot-com boom in the early 
2000s evidenced in Figure 39, which has no equal in any of the other indices. This result 
differs from most studies that compare real estate securities with private real estate indices 
and broad-based stock market indices, such as Liu, et al (1990), Webb and Myer (1993), 
and Giliberto (1990) who found that REITs are predominately integrated with the stock 
market compared to private commercial real estate. The low correlation of the FTSE All 
Shares Index relative to the property-based indices is indicative of divergent market 
                                                 
163
 12.68% is the standard deviation of the IPD UK All Property Index between 2001-2010 which is not 
reported in Table 49 or Table 50. 
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movements between the two asset types, and has been previously reflected in the distinct 
grouping of these two assets in factor analyses by Lee and Lizieri (1999). 
Conclusion 
This paper compares commercial property valuation, desmoothed valuation, hedonic, 
repeat-sale, transaction-linked, and real estate securities indices within the context of the 
London office market during the period 1998-2010. As these indices have been developed 
using different data and different methodologies, the common themes and patterns we 
observe can be considered a relatively robust indicator of the actual price movements 
experienced during this period. These price movements are of interest as they coincide with 
some of the most dramatic market booms and busts experienced in several decades. The 
evidence from a comparison of these indices in Table 49 suggests that the London office 
market increased through the late 1990s until 2000 or perhaps 2001, and then proceeded 
marginally downward by about 10% until 2003. From this point the market experienced a 
large sustained boom in prices of around 55% peaking in 2006. From here the market fell 
markedly in 2007 and then precipitously in 2008 by a total of approximately 40%. In the 
following two years the market then quickly recovered by a total of about 30% off its 2008 
nadir. The major differences between the sequence of events outlined by these various 
indices and the IPD inner London index are the earlier market corrections in both 2006 and 
2008, and the slightly more extreme fluctuations around these years. 
 
Given the dearth of transaction-based comparisons of commercial real estate and problems 
with the literature that exists164, this paper is able to expand and improve upon previous 
studies to produce results which are novel to the literature. In agreement with previous 
research, this paper finds that, in general, valuation indices suffer from problems of 
smoothing: lagging transaction-based indices with higher autocorrelations and 
approximately 33% lower standard deviations. In terms of original results, this paper finds 
that although the magnitude of the desmoothing, parameter chosen was in line with 
previous empirical estimates, overall it produced a mixed approximation of transaction-
                                                 
164Such as excessively parsimonious and aggregated hedonic models and comparisons of fractionally time 
weighted and non-fractionally time weighted indices. 
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based indices. Although the unsmoothed series more closely matched the timing of the 
transaction-based indices, many descriptive statistics, in particular variance, appeared to be 
well out-of-line. Although not currently used in industry, desmoothed indices whose 
parameters have been calibrated by transaction-based indices may prove popular in future.  
 
Turning to transaction-based indices, real estate has tended to shy away from hedonic 
indices in commercial real estate often on the grounds that hedonic specification is too 
difficult and unreliable. Moreover, many industry professionals have a vested interest in 
valuations and most operators would neither understand nor be able to construct a hedonic 
model. This study has demonstrated that hedonic models of commercial real estate markets 
can not only be adequately specified, but if done so, hedonics performs no worse than 
repeat-sales indices, and if anything is superior due to the sample sensitivity underlying 
both methods and the greater inclusivity of sales observations made possible by the hedonic 
methodology. On that note, transaction-based indices are indeed found to be extremely 
sensitive to the sample of properties used, even when using sample sizes which would 
normally be considered ample. In order to improve the representativeness of transaction-
based indices of London offices in future, assuming adequate data, future research may 
consider a Heckman’s correction for unobserved sample selection bias on both hedonic and 
repeat-sales indices. However this method must be used with caution as previous research 
has tended to find these corrections to be unstable. 
 
Since London may be unique among other markets in that high quality disaggregated data 
is available on relevant hedonic variables, it is an open question as to whether this method 
can be extended to other localities that may necessitate a different mix of variables or 
where such variables are unavailable or not measured with sufficient accuracy. However, 
this paper has introduced a technique for testing the acceptability of hedonic models of real 
estate prices by simultaneously producing a repeat-sales index with as similar a sample of 
properties to the hedonic index as is possible. The two indices are then compared to see 
whether the two time-series they produce are identical. In future this method could be used 
to test the validity of proposed hedonic models in other cities or as a robustness check for 
whether the hedonic models employed in other research are indeed valid.   
271 
 
 
Additional results from the other indices include noting that the 3SLS procedure, 
conventionally used to correct for heteroskedasticity in repeat-sales regressions of housing 
produces a time-series for commercial offices which is indistinguishable from uncorrected 
OLS. Therefore it may be the case that repeat-sale regressions of commercial offices do not 
exhibit the same problems of heteroskedasticity that are generally encountered in housing. 
In addition, this paper introduces an original fractional-time weighting procedure for 
repeat-sales that allows for simpler calculation of transformation-bias while maintaining a 
minimum of temporal aggregation bias. Other notable findings include the fact that, 
contrary to previous research, real estate securities in the UK follow the movements of 
London office property more closely than the stock market as a whole, and that the annual 
transaction-linked index is extremely similar to its underlying uncorrected valuation index. 
 
Given the material variation in the price indices produced above and their relative strengths 
and weaknesses, it is clear that researchers and investors should not rely on any single 
index methodology to provide them with the correct picture of market movements. Rather, 
by comparing and contrasting several indices in concert while recognising the specific 
strengths and weaknesses of each, the most accurate impression of historical price 
movements can be obtained. Although it is doubtless preferable to arrive at these 
conclusions with statistical rigour, in the world of commercial real estate were data is 
scarce, for the time being informal tests remain an important check upon the validity of 
return series.   
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Appendix A: IPD UK ALL Annual 
Figure 42: IPD UK All 
 
Base year is 2003 with index values =100. 
 
As a comparison for the TLI index, the IPD UK All series contains valuation data on all the 
UK geographies and property types covered by IPD. These sectors comprise office, 
industrial, retail, residential, hotel, and healthcare properties.
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Appendix B: FTW level-based index time-weights 
Table 54: Hedonic regression fractional time-weightings 
 Month of Sale 
Sale Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 (Previous year weight) 
(Current year weight 
 
(11.5/12) 
(0.5/12) 
 
(10.5/12) 
(1.5/12) 
 
(9.5/12) 
(2.5/12) 
 
(8.5/12) 
(3.5/12) 
 
(7.5/12) 
(4.5/12) 
 
(6.5/12) 
(5.5/12) 
 
(5.5/12) 
(6.5/12) 
 
(4.5/12) 
(7.5/12) 
 
(3.5/12) 
(8.5/12) 
 
(2.5/12) 
(9.5/12) 
 
(1.5/12) 
(10.5/12) 
 
(0.5/12) 
(11.5/12) 
 
Table 55: Repeat-sales regression fractional time-weightings 
 Month of Sale 
Sale Order Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
First Sale 
(Previous year weight) 
(Current year weight 
 
-(11.5/12) 
-(0.5/12) 
 
-(10.5/12) 
-(1.5/12) 
 
-(9.5/12) 
-(2.5/12) 
 
-(8.5/12) 
-(3.5/12) 
 
-(7.5/12) 
-(4.5/12) 
 
-(6.5/12) 
-(5.5/12) 
 
-(5.5/12) 
-(6.5/12) 
 
-(4.5/12) 
-(7.5/12) 
 
-(3.5/12) 
-(8.5/12) 
 
-(2.5/12) 
-(9.5/12) 
 
-(1.5/12) 
-(10.5/12) 
 
-(0.5/12) 
-(11.5/12) 
Second Sale 
(Previous year weight) 
(Current year weight 
 
(11.5/12) 
(0.5/12) 
 
(10.5/12) 
(1.5/12) 
 
(9.5/12) 
(2.5/12) 
 
(8.5/12) 
(3.5/12) 
 
(7.5/12) 
(4.5/12) 
 
(6.5/12) 
(5.5/12) 
 
(5.5/12) 
(6.5/12) 
 
(4.5/12) 
(7.5/12) 
 
(3.5/12) 
(8.5/12) 
 
(2.5/12) 
(9.5/12) 
 
(1.5/12) 
(10.5/12) 
 
(0.5/12) 
(11.5/12) 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis has developed three chapters which extend our understanding of asset 
performance within the London office market. These analyses collectively investigated the 
determinants of capital returns and issues which affect their accurate measurement. It was 
found that rent seeking through eminent building design, changes in local employment 
density, and the planning restrictiveness of local authority areas are important drivers for 
realised capital returns in the London office market, and that these effects can have 
important ramifications for price index construction. It was also shown that commercial 
real estate price indices in London are sensitive to the particular method used for their 
assembly, with marked differences not only between valuation and transaction-based 
indices, but also within them.  
 
The first chapter began by examining whether star architects are able to convince city 
planners to allow bigger projects within the tightly regulated London property market, and 
therefore to earn economic rents relative to developments which are not so favoured. 
Although any decision criterion used to define ‘star’ architects is naturally subjective, peer 
recognition is perhaps the least contentious. Therefore, it was decided that architects which 
had won awards from at least one of the three most prestigious architectural bodies were to 
be considered famous for the purposes of this paper. Outside of conservation areas it was 
found that planners allow famous architects to build on average 20 stories taller than their 
less celebrated peers. Using cost data from Gardiner & Theobald it was estimated that these 
additional floors allowed developers to increase total revenues and profits on a given land 
plot by roughly 100%. This figure is inherently somewhat inflated however because these 
returns do not account for the additional expense and uncertainty associated with 
attempting to flex the planning system. Although Kruger (1974) famously demonstrated 
that competitive rent-seeking in a regulated economy exacts dead-weights losses over and 
above those caused purely by the regulations themselves, in the case of architecture this 
competitive process may yet yield some ancillary benefits in the form of improved public 
aesthetics. If this is the case, then London’s flexibly enforced development restrictions may 
be responsible for much of its critically acclaimed modern architecture. 
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In contrast to previous research, this paper also found that modern famous architects exert 
no net effect upon the sale price of their space. Apparently, it is only the fact that famous 
architects are allowed to build tall which makes their services at all valuable to developers 
in London. This finding can be explained by considering the extra maintenance costs which 
may be involved in the upkeep of such buildings, and the fact that planning authorities may 
eye these properties with designs for historic designation in future, thus reducing the 
present value of future redevelopment options. Moreover, it was found that buildings built 
by pre-modern famous architects (built previous to 1925 in our sample) sold for a marked 
discount. If famous architects cannot in fact increase the per area-unit sale price of office 
buildings in the current regulatory environment, then this implies that the divide between 
the sale price of buildings with good architecture and the total subjective benefits such 
buildings provide to the public may be large. This value gap may lead to a situation where 
good architecture is underprovided by way of private incentives. If this is the case, then in 
order to generate efficient levels of good architecture threats of historic designation for new 
buildings would either have to be lessened or public subsidies to good design would have to 
be provided. The current concession to developers who hire famous architects to build tall 
appears to be one such subsidy which can overcome this price-gap and deliver more 
efficient quantities of good architecture to the city. 
 
Given the degree to which land markets in London are regulated it is not surprising that 
there are economic rents to be earned from obtaining special exemptions to them. What is 
of greater concern however is the magnitude of these rents, as this is indicative of the 
degree to which these planning regulations cause market distortions. Although not the 
primary aim of this paper, the data corroborates the controversial conclusion of Cheshire 
and Hilber (2008) that the regulatory restrictiveness of the London office market may exert 
significant economic costs, though the estimated magnitudes of these effects were not 
found to be as large as in their paper165. Nevertheless the size of the regulatory distortions 
estimated here are still substantial and cause for concern. Of course, as in previous studies 
                                                 
165
 This discrepancy is likely due to methodological conflicts between the two papers rather than material 
differences in measured regulatory tax levels. 
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these gross costs are presented without a comparison of the estimated benefits potentially 
also delivered by these regulations.  
 
Regulatory restrictions on building development which arbitrarily limit employment 
density may also have important consequences for the productivity of the economy as a 
whole. Employment density has long been regarded as fundamental for increasing 
opportunities to conceive and exchange the ideas which drive economic growth. Therefore 
regulations which affect the land market may have direct consequences for other areas of 
the economy and economic welfare generally. For this reason it is imperative that 
researchers extend this investigation in future to ascertain the full complement of costs and 
benefits of the current land-use planning system, and use this information to inform the 
public and politicians of the economically efficient course of action. Until such time as 
these questions are answered, our current knowledge of the substantial costs of the planning 
system would logically preclude any further entrenchment or expansion of existing 
regulations. 
 
Like Cheshire and Hilber (2008), the first chapter also found that the estimated regulatory 
taxes varied considerably across London submarkets due to differences in the price of 
office space. As was shown in the second paper, this intra-city price variation seems to be 
at least partially due to differences in the restrictiveness of development control across local 
administrative boundaries, which roughly correspond to the recognised extent of London 
submarkets. Furthermore, this very same submarket price variability has significant 
implications for the accuracy of repeat-sales price indices in practice, because the sale-
multiples required for these indices are unrepresentative of the market as a whole. While 
the primary advantage of repeat-sales indices is that their construction requires no more 
information than; sale prices, sale dates, and sale locations, the assumptions that allow this 
procedure to produce a viable price index may be violated in practice with important 
repercussions. In particular, it was found that repeat-sales of office properties in London are 
over-weighted by their specific temporal and locational attributes relative to the office stock 
as a whole. The factors contributing to this bias were found to be employment density 
changes and the restrictiveness of office supply in the corresponding local authority area. 
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These biases arise because of the effect of employment density and supply restrictions on 
prices and the fact that repeat-sales occur disproportionately in areas where these attributes 
differ compared to the office stock as a whole. The correlation between planning 
restrictiveness by submarket and the realized returns of office properties within that 
submarket, if causal, has important implications. As argued by Cheshire (2005), to a large 
extent the current level of office prices in the United Kingdom is a product of the system of 
planning controls currently in force which effectively restrict supply.  
 
Although other factors not examined here may be simultaneously causing bias in the 
repeat-sales index, when employment density changes and planning restrictiveness are 
controlled for, a Heckman’s correction for unobserved sample heterogeneity loses its ability 
to explain index levels. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that employment 
density changes and development restrictiveness are the key external drivers of sample 
heterogeneity and bias. A further methodological contribution to this paper is that it may be 
enough to run a standard Heckman’s correction when unrepresentative sample selection is 
only occurring in the second-sale. Although selection bias in employment density changes 
and planning restrictiveness were found to be statistically significant, the resulting price 
indices derived from them were not statistically different from the naïve repeat-sales index. 
Given their limited statistical power, even though these indices were not found to be 
statistically different, the absolute differences between them may still be practically 
important. Where these indices are used as performance benchmarks or in order to assess 
the cross-correlation of returns with respect to other assets for diversification purposes, 
accurate indices are essential to informed decision-making. If in future market actors 
attempt to produce a commercially viable repeat-sales index for the London office market, 
these findings may prove useful in informing market participants of its inherent limitations 
and in identifying fruitful directions that it may be improved. 
 
The third paper expands upon the analysis of repeat-sales in the second by comparing seven 
different price index methodologies within the context of the London office market during 
the period 1998-2010. Given the dearth of transaction-based comparisons of commercial 
real estate and problems with the examples that do exist, this paper is able to expand and 
285 
 
improve upon these previous investigations. In accord with previous research this paper 
finds that, in general, valuation indices suffer from problems of smoothing: lagging 
transaction-based indices with higher autocorrelations and lower standard deviations. This 
paper also finds that the desmoothing technique of Geltner (1993b) produces lead-lag 
relationships that are a surprisingly close analogue to transaction-based series but which 
appear to exaggerate actual price movements. 
 
Real estate markets have been reluctant to adopt hedonic indices in commercial property 
often on the grounds that hedonic specification is too difficult and unreliable. However, this 
study has demonstrated that hedonic models of commercial real estate markets can not only 
be adequately specified, but if done so hedonics performs no worse than repeat-sales 
indices, and if anything is superior due to the sample sensitivity underlying both methods 
and the greater inclusivity of sales observations allowed by the hedonic methodology. On 
that note, both hedonic and repeat-sales indices are indeed found to be extremely sensitive 
to the sample of properties used, even when using sample sizes which would normally be 
considered sufficient. Although other markets may be more difficult to model with 
hedonics, this paper has introduced a technique for testing the acceptability of hedonic 
models of real estate prices by simultaneously comparing them with a repeat-sales index 
produced with a similar sample of properties. If the two indices so constructed are not 
essentially identical, one can justifiably infer that the hedonic model suffers from 
misspecification, and that any differences between the full sample results of these indices is 
due to sample selection bias.  
 
Additional results from this paper include noting that the 3SLS procedure, conventionally 
used to correct for heteroskedasticity in repeat-sales regressions of housing produces a 
time-series for commercial offices which is indistinguishable from uncorrected OLS. 
Therefore it may be the case that repeat-sales indices of commercial offices do not exhibit 
the same degree of heteroskedasticity that is generally encountered in housing. In addition, 
this paper introduces an original fractional-time weighting procedure for repeat-sales that 
allows for simpler calculation of transformation-bias while maintaining a minimum of 
temporal aggregation bias. Other notable findings include the fact that, contrary to previous 
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research, real estate securities in the UK follow the movements of London office property 
more closely than the stock market as a whole, and that the annual transaction-linked index 
is extremely similar to its underlying uncorrected valuation index. Given the material 
variation in the price-paths of the indices identified in this chapter, it is clear that 
researchers and investors should not rely on any single index methodology to provide them 
with a complete picture of market movements. Rather by comparing and contrasting several 
indices in concert the most accurate impression of historical market movements can be 
obtained. 
 
The London office market is a fertile environment for studying empirical and practical 
issues of urban economics. Not only is it one of the world’s most important property 
markets, but its rich history and array of market interventions suffuse research initiatives 
with intrigue and import. Until recently data limitations in this relatively private and closed 
market had precluded many such analyses. However thanks to a unique dataset assembled 
from several leading property firms and primary sources, this thesis was able to 
successfully address issues centred around asset performance within the London office 
market across three papers. Although by no means comprehensive, this foray into the 
London office market has at least shown potential for fruitful new discovery and it is hoped 
that subsequent research can benefit from and expand upon these preliminary findings. 
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